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Abstract
This thesis makes three important theoretical contributions to the existing litera­
ture. First, the thesis explores the hold-up problem between two parties (an en­
trepreneur and an investor) when one of the parties (the entrepreneur) is unable to 
commit not to repudiate the initial contract. As in Neher (1999), we allow the par­
ties to stage investments over time to help mitigate the hold-up problem. However, 
unlike Neher, we derive the optimal investment path for a variable rate of return. 
We show that when the rate of return is not constant the optimal investment path is 
significantly different. For example, our model predicts that neither positive wealth 
of the entrepreneur nor the lack of discounting ensures that all profitable projects 
proceed. The model is extended in several ways: first, both agents are allowed 
to repudiate the initial contract; and, second, new costs of staged financing are 
introduced.
Second, the thesis explores the hold-up problem when trading parties can choose 
to make specific investments simultaneously or sequentially. An advantage of stag­
ing investments is contracting on any subsequent investment becomes possible after 
the project is underway and better defined. It is shown that there can be efficiency 
improvements with the sequential regime, as compared with simultaneous invest­
ment, if the parties are sufficiently patient. Further, as previously emphasized in the 
literature, sequencing of investments can allow some projects to proceed that would 
not be feasible with a simultaneous regime. This however, is not always the case. 
A cost of sequencing investment is that it can disadvantage some parties, reducing 
their incentive to invest. In fact, the mere possibility of sequential investment can
be detrimental to overall welfare. In the extreme it can prevent mutually beneficial 
trade from occurring. This is a new result: it allows the choice about the timing of 
investment to be interpreted as a new (potential) form of hold-up. Additionally, in a 
continuous set-up when the two investments are independent, three effects are iden­
tified when comparing the two regimes: sequential investment increases the costs of 
delay; sequential investment reduces the incentive for the first player to invest; and 
the sequential regime increases the second player’s incentive to invest.
Third, the thesis also examines a dynamic investment game where industry sunk 
costs provide an incentive for a firm to be a follower into the market as opposed 
to a leader. Interesting dynamics can arise: as the potential investment horizon is 
extended the game can switch from a prisoners’ dilemma to a coordination game 
and back again. The model also exhibits an investment cascade: once one firm 
has entered the market all other firms enter immediately after. This result arises 
without the presence of asymmetric information.
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
Investment is an essential economic activity. It creates economic growth and gen­
erates surplus. However, investment is often undertaken when complete contracts 
between invested parties are not possible. As a result agents are unable to commit 
to their future behavior. Such incompleteness can affect the returns to the investor 
and, consequently, the incentives to invest. Thus, the main goal of this thesis is to 
explore the incentive to invest when contracts are incomplete.
In Chapter 2 we present a selective review of the literature that investigates how 
a firm chooses the debt-to-equity ratio when it needs to finance investment projects. 
This provides an insight into the optimal amount of debt that a firm will choose 
when undertaking any investment. We divide the material of this chapter into five 
sections. First, we discuss models in which capital structure is determined by agency 
costs. Then, we consider how the presence of incomplete information influences the 
optimal debt level. Further, we describe models in which corporate structure acts 
as a strategic tool. In these models firms use debt to either gain advantage over 
rivals or to commit to future behavior. Additionally, we outline models that focus 
on corporate control considerations. In the final section, we review the literature 
that provides insight into the optimal structure of debt using incomplete contract 
theory approach.
Chapter 3 presents a new contribution to this literature. We explore the hold­
up problem between two parties (an entrepreneur and an investor) when one of the 
parties (the entrepreneur) is unable to commit not to repudiate the initial contract. 
As in Neher (1999), we allow the parties to stage investments over time to help miti-
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gate the hold-up problem. However, unlike Neher, we derive the optimal investment 
path for a variable rate of return case. A non-constant rate of return allows for an 
examination of a wider scope of projects including, for example, projects with fixed 
costs or increasing and decreasing rates of return. It will be shown that relaxing 
the assumption of constant returns significantly alters the optimal investment path 
- this is the main result of the chapter. Although the algorithm of the optimal in­
vestment path derivation is quite similar to the algorithm presented in Neher(1999), 
some of the results presented here are considerably different. For instance, Neher 
(1999) predicts that positive wealth of the entrepreneur and a lack of discounting 
(equivalent to a very short time duration of one period) ensures that all profitable 
projects go forward. On the contrary, the model presented here shows that this is 
not the case. Specifically, with a variable rate of return, not all profitable projects 
are financed, even if the parties can stage their investments.
In this chapter we also explore the issue of repudiation in more detail. We 
construct a model in which both agents are able to repudiate, and find that allowing 
the investor to repudiate mitigates the commitment problem to such an extent that 
all profitable two-period projects are financed. There is still some inefficiency in this 
set-up with respect to financing in one period, but this inefficiency is much smaller 
than in the case when only the entrepreneur has the right to repudiate.
Whereas previous literature has considered the costs of staging simply as the 
delays of project completion, we introduce additional staging costs such as costs of 
additional shareholder meetings. We assume, for example, that half of the capital 
is invested straight away, and the remaining half of the capital is invested in half a 
period’s time. The project finishes in one period, and the sole costs of staging are 
due to ‘chopping’ this period in two parts. Surprisingly, we find that the optimal 
investment path for this model exactly coincides with the optimal investment path 
for the main model with no discounting. We find that with respect to a model 
without any costs of staging, adding additional costs of ‘chopping’ the period, only 
diminishes the likelihood that the project will be financed. It does not though 
change the optimal investment path.
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The model also generalizes several of Neher’s results for projects with a variable 
rate of return. For example, an increase in the profitability of a project both in­
creases the probability that the project will be financed and weakly decreases the 
number of stages needed. We derive similar results with respect to a decrease in 
the discount rate, an increase in tangibility of the physical assets of the project, 
and an increase in growth of physical assets in outside value. Further, we relax the 
assumption that the entrepreneur has no wealth and find that it is optimal for him 
to invest all his wealth at the beginning of the project, before relying on outside 
financing in subsequent rounds.
Chapter 4 explores the hold-up problem between two trading parties investing in 
a profitable relationship when they can choose to make specific investments either 
simultaneously or sequentially. An advantage to staging such investments is that 
contracting on any subsequent investment becomes possible after the project is 
under way. We show that if the parties are sufficiently patient, sequential investment 
can lead to efficiency improvements, as compared with simultaneous investment. 
Further, sequencing of investments can allow some projects to proceed that would 
not be feasible with a simultaneous regime.* This however is not always the case. A 
cost of sequencing investment is that it can disadvantage the party that makes the 
initial investment, reducing their incentive to invest. In fact, the mere possibility of 
sequential investment can be detrimental to overall welfare. In the extreme it can 
prevent mutually beneficial trade from occurring. This is a new result: it allows the 
choice about the timing of investment to be interpreted as a new (potential) form 
of hold-up.
The decision over the timing of investment can be seen as a choice over the 
completeness of contracts: if parties opt for simultaneous investment they are opting 
for a more incomplete contract than necessary. As a result, the choice concerning 
the completeness of contract is endogenous. The advantage of a (more) complete 
contract with sequential investment is that hold-up of the follower is avoided. The 
cost of a complete contract is that it diminishes the first party’s incentive to invest.
*See, for example, Neher (1999) and Admati and Perry (1991).
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A party will opt for simultaneous investment - that is, they will opt for an incomplete 
contract - when their gain from the increase in total surplus outweighs the additional 
bargaining power they receive from avoiding hold-up.
Finally, interesting dynamics can arise out of this investment game when both 
parties want to be a follower rather than the leader. If there are just two potential 
investment periods (and the opportunity to invest disappears after the second pe­
riod) the parties find themselves in a prisoners’ dilemma. If the potential investment 
horizon is continually extended to three periods, four periods and so on, eventu­
ally the benefit from not investing (waiting) will diminish sufficiently so that the 
players will find themselves in a coordination game. (The players will mix between 
investing immediately and waiting.) If the horizon is extended further from this 
point, it is possible that the players will again return to a prisoners’ dilemma game. 
This arises because the payoff in the coordination game (say in period K)  alters the 
expected return from waiting in the game with the longer horizon (say a game of 
K  +1 periods). It is possible that the optimal strategies switch between a prisoners’ 
dilemma game and a coordination game as the potential horizon is extended. As 
far as I am aware, there are no games in the existing literature that exhibit this sort 
of dynamic switching.
In Chapter 5 we generalize the model presented in Chapter 4 for continuous 
values of investments. In this set-up, both the timing and size of investment are 
endogenous. It is shown in the model that if the two investments are independent, 
three effects are identified when comparing the total welfare of the two regimes: se­
quential investment increases the costs of delay; sequential investment reduces the 
incentive for the first player to invest: and the sequential regime increases the second 
player’s incentive to invest. The ultimate impact on total surplus is a combination 
of these effects. We analyze the circumstances under which each regime is welfare 
maximizing. Moreover, despite the simplicity of the model, no simple relationship 
between the welfare effects of the two regimes exists, as there are no restrictions 
on how the three effects identified above interact. However, given that the simul­
taneous regime encourages the first player to invest, if this player’s contribution
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is relatively more important than the other player’s contribution the simultaneous 
regime is preferred. In the same way, the sequential regime is preferred when the 
second investor’s contribution is relatively more important, provided both players 
are sufficiently patient. Similarly, if a party is not responsive to the incentives pro­
vided by one timing regime, the regime that maximizes the other party’s incentive 
to invest is preferred. For example, when the first investor is not responsive to 
the additional incentive provided by the simultaneous regime, the sequential regime 
generates a higher level of surplus. On the other hand, if the second player is not 
responsive to the additional incentives to invest provided by the sequential regime, 
the simultaneous regime is preferred. These predictions are similar in nature to the 
property-rights predictions of Hart (1995), although the model is somewhat more 
general in that a player may voluntarily forgo the advantages of sequencing of in­
vestment (their property right) in order to encourage the other party to invest more. 
In this way, the parties can opt for a (more) incomplete contract by choosing to in­
vest simultaneously. The model is also extended in several other ways, for example, 
by analyzing these trade-offs when the two investments are strategic complements 
and substitutes.
Chapter 6 considers the choice between being a leader or a follower in an in­
vestment game. We assume that there is a number of potential investors in a new 
profitable market opportunity. Before any firm can exploit this opportunity, a cer­
tain amount of resources needs to be expended on either advertising - to inform the 
public of the new product - or on non-patented research. This cost is borne by firms 
that initially enter the market, but this expenditure is a public good for all potential 
entrants in that, once the investment has been sunk, all firms can benefit of this 
investment if they choose to enter the market. The question then arises for each 
firm as to when they should enter the market. Early entry allows them to benefit 
with fewer competitors, but may mean they incur some of the industry set-up costs, 
whilst delayed entry may allow a firm to avoid the set-up costs, but they forgo some 
benefits by not participating in the market.
Several interesting results arise out of the model. First, the switching result of
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Chapter 4 is generalized to n players. Namely, it is possible that with two potential 
investment periods the parties find themselves in a prisoners’ dilemma; with three 
potential investment periods they mix between investing immediately and waiting; 
and with four potential investment periods the players again return to a prisoners’ 
dilemma. Second, the model can display an entry cascade, quite often observed in 
empirical studies of technology diffusion. Once one player has entered the market, 
all other potential suppliers enter as soon as possible. Note that this result is 
generated when all parties have perfect information.
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CHAPTER 2
The theory of capital structure: a 
literature review
2.1 Introduction
The theory of capital structure started with the celebrated paper on the cost of 
capital, Modigliani and Miller (1958), in which the authors demonstrated that, in 
the absence of taxes and frictions and with complete markets, the value of the firm 
is independent of the financial structure. Since then, a huge volume of research has 
been conducted in this area. This chapter provides a selective review of the capital 
structure theory. Our goal here is to describe the factors that determine how a firm 
chooses the debt/equity ratio when it needs to finance investment projects.1
To address this issue we divide the material of this chapter into five sections. 
First, we discuss models in which capital structure is determined by agency costs. 
A conflict arises in these models because different agents might have different in­
centives. Specifically, shareholders maximize the value of the firm, while managers 
maximize they own utility. Managers have full control of the firm and shareholders 
can only make initial capital structure decisions. Consequently, shareholders choose 
the value of debt to maximize ex ante firm value given expected manager’s behavior.
In the second section, models with incomplete information are considered. In 
these models managers possess information about a firm that is not directly available 
to outsiders (current and potential shareholders). Capital structure decisions can
^Debt yields a fixed return to the investor, while equity provides the investor a claim on the 
returns of the project.
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be used by managers to signal the firm’s profitability to the capital market.
Third, we examine market equilibrium strategic models. In these models corpo­
rate structure acts as a strategic tool. Firms use it to either gain an advantage over 
rivals or to commit to future behavior, for example with customers or suppliers.
Finally, we outline models that focus on corporate control considerations. In 
these models corporate structure is used to influence which group of investors, be 
it the current owners or another company, gets control of the firm.
As an extension to this literature we also consider the issue of the optimal 
structure of debt contract. Models examining this issue typically have two agents 
with different objectives, as in the models in section 2.2. The first agent (an investor) 
provides funds for the second agent (an entrepreneur) to undertake a project. The 
parties know that renegotiation of the initial debt contract can occur because, either 
contracts are incomplete or not binding. Namely, by threatening to remove his 
essential human capital the entrepreneur can alter the distribution of surplus in 
the project. In this situation, debt contracts need to be renegotiation-proof. This 
literature provides insight into the optimal structure of debt.
Some of the arguments discussed in this chapter are based on other surveys of 
the theory of capital structure, particularly Harris and Raviv (1991), Hart (1995) 
and Shleifer and Vishny (1997).
2.2 Agency Cost
Probably the best paper to describe the research in this area is Jensen and 
Meckling (1976), who identify two types of conflicts within a firm. First, there is 
a conflict between the firm’s owners and managers.! This conflict emerges because 
while managers incur effort costs, they do not receive all the benefits from their 
profit enhancement activities.! This creates incentives for the managers to put
!This is well known conflict between ownership and control.
!As in the most of the literature, the owners of the firm (equity holders) are assumed to be 
interested in its total value. Managers, who have the full control of the firm, are assumed to 
maximize they own utility (benefits minus costs).
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a suboptimal amount of effort into managing firm resources and to transfer the 
firm resources to their own personal benefits, for example managers may consume 
‘perquisites’ or build ‘empires’. An increase in the value of debt, ceteris paribus, 
mitigates the conflict of interest between shareholders and managers outlined above: 
an increase in debt increases the share of managers in the firm profits and motivates 
them to work harder. Consequently, debt financing has a positive effect on firm value 
because it softens the conflict between shareholders and managers.
Second, there is a conflict between debt holders and equity holders. This conflict 
arises because debt contracts give equity holders an incentive to invest in risky 
projects. On the one hand, if these investments succeed all of the marginal benefits 
(after paying the debt holders their fixed return) will be captured by equity holders. 
On the other hand, if these investments do not succeed some of the costs will be 
borne by debt holders because equity holders have limited liabilities. Debt holders 
anticipate this and impose additional costs on equity holders by increasing costs of 
debt. This effect is called the ‘asset substitution effect’. A decrease in the value 
of debt mitigates the conflict between debt holders and equity holders outlined 
above. It decreases the value that can be extracted from debt holders in the case of 
bankruptcy, makes it unprofitable for shareholders to finance very risky projects and 
consequently, leads to a reduction in the additional costs of debt for equity holders. 
Thus, debt financing has a negative effect on firm value because it strengthens the 
conflict between debt holders and equity holders.
Now consider both conflicts simultaneously. In this case, debt financing affects 
firm value both positively, by weakening the conflict between shareholders and man­
agers, and negatively, by strengthening the conflict between debt holders and equity 
holders. The tradeoff between these costs and benefits implies that there is a level 
of debt that maximizes firm value. This value of debt determines an optimal capital 
structure in Jensen and Meckling (1976).
Other papers based on agency costs approach use at least one of the conflicts 
described by Jensen and Meckling as a starting point. We divide these papers into 
two subsections. In the first subsection we review papers that explore the conflicts
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between equity holders and managers; in the second subsection we investigate the 
asset substitution effect that arises from conflicts between debt holders and equity 
holders.
2.2.1 Equity holders vs Managers
Papers presented below investigate different costs and benefits of debt when 
there is a conflict between equity holders and managers.
In Stulz (1990) managers are empire-builders and always want to invest all the 
free cash flows they receive. They seek to make the firm as large as possible so long 
as the larger firm makes it easier to transfer the firm resources to manager’s personal 
benefits. Consequently, when cash flow is high, they invest even in negative present 
value projects instead of paying out cash. In contrast, when the cash flow is low, 
managers do not have enough cash even for positive present value projects. They 
also cannot credibly convince shareholders to give them additional cash because it is 
always advantageous for them to pretend that some positive present value projects 
are unfinanced. By imposing debt on the firm, investors decrease the degree of over­
investment in the states where investment would otherwise be too high - this is the 
benefit of debt. However, the use of debt can stop some of profitable investments 
in the other states of the world - this is the cost of debt. The tradeoff between the 
costs and the benefits of debt determines some optimal value of debt that maximizes 
the value of the firm in this model.
In Harris and Raviv (1990) managers always want to continue the firm’s opera­
tions although sometimes liquidation is preferred by the investors. By imposing debt 
on the firm, investors create an opportunity to decide whether to liquidate the firm 
or continue the current operation. If the firm is not able to pay the debt, investors 
conduct a costly investigation to determine whether the firm should be liquidated.t 
This investigation not only decides the future of the firm, but also gathers useful 
information about the firm’s ability to make future payments. Thus, the optimal
*With no debt investors can only liquidate randomly, while with positive debt they liquidate 
when firm defaults and information about the firm is bad.
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amount of debt is determined by trading off the information and opportunity to 
liquidate, against the possibility to incur investigation costs.
In Jensen (1986) and Hart and Moore (1995), debt payments reduce free cash 
flows. While Jensen stresses the role of short-term debt in forcing managers to 
disgorge free cash flows1”, Hart and Moore examine the role of long-term debt in 
constraining self-interested managers from raising new capital.”1 The tradeoff in 
Hart and Moore (1995) is as follows. If the company has a small long-term debt, 
in some states managers will be able to finance some negative-net-present-value 
projects and there will be over-investment. On the other hand, if the company has 
a large long-term debt, in some other states managers will be unable to finance some 
positive-net-present-value projects and there will be under-investment. As usual, 
the optimal value of debt trades off the costs of debt against the benefits of debt.
To summarize, in this subsection we considered models that explore the conflict 
between equity holders and managers. This conflict arises because there is a sepa­
ration between ownership and control. The following result describes benefits and 
disadvantages of issuing debt.
Result 2.1 The benefits of issuing debt are
• increased managerial ownership (Jensen and Meckling 1976);
• negative present value projects are not financed (Stulz 1990);
• reduced free cash flow (Jensen 1986 and Hart and Moore 1995); and
• unprofitable firms are liquidated (Harris and Raviv 1990).
The disadvantages of issuing debt are
• asset substitution (Jensen and Meckling 1976);
Mensen (1986) does not specify a tradeoff, he emphasizes the benefits of debt and has little to 
say about the costs. There is no formal analysis in his paper.
^Once again, in Hart and Moore’s model there are some projects that the managers seek to 
undertake even though they are not profitable. For such projects, the owners would prefer the 
cash to be returned to them, while the managers prefer to invest.
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• investigation costs in the states of default (Harris and Raviv 1990); and
• positive present value projects are unfinanced (Stulz 1990 and Hart and Moore 
1995).
2.2.2 Asset Substitution Effect
A paper presented below investigates different costs and benefits of debt when 
there is a conflict between equity holders and debt holders.
Diamond(1989) constructed a game-theoretical model that explored reputation 
considerations of firm owners and managers. In Diamond’s model firm owners, 
who maximize combined projects’ return on a some finite horizon, can choose in 
every period between investing in a risky negative present value and a safe positive 
present value project. Both projects must be financed by debt. Due to the asset 
substitution effect outlined above in this section, the risky project maximizes a one 
period return. Debt holders, who are aware of the firm’s willingness to finance risky 
projects, also know the firm’s history of repaying its debt, which constitutes the 
firm’s reputation. The better is the firm’s reputation the cheaper is the debt. The 
following equilibrium arises in this model. Initially, when the firms are young they 
prefer risky projects. Some of them survive, the others default. The surviving firms 
get older and prefer safe projects, because the opportunity costs of the risky projects 
are quite high: they might loose their reputation. A reasonable implication of this 
model is that younger firms have lower debt than older firms.
Result 2.2 In Diamond(1989) the benefits of issuing debt arise from reputation 
considerations, while the costs are due to asset substitution.
2.3 Asymmetric Information
This section explores models in which managers have some private information 
about their firms. There are three different streams of literature covered in this 
section. First, the pecking order literature started with Myers (1984) and Myers
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and Majluf (1984), that asserts firms always prefer debt to equity. The second area 
of literature suggests that a firm uses debt to signal its quality to outsiders. The 
final strand of literature uses the fact that because managers are risk averse, an 
entrepreneur’s ownership share, signals the firm’s quality to the outsiders.
2.3.1 The Pecking Order Theory
The notion of the Pecking Order Theory was introduced by Myers (1984). In 
short, it can be described as follows.
1. Firms always prefer internal finance.
2. If external finance is required, firms use the safest security first - they start with 
debt and only use equity as a last resort.
The theoretical foundation for the Pecking Order Theory was proposed by Myers 
and Majluf (1984). In their model there are two types of firms in the market. The 
type of every given firm is known by the insiders, while outsiders are only aware of 
the common probability distribution: with probability p the firm has value L, while 
with probability 1 — p it has value H > L l All the firms have access to a some 
profitable project with the investment costs of /  and the net present value of R. 
They can pay the costs by issuing additional equity. Let us show that separating 
equilibrium can exist in which all L-type firms invest while all H- type firms do not 
invest. In this equilibrium everyone knows that if the firm invests it is of L type. 
Once the investment is made, old shareholders in the L-type firm give up a fraction 
a = I / ( R  +  L +  I) of their shares (R + L + I) to new shareholders. Thus, the 
old shareholders of L type receive the payoff (1 — cx)(R +  L +  I) = R  +  L from 
investing and issuing equity, which makes them better off. If investment occurs in 
LLtype firms, investors give up the same fraction a = I / {R  +  L + 1) of their shares 
(R + H ^ I ) .  That is they receive the payoff (R + L)(R + H + I ) / (R + L + I). For 
some particular parameters, namely
^Both managers and current shareholders are insiders, while investors and potential sharehold­
ers are outsiders.
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{H -  L)a > R, (2.1)
the old shareholders of ET-type firms are worse off from investing and issuing equity, 
that is the payoff (R + L)(R + H + I ) / (R + L +1)  is less than H. Thus, the above 
mentioned equilibrium is possible with some particular parameter values. There 
is a number of important applications that follow from this simple model. First, 
it is usually better to issue a safe security rather than a risky one. In particular, 
external financing using safe debt is better than financing by risky equity. Second, 
when low-risk debt is unavailable some of positive NPV projects might not be 
financed. Third, the share prices may fall with announcement of new share issues. 
Specifically, before the announcement, the firm’s market value is p H + ( l —p)(L+R).  
In contrast, if the firm issues shares its value becomes L + R. For parameter values 
satisfying inequality 2.1, pH + (1 — p)(L + R) > L +  R, which proves that after 
the announcement, the value of the firm decreases. On the other hand, if the firm 
issues safe debt to finance investment, stock price will not fall.
A number of researches have extended the basic Myers-Majluf idea. For example, 
Krasker (1986) generalized their model by making the issue size a continuous choice 
variable. (In Myers-Majluf model the firm raises either some amount of equity, 
known by all investors or none at all.) Krasker’s main results are that: the stock 
price is decreasing with the issue size; and there is an upper bound for the amount 
of money that can be raised by issuing equity. This second effect is termed ‘equity 
rationing’.
Narayanan (1988) finds another advantage of issuing debt. If there is asymmetry 
with respect to the value of the new project, some negative net present value projects 
will be financed. This happens because the only information about the new project 
available for the public is whether the project is taken. It makes the price of issued 
equity that finances the project to be the expected average price of all the projects 
that go forward. Even though firms finance negative net present value projects 
they can be more than compensated for these losses by issuing overpriced equity. 
Thus, all the projects with the net present value higher than some negative value
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are taken. Narayanan’s model also strengthen some of Myers and Majluf results. It 
shows that even if debt is risky it is always better than equity. * This result arises 
because, risky debt is less overpriced than risky equity, and the cut-off level for the 
risky debt is higher.
To facilitate the overinvestment problem mentioned above Heinkel and Zechner 
(1990) use Myers’s (1977) idea: initially outstanding debt makes investment less 
attractive (there is a punishment in the case of default) and increases the cut-off 
level. Thus, when firms can choose their capital structure prior to when the projects 
become available, some level of debt is voluntarily chosen. This restricts the firms 
from future overinvestment.
Brennan and Kraus (1987), Noe (1988), Constantinides and Grundy (1989) and 
Viswanath (1993) obtained results inconsistent with the pecking order theory.
Brennan and Kraus (1987) modify the example of Myers and Majluf (1984) in 
the following way. Two types of firms, L and H : have access to a some profitable 
project. Initially, both have some positive debt outstanding. A possible equilibrium 
proposed by the authors is that both types issue equity. Firms of H  type finance 
the new project and pay its debt at face value, while firms of L type only finance 
the new project. Investors can distinguish between both types by observing their 
behavior. In this separating equilibrium there is no incentive for either of the types 
to imitate each other. The benefit of paying the debt is that issued shares are highly 
priced, while the cost is that the firms buy their debt at face value. The benefit 
is bigger (smaller) than the cost if the firm is of H -type (L-type). The difference 
arises because L types have a bigger risk incorporated in the face value of debt. 
These results differ from those of Myers and Majluf (1984). Firstly, there is no 
underinvestment in this story. Secondly, issuing equity by itself is not a bad signal. 
In fact, if it is followed by payment of the debt it can even be a good signal.
Constantinides and Grundy (1989) assumed that in Myers and Majluf’s model 
the managers possess some shares of the firm. The true value of these shares is 
maximized with the management being able to issue any type of security and being
*Myers and Majluf (1984) consider only safe debt.
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capable of repurchasing existing equity. In this set-up there is a fully separating 
equilibrium in which all the firms finance positive net present value projects by 
issuing securities that are not straight debt nor equity. This result contradicts the 
pecking order theory, because here firms do not finance the projects via internal 
funds or riskless debt even if they are able to.
Noe (1988) changed the example of Myers and Majluf (1984) so that there are 
three types of firms in the market 5, L and H , where S < L < H. As before 
there are only two possible options for how they can finance the new project: either 
use debt or equity. In the equilibrium with two firms L and H f  firms of H  type 
issue debt and firms of L type issue equity. Now if S  type is added, it will be 
able to imitate both L and H, but imitating H is more profitable. Thus, in the 
new equilibrium types S  and H  issue debt, while type L issues equity. The type 
that issues equity does not have the lowest value. However, average quality of the 
firms that issue debt is higher than that of the firms that issue equity. Thus, the 
conclusion that the announcement of equity issue is a bad signal is consistent with 
Noe’s model.
Viswanath (1993) consider the example of Myers and Majluf (1984) in a dynamic 
framework. The paper assumes a firm faces profitable projects not only now, but 
also in the future. If the firm finances the current project using internal funds 
then it will have to issue equity to finance the future projects. For some particular 
parameters it might be optimal to issue equity now and finance the future projects 
with internal funds. In contrast to the pecking order theory, in this model, equity 
issuing is not recognized by the market as a bad signal, contradicting.
Result 2.3 The Pecking Order Theory, derived in Myers and Majluf (1984), states 
that debt is preferred to equity. However, this result can be invalidated in some cases 
if firms are allowed to have a wider range of financing choices. Thus, whether the 
Pecking Order Theory is relevant is an open question for empirical investigation.
^See discussion of Myers and Majluf (1984).
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2.3.2 Signaling with Proportion of Debt
To describe the research in this area let us outline the model in Ross (1977), 
who suggests that the manager of a firm, whose wages depend on the firm’s current 
and future values, uses debt to signal the quality of the firm (known only to him) 
to the market. The dependance of the wage on the current value of the firm gives 
him the incentive to signal, while a penalty in the case of bankruptcy dissuades 
him from overstating its value. To see how this process works in somewhat more 
detail, consider the following model. Let the future return of a firm be distributed 
uniformly on [0, t], where t is positive and unknown to the investors. The manager, 
who observes t, chooses value of debt d, to maximize his wage that depends on 
expected weighted average of value of the firm now and in the future. The value 
now is denoted by V’(d), while the value in the future is the expected return t/2 
minus expected bankruptcy punishment L/(d, t), where L is the value of punishment 
and f (d, t)  is the probability of punishment as evaluated by the manager. Thus, 
the manager maximizes the following function
( l - 9 ) V ( d )  + 9 ( t / 2 - L f ( d , t ) ) ,  (2.2)
where the parameter 9 is a weighting of present versus future value. When 9 — 0 
the manager maximizes the firm’s present value, while when 9 =  1 he maximizes 
the firm’s future value. In general, 9 characterizes how much weight the manager 
puts on the firm’s future value.
The model presumes that investors infer that t = a(d); this means that they 
discern the firm’s type from the chosen debt level. The value of the firm is a half 
of i, V(d) = a(d)/2. Substituting V(d) in equation 2.2 and differentiating with 
respect to d gives
no
a'(d) = — Lf'd(d,t)2.3)
If the investors are able to infer the firm’s type correctly then a(d(t)) = t, which
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being substituted in equation 2.3 produces the following differential equation
a'(d) _  2 9
,a{d)) 1 - 6
Once we assumed that the future return of a firm is distributed uniformly on 
[0, t], the bankruptcy probability f (d, t)  = d/t  if d < t and f (d, t)  = 1 if d > t. 
When d < t the solution to differential equation 2.4 is
d(t) = i l 4 ö f -  + C’ (2'5)
where c is a some constant that can be obtained from initial conditions4 As men­
tioned above, the parameters have to be such that d(t) < t. From equation 2.5 
one can see that increases in the bankruptcy penalty decrease the debt level, other 
things being equal.
Now let us calculate values of debt and equity. The probability of default is
p = Prob{x < d(t)\t} = (2-6)
consequently levels of debt and equity are
D = (1 -  p)d(t) +  pE{x\x < d(t)} = (1 -  ~2j~)d(t) (2-7)
and
E = V - D = t- - ( l - ^ - )d( t ) . (2.8)
Differentiating D/E  with respect to t verifies that the debt-equity ratio and firm 
value (or profitability) are positively related.
Poitevin (1989) also uses debt as a signal, but in a different set-up. He considers
Wo understand why the manager chooses the debt value to satisfy equation 2.5 let us see the 
trade off he faces. His utility function is given by equation 2.2, which consists of the weighed sum 
of the firm’s present value and its future value. With higher values of debt the first term is higher 
because investors discern the firm has a high value of t. On the other hand, with higher values of 
debt the second term is lower due to increased probability of default. The optimal value of debt, 
which is given by equation 2.5, solves this trade off.
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two firms: one is an incumbent in some market and the other one is a potential 
entrant to this market. The marginal costs of the entrant is private information. 
Here, there is the following signalling equilibrium. Low cost entrants issue debt, 
while high cost entrants and the incumbent issue equity. The cost to an entrant 
of issuing debt is that the incumbent firm can start predation, which might result 
in bankruptcy of the entrant. The benefit of issuing debt is that market treats the 
debt issuer as a low cost firm and consequently assigns to this firm a higher value. 
Thus, the main result of this paper is consistent with the result of Ross (1977).
R esu lt 2.4 From signalling considerations the issuing of debt is good news to the 
financial market.
2.3.3 Managerial Risk Aversion
The basic idea for papers in this subsection is that managers are risk-averse and 
can signal the quality of projects by firm’s leverage. That is, they can signal how 
much risky equity they are ready to retain. In the model of Leland and Pyle (1977) 
an entrepreneur has access to a project that returns ß + e, where ß is constant and 
known by the entrepreneur and E[e] = 0. The investors do not know the exact value 
of /i, rather, they only know its distribution.
The manager has to raise /  of external funds from investors. There are two 
ways in which the entrepreneur raises the funds: via issuing debt D and via issuing 
equity. That is
I  = { l - a ) [ V { a ) - D }  + D, (2.9)
where a is the fraction of the equity retained by the entrepreneur, and V(a)  is the 
value of the firm as a function of a. The manager maximizes his expected utility of 
end-of-period wealth, where wealth is given by
W  = a{ß + e -  D) +  (1 -  a)(V{a) -  D) + D. (2.10)
The first term represents the entrepreneur’s equity, while the rest is his cash. Here
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it is assumed that the funds raised externally are invested with riskless zero return. 
Thus, only equity is risky and by choosing a the entrepreneur adopts a suitable 
level of risk.
Differentiating the manager’s utility with respect to a  and substituting the equi­
librium condition that V(a(fi)) =  /x, gives the first order conditions for a. Leland 
and Pyle show that the optimal level of entrepreneur’s ownership share a  is an 
increasing function of firm quality /i. Further, the authors prove that under some 
specific conditions the increase in a  increases debt level D. Moreover, firms with 
larger debt also have a larger fraction of the equity owned by insiders and are of 
higher quality. The intuition for this result is as follows. Managers of higher quality 
firms can afford to choose a larger fraction of the equity, which gets less risky with 
firm’s quality, and corresponds to larger debt values. This is the main result of their 
paper.
Result 2.5 Firms with larger debt also have a larger fraction of the equity owned 
by insiders and are of higher quality.
2.4 Industrial Organization Models
There are two different types of models in this section. First, the models that 
explore how debt can influences strategic interactions among competitors. Second, 
the models in which debt influences interaction with customers and suppliers.
2.4.1 Debt influences rivals
One of the initial papers in this area is Brander and Lewis (1986). The main 
mechanism of their model is based on the ‘asset substitution effect’, which was 
described in section 2.2. Consider a two period game, in which two firms firstly 
choose debt levels and then output levels. As usual, such a game can be solved 
by backward induction. For given levels of debt the firms compete in the standard 
Cournot quantity game in the output market. The authors show that with a higher
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level of debt the equilibrium output of the firm increases, while the equilibrium 
output of its rival decreases relative to the standard Cournot quantities/ The 
explanation of this effect might be as follows. Imagine you are playing a game of 
chess and you are several pieces down relative to your opponent. To survive (or 
even to win) you may have to pursue an aggressive strategy, which might even 
include sacrificing more of your pieces. Additional sacrificing will not deteriorate 
the result: the position is pretty much lost anyway. An aggressive strategy can 
make the outcome of the game more stochastic. Similar intuition applies to the 
effect of changes in output levels with the increase in debt level. In the bad states 
shareholders get nothing: they pay all the revenue to debt holders. In the good 
states they receive the difference between the revenue and the level of debt. Thus, 
when the level of debt is positive, shareholders care only about good states. If 
the level of debt increases the set of good states gets smaller: only in very good 
states can the firm pay something to shareholders. With higher levels of debt the 
average marginal profit of good states is higher (see the previous footnote). It means 
that the equilibrium output of a given firm is higher. Once output is higher, the 
equilibrium outcome of the rival is lower because the rival’s reaction function does 
not change with the change in the debt level of the firm. Typical reaction functions 
are presented in Figure 2.1.
Now let us move to the first period in which firms choose levels of debt. Imagine 
one of the firms does not use debt. In this case the other firm has an incentive to use 
some positive level of debt, because it increases its output in the second period, and 
consequently enlarges its revenue. A drawback of this behavior is that the revenue 
of the first firm is decreased. Thus, when both firms have a choice of issuing debt 
they face a type of prisoners’ dilemma. Joint profit is maximized if both do not use 
debt, while in the unique Nash Equilibrium both firms choose to have some positive 
debt.
*To obtain this result the authors assumed that the marginal profit is higher in good states than 
in bad states, that is the marginal profit is an increasing function with respect to some parameter 
that reflects the degree of the state of being ‘good’. If this assumption is reversed then the result 
will be opposite.
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Firm 2’s reaction function
Figure 2.1: Typical reaction functions
From the finitely/infinitely repeated game literature, tacit collision over an ex­
tensive period is possible in oligopolistic industries. The monopoly level of profit 
can be achieved as a subgame perfect equilibrium for an infinitely repeated Cournot 
game if the following condition is satisfied, see for example Green and Porter (1984),
1 + r
7Tm---------  >  7Td +  'Kc/l'. ( 2 . 11)
Here itm is a half of the monopoly profit; ltd is the profit of a given firm if it 
deviates; izc is a half of the Cournot equilibrium profit; and r is a discount factor. 
Thus, every firm has a strategy to play a monopoly until the rival deviates. After 
that the firm always plays an oligopoly. The condition states that the payoff of 
playing a monopoly for infinite period of time is higher than deviating now and 
playing oligopoly after that. In this story, shareholders maximize the value of the 
firm.
Maksimovic (1988) explores the case when shareholders maximize the value of 
equity, namely the value of the firm minus debt. Let the firm issue debt that 
promises to pay d every period. It is assumed that d > 7rc, otherwise there is no
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effect from issuing debt, even in the case of Cournot equilibrium the firm is capable 
of paying the debt every period. If the firm always plays monopoly its payoff is 
(7rm — d)( 1 + r) /r . If it deviates the firm will get 7Td — d immediately, and nothing 
after that, as all the proceedings will go to debt holders. Thus, equation 2.11 is 
modified to
(7rm -  d) 1 +  r  > 7Td -  d. (2.12)
r
Maksimovic calls ‘debt capacity’ the maximum amount of debt that firms can 
handle without ruining the possibility of tacit collision. From the last equation the 
debt capacity is equal to
d  ^  7Tm  (iTd 7Tm V̂.
The author shows that the debt capacity decreases with the interest rate and 
increases with the elasticity of demand.
R esu lt 2.6 Consideration of strategic interactions among competitors results in a 
positive level of debt.
2.4.2 Debt influences customers/suppliers
Titman (1984) argues that liquidation of a firm may impose some additional 
costs on its customers or suppliers. Specifically, if the firm produces durable goods, 
the maintenance costs of the goods will increase after the firm liquidates. The con­
sumers anticipate the possible future increase in the maintenance costs and reduce 
their demand for the firm’s products in the current period. In other words, these 
additional maintenance costs are indirectly imposed on the firm itself in the current 
period via reduction in the prices of the produced goods. Because of this, the liq­
uidation policy that maximizes a firm’s current value takes into account the costs, 
which it imposes on its customers in the future in the case of liquidation. However, 
this policy is not credible because in the future it is optimal for the firm to liquidate
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whenever its liquidation value exceeds its operating value. To restrict itself in the 
future, the firm voluntarily chooses some level of debt. If the level of debt is chosen 
appropriately, the firm is terminated when liquidation is consistent with the initial 
optimal policy.
A similar idea was used in Maksimovic and Titman (1991). Consider a firm 
that can produce either low or high quality goods (services).1" The consumers are 
unable to recognize the quality of these goods until they consume the goods. If the 
firm has no financial problems, it supplies high quality goods to maintain a favorable 
reputation. In contrast, when it has financial problems, the firm supplies low quality 
goods. Even if we assume that the firm has no financial problems now, no-one knows 
what might happen to it in the future. As in Titman (1984), the value maximizing 
firm has time-inconsistent policies ex ante (when it has no financial problems) and 
ex post (when the firm gets some financial problems). Ex ante it is optimal to take 
into account possible future financial problems, while ex post it is optimal to supply 
low quality goods. To mitigate this problem, the firm restricts itself by issuing some 
level of debt ex ante. With a proper choice of debt, the firm’s operations will be 
terminated whenever the firm will has financial problems.
Result 2.7 Consideration of strategic interactions with customers and suppliers 
results in a positive level of debt.
2.5 Corporate control considerations
Models using corporate control considerations are based on the fact that equity 
holders have voting rights while debt holders do not. This difference can have a 
crucial influence in the case of takeover attempts. To describe the research in this 
area we use the model of Stulz (1988).
In Stulz (1988) the optimal value of shares possessed by the management maxi­
mizes the expected gain to the investors from the takeover attempts. To outline his
tOne possible example is the airline industry, where we observe such low quality airlines as 
Aeroflot and such high-quality airlines as Qantas.
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model, let us consider the following simple set-up. There is a manager (who pos­
sesses fraction ß of all shares), investors (who possess fraction 1 — /? of all shares), 
and a potential rival. Further, assume the manager never sells his shares, while the 
investors are distributed heterogeneously with respect to their reservation prices. 
The takeover benefit A  to be acquired by the rival is unknown by the manager and 
investors, while its distribution function F(A) is common knowledge. To acquire 
control, the rival has to buy at least 50% of all shares. It means that at least fraction
has to be purchased by the rival from the investors, where P* is the level of the 
premium paid to the investors.'*’ Further, the probability of a takeover is just 1 — 
F (P *), so the expected gain to the investors is
The optimal value of ß is chosen to maximize B where from equation 2.13
To summarize, a larger ß leads to a larger premium in the case of successful takeover, 
but a smaller probability of this takeover. As has been already mentioned in this 
chapter changes in leverage cause changes in the fraction of shares possessed by the 
manager. Thus, the main idea of Stulz (1988) is that the optimal debt/equity ratio 
maximizes the expected gain to the investors from possible takeovers.
Result 2.8 The optimal capital structure maximizes the expected gain to the in­
vestors from possible takeovers.
^The intuition for this equation is as follows. If a  is an increasing function in P* (When the 
premium is bigger, more investors are ready to sell their shares.) then P* is an increasing function 
in ß. It means that the bigger is the part of shares possessed by the manager, the harder it is to 
acquire 50% of all remaining shares.
(2.13)
B =  P * (1 -F (P * )) . (2.14)
(2.15)
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2.6 Structure of debt contract
A recent contribution to corporate structure literature deals with incomplete 
contracts. Given its importance and size, this area of literature is a primary focus 
of this chapter.
Hart and Moore (1998) claim:
...  economists do not yet have a fully satisfactory theory of debt finance 
(or the differences between debt and equity). One of the reasons for this 
is that debt is a security with several characteristics: a debtor typically 
promises creditor a noncontingent payment stream, provides the creditor 
with the right to foreclose on the debtor’s assets in a default state, and 
gives the creditor priority in bankruptcy... (p. 1)
The second of these characteristics is explored in two papers: Hart and Moore (1994) 
and Hart and Moore (1998). Hart and Moore (1994) examine debt contracts when 
a debtor can repudiate the initial contract by withdrawing his human capital from 
the project. In their model the capital borrowed from the investor plus manager’s 
wealth are invested by the manager at the beginning of the first period. This 
investment generates a stream of nonnegative returns R(t), 0 < t < T  and a 
stream of nonnegative liquidation values L(t), 0 < t < T. The timing of the model 
is presented in Figure 2.2. The returns offered to the investor may not be credible
t = 1 Li t = 2 l 2
I------------------------------------------------------------ 1 I-------------------------------------------------------------1 • •
Ii + W Ri R2
t = T l t
Rt
Figure 2.2: Time Line for the firm
26
as the entrepreneur cannot commit not to remove his valuable human capital from 
the project and renegotiate the investor’s return.* If in some period the outcome of 
renegotiation leaves the investor with a combined return less than his investment 
minus returns he has already received, he would not be willing to finance the project 
ex ante. Thus, the main point of this paper is that only some investment projects 
that have large enough returns and liquidation values can be financed. The optimal 
debt contract structure here is designed to protect the investor from opportunistic 
behavior of the manager.
Hart and Moore (1998) consider a similar situation in which investment is pro­
vided by one party (an investor) and returns accrue to the other party (a manager). 
The manager can divert the project returns but cannot steal the assets used in the 
project. He promises to make a fixed stream of payments to the investor. As long as 
he makes these payments, he continues to run the project. If, however, the manager 
fails to pay, the investor recognizes that the manager diverts some project returns. 
At this stage the parties can renegotiate the initial contract. The following assump­
tions from Hart and Moore (1994) are used in this model. First, if the manager 
defaults, the investor is assumed to have an option to terminate the project. How­
ever, he uses this option only as a last resort. Second, the outcome of renegotiation 
for the investor is at least his return in the case of project’s termination. Thus, if in 
some period the outcome of renegotiation is less than the capital he invested minus 
returns he received, the investor would not be willing to finance the project ex ante. 
Again, as in Hart and Moore (1994), the optimal debt contract in this model is 
designed to secure the investor from opportunistic behavior of the manager.
Another model that uses a very similar set-up is of Neher (1999). He explores 
the case of staged financing instead of up-front financing. In his model the capital is 
invested gradually and the returns are generated only when the project is completed. 
In all other respects, his model coincides with the model of Hart and Moore (1994).
tAs the investor can terminate the project any period and receive that period’s liquidation 
value, his minimum renegotiation return is the project’s liquidation value. The exact value of 
the renegotiation return depends on the bargaining solution used. Nevertheless, the only that 
important here is that this return is increasing with the liquidation value.
27
The main result of Neher is that he derives the optimal staged investment path 
when the entrepreneur is unable to commit not to repudiate. Here, as in Hart and 
Moore (1994, 1998), the optimal debt contract is designed to secure the investor 
from the opportunistic behavior of the manager.
2.7 Conclusion
This chapter provided a selective review of corporate finance models and, in 
particular, their explanations of how firms choose their capital structure. Firstly, 
corporate structure is determined by agency costs. Secondly, presence of incomplete 
information influences the optimal debt level. Further, consideration of features of 
the theory of industrial organization also changes the debt/equity ratio. Finally, 
corporate control consideration is a determinant of corporate structure. As an 
extension to this literature we also considered a recent contribution to the capital 
structure theory. This literature provides insight into the optimal structure of debt 
using the incomplete contract theory approach.
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CHAPTER 3
Staged Financing with a Variable Return
3.1 Introduction
Consider a cash constrained entrepreneur who has access to a profitable investment 
project with some rate of return s, that is constant and greater than one. If the 
entrepreneur had enough money he would buy physical assets worth K  dollars and 
work with them for one period. At the end of this period he would receive a return 
R = sK  dollars that would completely cover the costs of his physical capital and 
labor investments. With no wealth, however, the entrepreneur has no choice but 
to find an outside investor to finance the project. The investor must be offered a 
large enough part of the return to at least completely cover his costs. Hart and 
Moore (1994) considered this basic set-up when the initial agreement between the 
entrepreneur and the investor is not enforceable. The entrepreneur may repudiate 
the initial contract by threatening to withdraw his human capital from the project. 
Anticipating such behavior from the entrepreneur, the investor will not finance some 
profitable projects.
To illustrate this point, let us consider the following example. The rate of 
return s is equal to 1.8 and total cost of capital investment K  is equal to $1. The 
entrepreneur borrows $1 from the investor and promises to return $1 to him in 
one period’s time. After the investor lends the money the entrepreneur repudiates 
the initial agreement. We assume that both agents have equal bargaining powers. 
As the investment is sunk the investor will receive half of the final return, that 
is sK/2  =  $0.9, which is less than the total capital invested. Consequently, the
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investor will not finance such a project up-front.
To mitigate the problem outlined above, Neher (1999) assumed the entrepreneur 
stages the physical capital investment such that, for example, K / 2 dollars are in­
vested immediately, and the remaining K / 2 dollars are invested in one period’s 
time. Such a project returns R = sK  dollars in two periods. The outcome pro­
duced in the first period is used as collateral in the second period. This collateral 
reassures the investor that the entrepreneur will not repudiate the initial agreement 
in the second period. Also, first period repudiation will not occur because the en­
trepreneur’s net return with repudiation is smaller than his net return specified in 
the initial contract. The investor may therefore be able to finance the project with 
the investment staged in two rounds, something he would not be whiling to do if all 
the investment was provided up-front.
Let us go back to our example and show that it is possible to finance the project 
in 2 stages. Let the up-front investment be R  =  $0.6 and the investment in one 
period time be R = SO.4. The entrepreneur receives R  = $1.8 over the two periods 
and promises to pay back the investor $1; the entrepreneur’s net return is $0.8. 
What if the entrepreneur repudiates the initial contract straight after R has been 
invested? R  is sunk and the net return of the project is R — R  =  $1.4. As both 
parties have equal bargaining powers the entrepreneur receives \ {R — 12) = $0.7 and 
the investor receives the remainder, that is R  + ̂ (R — R)  =  $1.1. The entrepreneur’s 
return in the case of repudiation is smaller than his return specified in the initial 
contract. Therefore, he has no incentive to repudiate the initial contract in the first 
period. What if the entrepreneur repudiates the initial contract after R  has been 
invested? In this case the investor has an option to liquidate the project and receive 
the output from the first period. The return of the investor is sR  =  $1.08, which 
is greater than his costs. Again, the entrepreneur has no incentive to repudiate the 
initial contract. This shows that the investor can finance the project in two stages.
Unlike the example above, empirical and theoretical research asserts that the 
rate of return is not constant. In fact, returns may differ significantly over different 
stages of the project. For example, returns may decline due to the law of diminishing
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returns.* Non-constant returns also arise due to fixed costs.*
A non-constant rate of return - so that s(-) be a function of investment made up 
until that date - allows for an examination of a wider scope of projects including, 
for example, projects with fixed costs or increasing and decreasing rates of return. 
As shown below, relaxing the assumption of constant returns significantly alters the 
optimal investment path - this is the main result of this chapter. Although the al­
gorithm of the optimal investment path derivation is quite similar to the algorithm 
presented in Neher(1999), some of the results presented here are considerably dif­
ferent. For instance, Neher (1999) predicts that positive wealth of the entrepreneur 
and a lack of discounting (very short time duration of one period) ensures that all 
profitable projects go forward. On the contrary, the model presented here shows 
that this is not the case. Unlike Neher, if the returns from the first periods do 
not produce large enough collateral for the future periods the project will not be 
financed, even if it is profitable.
Another difference arises with respect to the optimal investment path itself. 
Neher (1999) claims that starting from the second investment this path is always 
monotonically increasing. The result presented here is that the optimal investment 
path in general is not monotonical. In both models the values of investments are de­
termined by collaterals, while collaterals are determined by rate of return functions. 
However, if the rate of return function is decreasing, the values of collateral for new 
investments may also be decreasing. In this case the sequence of investments will 
be decreasing as well.
This chapter finds an additional source of collateral for the investor. The out­
come of repudiation in some periods might be termination of the investment project. 
If this threat is credible, the entrepreneur will never repudiate in these periods. We 
construct the optimal investment path with all available collaterals and prove that
^Madalla and Miller (1989) stated this law as: ‘...holding technology and the quantities of 
all other inputs constant, as equal increments of the variable input are employed, a point will 
eventually be reached where the increments to output begin to decline (p. 162).’
^Stiglitz (1993) describes fixed costs in the following way: ‘First, there is the cost of the fixed 
input. To begin production, a firm may need space, machines, and a core of workers. The costs 
associated with fixed inputs are called fixed costs, or overhead costs (p. 316).’
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the termination collateral is never used on the optimal investment path.
In this work we also explore the issue of repudiation in more detail. We con­
struct a model in which both agents are able to repudiate. From this we find that 
allowing the investor to repudiate mitigates the commitment problem so much that 
all profitable two-period projects are financed^ There is still some inefficiency in 
this set-up with respect to financing in one period, but this inefficiency is much 
smaller than in the case when only the entrepreneur has the right to repudiate.
To address the issue of what the costs of staging are, we construct a model 
with costs of staging other than costs of delay. We assume, for example, that K/2  
dollars are invested straight away and the remaining K/2  dollars are invested in a 
half period time. This project returns R — sK  dollars in one period, and the costs of 
staging are only due to chopping this period. Surprisingly, we find that the optimal 
investment path for this model exactly coincides with the optimal investment path 
for the main model with no discounting. We find that with respect to a model 
without any costs of staging, adding additional costs of ‘chopping’ the period only 
diminishes the likelihood that the project will be financed, but does not change the 
optimal investment path.
The model also generalizes several of Neher’s results for projects with a variable 
rate of return. For example, an increase in the profitability of a project both in­
creases the probability that the project will be financed, and weakly decreases the 
number of stages needed. We derive similar results with respect to a decrease in 
the discount rate, an increase in tangibility of the physical assets of the project, 
and an increase in growth of physical assets in outside value. Further, we relax the 
assumption that the entrepreneur has no wealth and find that it is optimal for him 
to invest all his wealth at the beginning of the project, before relying on outside 
financing in subsequent rounds.
The issue of commitment has been examined in a number of recent papers. 
Hart and Moore (1994) construct a model in which the capital borrowed from the
* There is a some condition on how the second period investment relates to the first period 
investment.
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investor plus entrepreneur’s wealth are invested by the entrepreneur at the beginning 
of the first period. This investment generates a stream of nonnegative returns 
r(t), 0 < t < T  and a stream of nonnegative liquidation values Z(t), 0 < t < 
T. The returns offered to the investor may not be credible as the entrepreneur 
cannot commit not to remove his valuable human capital from the project and 
renegotiate the investor’s return. If in some period the outcome of renegotiation 
leaves the investor with a combined return less than his investment minus returns 
he has already received, he would not be willing to finance the project ex ante. 
Solving for all possible repayment paths such that the entrepreneur has no incentive 
to repudiate, the authors show how repayment paths change with the maturity 
structure of the project return stream, and with durability and specificity of the 
project assets.
Neher (1999) used the same set-up to explore the case of staged financing instead 
of up-front financing. In his model the capital is invested gradually and the returns 
are generated only when the project is completed. He derived the optimal staged 
investment path when the entrepreneur is unable to commit not to renegotiate. He 
also explored how different parameters, such as the entrepreneur’s wealth, project 
profitability and the tangibility of project’s assets, affect the optimal investment 
path. He claims his predictions are found to be consistent with the recent empirical 
studies, see for example Gompers (1995). The crucial differences between Neher’s 
and Hart and Moore’s models are that in Neher (1999) the capital is invested in 
stages and the returns are generated only when the project is completed.
A paper very similar to the model presented here is Admati and Perry (1991), 
who explored the role of staged financing in overcoming a commitment problem. 
In their model, two players invest consecutively one after the other until the total 
investment exceeds some value, in which case both players receive some benefits. 
The crucial feature of their model is the presence of free-riding and costs of delay. 
The free-riding gives incentives for the players to invest less (in the hope that the 
other party will incur the cost instead), while the costs of delay push them to invest 
more (so as to receive the benefits of the project sooner than later). Although
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there is no collateral in their model, the results of their model concur with the 
basic intuition of our model: that is, some of the projects that cannot be financed 
up-front due to the commitment problem can be financed in stages.
Staged financing has been also explored in a number of papers. For example 
Gompers (1995), Sahlman (1988, 1990), Admati and Pfleiderer (1994), Bolton and 
Scharfstein (1990), and Roberts and Weitzman (1981). Staging there arises as 
a result of uncertainty or asymmetric information, rather than the commitment 
problem outlined above.
This chapter can be also considered as a contribution to the literature on the 
theory of capital structure. For excellent surveys of this literature, see Harris and 
Raviv (1991) and Hart (1995).
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. The model is set out in sec­
tion 3.2. Section 3.3 presents an algorithm for finding the optimal investment path. 
It also contains some basic extensions to the model and comparative statics. Sec­
tion 3.4 extends the model to explore the situation when both agents are able to 
start renegotiation of the initial contract, while section 3.5 constructs a model with 
different costs of staged financing. Finally, section 3.6 concludes the chapter. Some 
of the proofs are contained in the Appendix.
3.2 The Model
We use the following model, first laid out by Neher(1999). Consider an en­
trepreneur, who needs to raise capital to finance a profitable project. The en­
trepreneur does not have any wealth and therefore must get an outside investor to 
finance the project. There is a competitive supply of deep-pocketed investors, who 
break even in equilibrium. These points are summarized in Assumptions (3.1) and 
(3.2).+
Assumption 3.1 The entrepreneur has no wealth.
tWe relax Assumptions (3.1), (3.4), (3.5), (3.10) and (3.16) later in the chapter.
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Assumption 3.2 The supply of investors is competitive.
Both physical assets and human capital are invested in the project. Physi­
cal capital is supplied solely from the investor in the form of an investment path 
71? I2 , . . . ,  i r ,  where the structure of the investment path - that is size of each invest­
ment I t and the number of periods of investment T  - is determined endogenously. 
This structure is chosen before the investment begins and cannot be changed after­
wards. Further, the total amount of the physical capital investment is fixed and is 
equal to K , that is
t= T
(3-1)
t = 0
Assumptions (3.3) and (3.4) outline these points.
Assumption 3.3 The structure of the investment path is determined endogenously 
at the very beginning and cannot be changed afterwards.
Assumption 3.4 The total amount of the physical investment is fixed at K .
Working with the physical assets, the entrepreneur invests human capital. There 
are no effort costs on the part of the entrepreneur. It is also assumed that he has 
no other income outside of the project. This is summarized in Assumptions (3.5) 
and (3.6).
Assumption 3.5 The entrepreneur has no effort costs.
Assumption 3.6 The entrepreneur has no outside income.
Each round of investment matches to a single period of the project and is struc­
turally identical. The length of every period is fixed and is the same for all periods. 
The investment is made at the beginning of every period and is followed by possible 
renegotiation (the procedure of renegotiation is outlined below). At this stage the 
human capital is invested and finally output is produced. For details see Figure 3.1.
Both the entrepreneur and the investor discount the future with a some common 
per period discount factor 0 < ß  < 1.
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Investment Possible Human Capital Output
Renegotiation
Figure 3.1: Sequence of events for every period
Assumption 3.7 Discount factor ß is the same for both agents.
The next assumption is the main innovation of this chapter. We assume the 
rate of return s is some function of the whole investment made to date, that is 
s : [0, K] -+RJ
Definition 3.1 s(-) is a rate of return function of investment.
The only requirements we impose on this function is that the integral f s { x ) d x  
exists and is greater than A//?, ensuring profitability. This integral is the final 
return of the project, that is
R =  s(x)dx. (3.2)
Jo
Definition 3.2 R is the final return of the project.
No other returns can be generated in the project. The following assumption sum­
marizes this discussion.
Assumption 3.8 All projects are classified by rate of return functions s(-). In all 
other respects the projects are identical.
In every period the project can be terminated during renegotiation, in which 
case the return of the project is the outside value of the assets in place at the time
Tn Neher (1999) s is constant, therefore our assumption is more general.
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of termination: this is equal to the value of the project without the human capital 
of the entrepreneur. This value is called the ‘liquidation value’ and is denoted by 
Lt, where t =  1 , 2 , . . . ,  T.
Definition 3.3 Lt V £ = l , 2 , . . . , T  is a liquidation value of the project in the case 
of its termination.
We determine Lt in the same way as Neher(1999). Before the investment has 
had the whole period with the entrepreneur it has zero liquidation value, which 
means that the last piece of capital invested before termination is sunk.1” All the 
previous investments have had at least one whole period with the entrepreneur, and 
they have the same value as at completion. Thus, in period t the liquidation value 
of the project is
In Figure 3.2 we draw rate of return s(-) as a function of the whole investment 
made to date. The liquidation value of the project is the area under this function.
The timing of the model is presented in Figure 3.3. At the beginning of every 
period t the entrepreneur receives a piece of investment It. During all this period 
the liquidation value is Lt. At the end of period T  the final return R  is realized.
In every period t after the investor puts It in the project, the entrepreneur 
might initiate renegotiation of the initial contract by refusing to work. His threat 
is to terminate the project.* This is a permanent end to the project - the project
Tn the Appendix we examine an extension when only a part of the last investment is sunk. 
We also consider when the growth of the liquidation value comes not only via new investment but 
also changes exogenously.
Tt is obvious that the entrepreneur never terminates the project. The outcome of the termina­
tion is that the investor gets the liquidation value and the entrepreneur gets nothing (for details 
see the discussion summarized by Assumption (3.12)). The entrepreneur only uses the termination 
threat as an incredible threat for the purpose of repudiation. All that important here, however, is 
that the mere threat by the entrepreneur triggers renegotiation. The investor, on the other hand,
(3.3)
where
(3.4)
37
s(x)
Figure 3.2: Rate of return function s(-) and liquidation value Lt
cannot be started again with some other entrepreneur. The following assumptions 
summarize this discussion.
A ssu m p tion  3.9 The termination of the project leads to its permanent end.
A ssu m p tion  3.10 Only the entrepreneur can start the renegotiation process.
If, on the other hand, the two sides find a way to resolve matters peacefully, 
the project will be continued. If the project is continued all the current physical 
assets remain in place, the investor stays with the project, and the next investments 
follow.
A ssu m p tion  3.11 If, after renegotiation, the project is not terminated it starts 
again from the same place.
We follow Hart and Moore (1994) and Neher (1999) by making the following 
assumption. As mentioned above in every period the entrepreneur has an option to
is assumed to have no option to start renegotiation of the contract. The situation when both the 
entrepreneur and the investor can start renegotiation will be considered in section 3.4.
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h  h  It R
Figure 3.3: Time Line for the firm
repudiate the contract and make the conditions of the investor worse than in the 
initial contract. The worst penalty that the investor can impose on the entrepreneur 
is expropriating all available physical assets from the project. The investor cannot 
punish the entrepreneur by jailing him or by confiscating his personal belongings. 
Thus, the maximum the investor can receive during renegotiation from the en­
trepreneur is the liquidation value.
Assumption 3.12 There is no outside project punishment for the entrepreneur.
Here we have to make another very important assumption, that it is possible to 
verify who started the renegotiation process. If it were non-verifiable the investor 
could repudiate and claim that the process was initiated by the entrepreneur.!
Assumption 3.13 Who initiates the renegotiation process is verifiable by a third 
party.
Now, let us describe the renegotiation process itself. We denote by U t , the 
present value to the investor of the outcome of renegotiation in period t, and by
T
St(T) := /3t+1- ‘R -  Y ,  (3.5)
i= t+1
!Neher(1999) also makes this assumption, although he does not make it explicit.
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the surplus being bargained over in period t f
Definition 3.4 Ut V t =  1,2, . . .  ,T  is the present value to the investor of the 
outcome of renegotiation in period t.
Definition 3.5 St V t = 1 ,2 ,... ,T  is the surplus being bargained over in period t.
We assume that the entrepreneur and the investor have equal bargaining powers; 
that is, if they start bargaining over some surplus under equal conditions they will 
share the surplus equally.
Assumption 3.14 Both agents have equal bargaining power.
We also assume that an agent’s outside option only affects the distribution of 
surplus, if it is optimal for the agent to adopt this option.
Assumption 3.15 Outside options are unimportant unless they are binding.
There is only one outside option for the investor. It is to liquidate the firm and 
receive the liquidation value. The entrepreneur has no outside options. Hence, in 
the case of renegotiation the investor chooses a half of the surplus if it is greater 
than the liquidation value. No termination occurs in this case because it worsens 
the payoffs for both players. (The outcomes in the case of termination in period t 
are none for the entrepreneur and Lt for the investor, while outcomes in the case of 
renegotiation are St/2 for both, where St/2 > Lt.)
If in some period t the liquidation value is greater than half of the surplus then 
there are two possible outcomes. If the liquidation value is less than the surplus 
itself, then by threatening to liquidate the firm, the investor increases his share up 
to the liquidation value. The termination does not occur, because with termination 
no-one is better. (The outcomes in the case of termination in period t are 0 for the 
entrepreneur and Lt for the investor, while outcomes in the case of renegotiation 
are St —  Lt for the entrepreneur and Lt for the investor, where St > Lt.)
t/3T+1 ~lR is period’s t value of the project’s final return, while Yfi=t+i is period’s t value
of the investments to be made after period t.
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If the liquidation value is greater than the surplus in some period t, the en­
trepreneur cannot entirely compensate the investor and persuade him not to liqui­
date the firm. It means that the outcome of repudiation in such a period t is always 
liquidation of the firm. The discussion above is summarized in the following result.
Result 3.1 Termination is the outcome of repudiation in period t iff St < Lt in 
that period.
Proof. The proof follows from the discussion above and is omittedd □
Definition 3.6 If, for some investment path, termination is the outcome of repu­
diation in some period t, such a path is called an investment path with possible 
termination.
Thus, for every 1 < t < T  the present value to the investor of renegotiation in 
period t is equal to
Ut =  max[Lt, St/2]. (3.6)
Formula (3.6) is well known in the literature on non-cooperative bargaining with 
outside options, for example, see Section 3.12 of Osborne and Rubinstein (1990). 
This formula is similar to one used by Chiu(1998), Neher (1999), Muthoo (1999) 
and Hart and Moore (1994). It is based on an alternating-offers model with outside 
options of Shaked and Sutton (1984).
There is the following type of investment contract between the entrepreneur 
and the investor. This contract summarizes all the assumptions presented in this 
section.
Contract 3.1 The investor provides all the rounds of investment in the initially 
specified investment path J1} / 2) • • •, It , and returns the future discounted value of 
this path at the end of period T. He does not get any revenue, he just breaks even.
*See also discussion summarized by equation (3.9).
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The entrepreneur works on the project for all T  periods and receives the net return, 
that is the final return minus the payment to the investor. If the entrepreneur 
repudiates the contract in some period t, then the control over the physical assets 
is transferred to the investor. After that a new contract can be renegotiated or the 
investor liquidates the assets for Lt . I f the new contract is specified, the project starts 
from the same place where it was before the entrepreneur repudiated. The investor 
provides the next rounds of investment and at the end of period T  he receives some 
other value specified in the new contract.
An important aspect of this model is that there is an efficiency cost to financing 
the project via multiple rounds verses a single round. The final return R  is the same 
regardless of the number of periods there is, but because of discounting there is a 
costly delay in realizing this return. On the other hand, the single round financing 
might not be feasible, because the entrepreneur might not be able to commit that he 
will not repudiate. As a result, the objective of the entrepreneur is to construct such 
an investment path that gives him the maximal net present value of the project. 
This path has to commit the investor at least to break even. In the next section we 
construct a procedure that finds the optimal investment path for the model outlined 
in this section.
3.3 Solving the model
Before proceeding, we outline the content of this section. Subsection 3.3.1 con­
structs a procedure that finds the investment path that is optimal among paths 
that cannot be possibly terminated. Subsection 3.3.2 considers paths with possible 
termination, and shows that the optimal path constructed in subsection 3.3.1 is 
optimal among all repudiation-proof paths, not just among paths without possi­
ble termination. In subsection 3.3.3 we present basic extensions and comparative 
statics.
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3.3.1 Paths without termination
In this subsection we consider only investment paths without possible termina­
tion, that is paths with St > Lt V t =  1 , 2 . . . ,  T.
Assumption 3.16 St > Lt V £ = 1,2, . . . , T.
The entrepreneur maximizes the following function with respect to the number 
of periods T  and the investment path { h Y tS
ßTR - J 2 ß t~^t ,  (3.7)
t= 1
where ßTR  is the present value of the project return, and Y^t=i is the present
value of the investment path.1- Amongst the investment paths without possible 
termination, we restrict our attention only to repudiation-proof investment paths. 
On such paths, even if the entrepreneur initiates the renegotiation, he cannot make 
the investor worse off than in the case of the initial contract. Consequently, the 
entrepreneur does not have any incentive to trigger renegotiation along these paths.
Definition 3.7 Repudiation-proof investment paths are such paths along which the 
entrepreneur will not trigger renegotiation.
To solve for the repudiation-proof investment path we start from period T  and 
move backwards period by period. The following repudiation-proof constraint is 
used in this model for period T
< / ^ t / r • (3.8)
2=1
On the left-hand side we place the present value of the payment to the investor, 
as specified in the initial contract. On the right-hand side we display the present
*Note that for a given T,  maximizing of the entrepreneur’s utility function is equivalent to 
minimizing the present value of the investment path, that is the minimal feasible payment to the 
investor.
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value of the payment to the investor in the case of repudiation in period T. The 
right-hand side consists of the present value to the investor of the outcome of the 
renegotiation in period T, plus the present value of the investment to be made 
by the investor in periods after T  (for the last period the second term is equal to 
zero). The left-hand side must be not greater than the right-hand side for period T, 
otherwise the entrepreneur has an incentive to decrease the payment to the investor 
by repudiating.
Next, we move to period T  — 1 and construct a repudiation-proof constraint for 
that period. The only difference that arises between period T  — 1 and period T  is 
that, in period T  we do not need to be concerned with any future repudiation. In 
contrast in period T —1, the outcome of renegotiation might be affected by a possible 
future repudiation, namely in period T. If in period T  — 1 the investor anticipates 
that the entrepreneur repudiates in period T, and seriously bids down the investor’s 
return, then in period T  — 1 the investor has a strong incentive to liquidate the 
firm. However, once the repudiation-proof constraint for period T  is satisfied, the 
outcome in period T  — 1 is not affected by the outcome in period T, because the 
investor knows that the repudiation in period T  will not occur. The repudiation- 
proof constraints for periods t = 1, . . . ,  T  — 2 are constructed exactly in the same 
way as the repudiation-proof constraint for period T  — 1. All the repudiation-proof 
constraints are summarized by the following formula
Again, the present value of the payment to the investor, specified in the initial 
contract, cannot be greater than the present value of the payment to the investor 
in the case of repudiation in period t, which consists of the present value to the 
investor of the outcome of renegotiation in period t, plus the present value of the 
investment to be made by the investor in periods after t.
T T
1 < t < T. (3.9)
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After simplifying the inequality (3.9) we get
<ut, i (3.10)
This inequality has exactly the same meaning as inequality (2) in Hart and Moore 
(1994). The pay-off to the investor in the case of repudiation must be at least as 
much as the expenses the investor has already incurred. In other words, investments 
should be completely covered by the liquidation value or by future return. If at some 
time t this condition does not hold, the entrepreneur has an incentive to repudiate 
the initial contract in that time. Because the final return for a given investment 
path is fixed, in the case of the repudiation the investor gets less, and hence the 
entrepreneur gets more than in the case of the initial contract. This observation 
gives some intuition why condition (3.10) has to be satisfied on repudiation-proof 
investment paths.
Now let us present the full maximization problem. For the given discount factor 
/?, rate of return function s(-), and total amount of the physical capital investment 
K , the following utility function is maximized by the entrepreneur with respect to 
the number of periods T  and investment path {ItYtZi
subject to (3.1), (3.2) and (3.10), namely1"
t /.* ■  t
Y ^ I t = K , R =  s(x)dand 1 <  <
t=  1 1=1
Before we present solution to this problem let us introduce a couple of definitions.
1 As mentioned above in this subsection, we consider only investment paths that satisfy As­
sumption (3.16). We do not set such a requirement in problem (3.11) but rather derive a solution 
to this problem without Assumption (3.16) and show that the solution satisfies the assumption. 
Here we use the mathematical fact that a point which is optimal in some set will be optimal in 
any subset of this set that contains this point.
T
(3.11)
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Definition 3.8 Investment path I \ ,h  • • •, It  is feasible if and only if it satisfies 
conditions (3.1) and (3.10).
Definition 3.9 Investment path I\, / 2 • • •, It  is optimal if and only if it solves prob­
lem (3.11).
The following proposition gives necessary and sufficient conditions for the opti­
mal investment path.
Proposition 3.1 A feasible investment path is optimal iff the following 4 conditions 
are satisfied)
Ut — Lt, 2 < t  < T , (3.12)
t
= 2 (3.13)
2=1
Ui(T) > h(T)  and U,(T -  1) < I ,(T  -  1), (3.14)
and the Minimal Cost Condition MCC described below.
Minimal Cost Condition 1 If there is only one investment path that satisfies 
conditions (3.12), (3.13) and (3.14), this path satisfies the MCC. If more than one 
investment path satisfies conditions (3.12), (3.13) and (3.14), there is a unique path 
that satisfies the MCC with the following pecking order property:
• of all the possibilities select the path with the lowest value of I\;
• of all the possibilities that satisfy the condition specified in the previous item 
select the path with the lowest value of I2 ;
• of all the possibilities that satisfy the conditions specified in the previous items 
select the path with the lowest value of Is;
and so on up until period T.
t If T =  1 then condition U\{T — 1) < Ji is unnecessary. Note also that from (3.3), (3.4) and 
(3.6) it follows that U\ =  Si/2.
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The technical proof of proposition (3.1) can be found in Appendix. Here we 
present some intuition for conditions (3.12), (3.13), (3.14) and the MCC.
Condition (3.12) states that for periods 2 < t < T, the present value to the 
investor of the outcome of renegotiation in period t is equal to the liquidation 
value in period t. It means that for the optimal investment path, the liquidation 
value (3.3) is equal or higher than a half of the surplus (3.5).* If in some period t > 1 
the liquidation value (3.3) is less than a half of the surplus (3.5), then investment 
from periods t = 1, 2, . . .  , t  can be added together and invested in period 1. The 
constructed investment path will satisfy all the feasibility constraints (because the 
original investment path satisfies them) and will be shorter.
Condition (3.13) states that the feasibility constraints (3.10) for the optimal 
investment path in periods 2 < t < T  are binding. If one of these conditions is not 
binding in period t, then investment from earlier periods (for example, from period 
t — 1) can be moved to period t and this change will increase the entrepreneur’s 
utility (same output, smaller costs), while all the repudiation-proof constraints stay 
satisfied (t constraint was non-binding and change is small enough to leave it non­
binding, while all other constraints can only win from this change).
Condition (3.14) is constructed from the feasibility constraint (3.10) for t = 1. 
This condition states that the minimal T  for which this constraint is satisfied is 
optimal. This is quite reasonable given the costs of delay.
The MCC chooses among the investment paths satisfying conditions (3.12), 
(3.13) and (3.14), a path that provides the smallest payment to the investor.^ With 
the fixed outcome and fixed number of periods, it is optimal to wait and invest 
as late as possible. Thus, an analogue of the Pecking Order is generated by this 
condition.
Now let us construct an algorithm for finding the optimal investment path: this 
investment path solves problem (3.11). For a moment assume that T  is given. From
*See equation (3.6).
^As was noted earlier, when T is optimal the problem of maximizing the entrepreneur’s util­
ity (3.11) is equivalent to minimizing the payment to the investor.
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conditions (3.12) and (3.13) we derive
t - 1
I t  = Lt- ^ ^ - ‘4  2 < t < T  (3.15) 
2=1
that depends only on a choice of /id  Next, we use equation (3.1) and find the value 
of I\.  The value of solves
/ i +  /2(/i ) +  . . .  +  / t ( / i ) =  # .  (3-16)
If there is a non-uniqueness with respect to I\ then the M C C  is applied. Further, 
we use equation (3.15) and the MCC  to derive the unique values of investments 
for 2 < t < T.  Thus, for any given T  we can construct an investment path that 
is optimal when the number of periods is T.  The next task is to find the optimal 
value of T.  Condition (3.14) solves this task. It investigates whether the given T  is 
optimal. The following algorithm summarizes this discussion.
Algorithm 3.1 To derive the optimal investment path assume first that T  =  1. 
Check condition (3.14)- U  this condition holds then the project is financed in one 
period with = K . I f  this condition does not hold then assume T  — 2. Using 
equations (3.15), (3.16) and the MCC, derive the two-period investment path. Check 
condition (3.14). I f  this condition holds then the project is financed in two period. 
I f  not, then assume T  = 3, etc.
Let us illustrate Algorithm 3.1 in the following example.
Example 3.1 Let ß  = 1, K  = 5 and s(x) = 0 for  x  < c, s(x) = 2 for c < x < K , 
where c is a some constant from  [0, K], see Figure 3.4. What is the maximal value 
of c for which the project will be financed?
First, note that the project will not be financed in one period for any positive c. 
Condition (3.14) Is not satisfied because U\ = S i(l)/2  =  s ( x ) d x / 2 — ( K  — c) is
always less than = K .
'The value of every next investment depends only on values of previous investments. For a 
given value of I\ we can find I2, then /* and so on.
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Figure 3.4-’ Rate of return s(x)
Second, assume that T  =  2. Using equations (3.15), (3.16) and the MCC con­
struct an optimal investment path. Equation (3.15) is I\ — L2 — 1-2, while equation 
(3.16) is 11 4- 12  = K . Combine them and derive K  =  L2, where by definition 
L2 = fg 1 s(x)dx = 2(Ii — c). Thus, I\ =  K /2  +  c and I2 = K /2  — c. Now we apply 
condition (3.14), that is 2U\{2) = S\{2) =  JQK s(x)dx — I2 =  2K  — 2c — I2 > 21\, 
which means that c < K/6.  Thus, c < |  is the condition for the project to be 
financed in two periods.
Next, let T  be a some large number. Using the same technique* one can get that 
at the optimum I\ = K  — 2c, I2 = K  — 4c, Is = 2I2, . . .  It = 2It~i V t € [3,T\. 
It means that if I2 > 0 then h  — °°> and there exists some finite T  that 
Ylt=i h  ^  that 25 project is financeable.
Thus, c < ^  = I is the condition for a project to go forward. □
If the project is financeable the algorithm will find the solution. However, it is 
still unclear whether this solution fits the entrepreneur. The following result states 
that the entrepreneur always gets a positive final return on any optimal investment
T See Appendix for details.
path.
Result 3.2 The optimal investment path constructed by Algorithm 3.1 delivers a 
positive final return to the entrepreneur.
Proof. The proof is presented in the Appendix. □
Thus, the entrepreneur will always implement the outcome of Algorithm 3.1, 
because this outcome delivers a positive final return to him. As we mentioned in 
section 3.2 there are no outside options for the entrepreneur.
Addressing our discussion at the beginning of this section, the next result states 
that Assumption (3.16) always holds on the optimal investment path.
Result 3.3 Assumption (3.16) always holds on the optimal investment path.
Proof. The proof is presented in the Appendix. □
Thus, in this subsection we have constructed an algorithm that finds the invest­
ment path that is optimal among all feasible investment paths for which Assump­
tion (3.16) is satisfied. We also prove that the entrepreneur is better off with this 
investment path. The objective of the next subsection is to explore paths for which 
Assumption (3.16) is not satisfied.
3.3.2 Paths with possible termination
To illustrate that paths with possible termination exist, let us consider the fol­
lowing example. Imagine that the first period investment A =  Si gives the return 
Ri = 10/i =  $10, the second period investment J2 =  $2 returns P 2 =  h  — $2 and 
the third period investment / 3 =  $6 returns R3 =  0.5/3 =  $3. The total capital 
investment is K  = $9, the total surplus R = R\ -t- R2 R3 =  $15, and the discount 
factor ß  =  0.9. Let us show that such a path is repudiation-proof and that S2 < L2. 
That is, repudiation in the second period does not occur, because its outcome is 
termination of the project, and that outcome does not suit the entrepreneur. First, 
the surplus bargained in period 1 is S\ =  ß3R  — /?J2 — /?2/ 3 =  $4.275. Half of this
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surplus is enough to cover the first period investment I\ = Si. Second, the surplus 
bargained in the second period is S2 =  ß 2R  — ß h  — $6.75, which is less than the 
second period liquidation value L 2 = Ri = $10. Third, the liquidation value in the 
third period is L3 = Ri + R 2 = $12, and it is greater than I i /ß 2 + h / ß  + h  ~  $9.46. 
The constructed investment path is repudiation-proof.
Thus, there is an issue whether it is possible to improve the optimal investment 
path constructed in the previous subsection by taking into consideration investment 
paths with possible termination. The following result clarifies this issue.
Result 3.4 The solution derived with the help of Algorithm 3.1 is optimal among 
all repudiation-proof paths independent on whether Assumption (3.16) holds along 
them or not.
Proof. The proof is presented in Appendix. □
Result (3.4) allows us to derive the solution to the model outlined in the previous 
section for a general case (no other assumptions are required). For a given discount 
factor /3, rate of return function s(-) and total amount of the physical capital in­
vestment K , Algorithm 3.1 constructs the optimal investment path, if such a path 
exists.
3.3.3 Basic results, extensions and comparisons
First, let us analyze the optimal investment path. Using equations (3.5) and 
(3.15) it is straightforward to derive that the value of entrepreneur’s utility func­
tion (3.7) is equal to
Si -  h  = ß (S2 -  Li) =  . . .  =  ßT~ \ S T -  Lt ). (3.17)
The net present value of the surplus from continuing the project in every period 
t is equal to the entrepreneur’s return. If the entrepreneur’s return is lower in some 
period t, then the investor has an incentive to repudiate in that period and increase 
his return. On the other hand, if it is higher, then the project is not optimal,
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because it could be financed more quickly with smaller costs of delay. Thus, on 
the optimal investment path in every period t > 1, the net present value of the 
difference between the future surplus and collateral is the same, and equal to the 
final return of the entrepreneur.
The optimal investment path is always efficient after the agents sign the con­
tract, because after the contract is signed both agents behave so that they maximize 
the total surplus of the project: the entrepreneur never repudiates; even if he repu­
diates the investor never liquidates the firm. Both repudiation and liquidation are 
inefficient, because Lt < St V t =  1,2 . . . ,  Tfi
Second, consider some basic extensions. Let us allow the entrepreneur to have 
wealth greater than zero. This change produces two results.
Result 3.5 It is optimal for the entrepreneur to invest all his wealth at the very 
beginning.
Proof. The proof is presented in Appendix. □
Result 3.6 Some of the profitable projects will not go forward even if an entrepreneur’s 
wealth is greater than zero.
Result 3.6 is different from the analogous result of Neher (1999), who found in 
his less general model that all the profitable projects go forward if the entrepreneur’s 
wealth is greater than zero. To illustrate the last result let us consider example 3.1 
from section 3.3. Let c in that example be equal to 2 and let the wealth of the 
entrepreneur u  be equal to 0.5. The project is profitable because its return is 
R = 2(K -  c) = $6, while its costs are K  — $5. Let us show that the project does 
not go ahead. From result 3.5 we know that the optimal strategy of the entrepreneur 
is to invest all his wealth at the very beginning. It means that the investor needs to 
finance only K' = $4.5, and only d = $1.5 of these costs are fixed. From example 3.1
*Note, however, that before the contract has been signed there is some inefficiency due to costs 
of delay. We mentioned this inefficiency in the end of the previous section.
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we know that the projects are financed if and only if d < This condition does 
not hold here, which means that the project does not proceed.
Now let us relax Assumption (3.4), namely the total amount of the physical 
investment is fixed at K.  In general, we can assume that the total amount of the 
physical capital investment is only bounded from above as in Neher (1999)
t= T
^ h < K (3.18)
or not bounded at all
t= T
y ^ / t €(0,oo).  (3.19)
t=  1
To find the optimal value of the physical capital investment we solve another opti­
mization problem. Namely, for all feasible values of the physical capital investment 
we construct optimal investment paths, and find among them such a path that max­
imizes the entrepreneur’s utility. In other words, we optimize optimal investment 
paths with respect to the physical capital investment. Thus, this set-up allows us 
to find an endogenous value of the physical capital investment.^
Let us illustrate this extension in the following example. Imagine that the in­
vestment project is construction of a building and the last piece of investment is 
painting this building red. Potential buyers of this building do not like red and will 
repaint the building yellow. It means that painting itself has negative productivity. 
The activity provides no returns, but has some positive costs. The optimal strategy 
for the entrepreneur is to sell the building unpainted, which can be regarded as 
maximization with respect to the the physical capital investment.
Next, let us focus solely on the optimal investment path. Is it always monoton- 
ically increasing? The answer is ‘no’. In the Appendix we give an example of an 
optimal investment path with decreasing values of investments. Again, this result
*Note, that Neher (1999) always gets either the whole K  is invested, either the project is not 
financed. The reason why the solution for our model is more complicated is because the increase 
in K  does not always mean the increase in the entrepreneur’s utility. For example when s(-) is 
some continuous decreasing function from some positive value to zero it is not optimal to invest 
the whole K.  The segment where s < l / ß  by itself has a negative productivity.
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is different from the finding of Neher (1999), derived for the constant rate of return 
cased The explanation for the difference is as follows.
In the general case the values of investments are determined by collaterals, while 
collaterals are determined by rate of return functions. As a rate of return function 
can be such that the values of collaterals for new investments are decreasing, the 
sequence of investments for such functions will be decreasing as well.* For an eco­
nomic reasoning, we can think about some seasonality. In Summer there is positive 
productivity, while in Winter the productivity is negative. It means that after Win­
ter the value of collateral for new investments decreases, and the value of the next 
investment after Winter will be smaller than the investment in Winter. Another 
example of this is the case of Federal Express, discussed in Gompers (1995): the 
first investment in Federal Express was £12.25 million, the second was £6.4 million 
and the third was £3.88 million. Clearly, the sequence of investments is decreasing.
Further, another result, which is different to an analogous result of Neher (1999), 
is described as follows. Neher claims that with ß —* 1 all profitable ventures become 
financeable. With more general return functions, as presented here, this is no longer 
true. For instance, in example 3.1, if c = 2 the project will not be financed for any 
T  and for any ß. However this project is still profitable, because 2(K — c) > K.  
The reason why the project is not financed is because, the returns are very bad at 
the beginning of the project, and such bad returns do not produce large enough 
collaterals to secure next period’s investments.
Finally, in the Appendix we present conjectures to the extensions of Neher 
(1999). First, we show that an increase in both the discount factor and rate of 
return function improves the optimal investment path. Second, we find that an 
increase in tangibility of the physical assets improves the optimal investment path. 
Third, we prove that an increase in growth of physical assets in outside value also 
improves the optimal investment path.
tNeher (1999) has a monotonically increasing sequence of investments starting from the sec­
ond investment; that is, every next investment after the second one is bigger than the previous 
investment.
Tn the constant rate of return case these values are always increasing, otherwise the project is 
unprofitable.
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3.4 Repudiation of both agents
In this section we consider the situation when both agents are able to start rene­
gotiation of the initial contract.*  The investor can initiate renegotiation by refusing 
to contribute the previously agreed round of investment, while the entrepreneur as 
usual can trigger the renegotiation process by refusing to work.* Thus, only for pur­
poses of this section we substitute Assumption (3.10) by the following assumption.
Assumption 3.17 Both the entrepreneur and the investor can start the renegotia­
tion process.
Before we proceed we would like to return to our original example and show some 
reasons why we have to put an additional assumption in the case of this extension. 
Let rate of return s be constant and equal to 1.8, total cost of capital investment K  
be equal to $1, and discount factor ß  be equal to 1. In the introduction we showed 
that when only the entrepreneur can repudiate, the investment path I\ =  $0.6 and 
I2 =  $0.4 is feasible. Let us show that this path is not feasible when both agents 
have the right to repudiate and all the other assumptions of the main model are the 
same. Imagine that after the output of the first period is released, but before the 
second period investment is made, the investor initiates repudiation and triggers 
liquidation. In this case his cost is just I\ =  $0.6, while his return is s * I\ — $1.08. 
The net return for him is $0.48, which is higher than zero return specified in the 
initial contract. Thus, now we are concerned not only about opportunistic behavior 
of the entrepreneur, but also about opportunistic behavior of the investor.*
Although the opportunistic behavior of the entrepreneur is very complicated*, 
the opportunistic behavior of the investor is easy to work out with the help of the
^The third and the last situation when only the investor is able to initiate renegotiation process 
is trivial. In this case there is no threat for the investor and all the profitable projects are financed 
in one period.
*Neher (1999) describes this extension in the introduction and claims that the results for it are 
exactly the same as in his main model. However, here we show that the results axe qualitatively 
different.
^Both types of opportunistic behaviors are explained in details in Chapter 1 of Hart (1995).
*A lot of research has been devoted to this topic. See, for example, Hart and Moore (1994) 
and Neher (1999).
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following assumption. Let us assume that during the time after the new output is 
released, and before the next investment is made, the victim of repudiation has all 
the property rights with respect to the new output.1" The investor, if he is not the 
victim, gets these property rights only after he invests the next piece. Thus, the 
liquidation value for the time after the new output is released, and before the next 
investment is made is as follows
L /t
Lt_i when the investor repudiates,
Lt when the entrepreneur repudiates.
(3.20)
In Figure 3.5 we present the sequence of events and liquidation values for period t.
-  L't - --------—-------------------------Lt
Previous
Output
Investment Human Capital Output
Figure 3.5: Sequence of events and liquidation values for period t
The following result with respect to this set-up holds.
Result 3.7 Both agents might repudiate only straight after the next piece of invest­
ment is supplied.
Proof. The proof is presented in Appendix. □
The utility function of the entrepreneur in the case when both agents can repu­
diate is the same as in the main model, specifically
T
0 r R - Y J ß t~Xh- (3.21)
£=1
^The victim of repudiation is an agent who does not initiate the repudiation process.
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The only difference arises with respect to the constraints. Because both the en­
trepreneur and the investor can initiate the renegotiation process in the last period, 
the constraint with respect to the last period has to be binding. That is
All the other constraints (3.10) do not appear in this extension, because even if one 
of the agents starts renegotiation in periods t =  1,2, . . . , T  — 1, the other one will 
have a chance to renegotiate the contract again in the last period. The following 
proposition, proved in the Appendix, determines the optimal investment path in 
the case of this extension.
P roposition  3.2 When both agents can repudiate, the optimal investment path al­
ways has two periods. This path is a solution of (3.21) under (3.22).
The collateral of the investor in the first period comes about due to his possi­
bility to renegotiate the result of the first-period repudiation later (in the second 
period). The collateral in the second period is the same as in the main model, that 
is the output produced in the first period. Surprisingly, Proposition 3.2 shows that 
all profitable two-period investment paths that solve (3.21) under (3.22), can be 
financed.
This extension to the model allows the investor to counteract the entrepreneur’s 
right to repudiate. Hence it helps to get the project financed more efficiently. In 
Figure 3.6 we present a graphical illustration of the efficiency improvement in the 
constant rate of return case. The horizontal axis depicts projects with different 
rates of return s, while the vertical axis depicts different discount factors ß.
Area A includes all the projects that are financed in one period, while area B 
includes only the projects that are financed in two periods, and area C includes only 
the projects that are financed in three periods. We do not show the projects that 
are financed in more than three periods, because the figure becomes too difficult to 
illustrate. However, it can be seen from Figure 3.6 that area B  is smaller than area 
A, area C is smaller than area B. That is, every next corresponding to more periods
T
(3.22)
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Figure 3.6: Illustration to the extension when both agents can repudiate
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area is less than the previous one. Area A + B  +  C +  D represents all the projects 
financed when both agents can repudiate, while A + B + C + D  + E  represents all the 
profitable projects. Thus, even in the case when both agents are able to repudiate 
there are still some efficiency losses, shown in Figure 3.6 as area E. The efficiency 
improvement is area D, minus the projects that are financed in more than three 
periods.
In this section we considered the extension to the main model when both agents 
are able to start renegotiation of the initial contract. We found that there is some 
efficiency improvement in comparison with the main model in this case. In the next 
section we examine an extension when the costs of staged financing are different 
from the costs described in the main model.
3.5 Different costs of staged financing
In this section we consider another extension, which explores a model with differ­
ent costs of staged financing. We assume that the entrepreneur instead of financing 
in many periods chops the initial period into a number of small periods. On the one 
hand, there is no costs of delay from this extension. Up-front financing and staged 
financing both finish in one period time. On the other hand, there are some costs 
associated with this chopping procedure. These costs are gross costs and they also 
incorporate differences in discounting within a period. We call these costs c(T), 
where c'(T) > 0 and c"{T) < 0 V T  > 1.
The following example illustrates how such an outcome may occur in practise. 
Imagine that in the first Best case a project can be financed in 4 years, while in the 
Second Best case it can be financed in 16 years.* The decision to meet once a year 
will incur additional costs, but will probably be better than the decision to extend 
the production process across the 16 years.t
*We use the term First Best to refer to the solution without the hold-up problem, and the term 
Second Best to refer to the solution given in section 3.2.
tHowever, this decision is possible only when the entrepreneur can finish the first part in the 
first year, the second part in the second year, etc and this is different from what is assumed in the 
main model. This extension is ‘another corner’ and the real situation is somewhere in between.
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The utility function of the entrepreneur in the case of this extension is as follows:
T
R  — Y ,  h  — c(T) c(T). (3.23)
It means that maximizing the entrepreneur’s utility function is equivalent to 
minimizing the number of periods T. This result is also derived in the main model, 
but here it is much more straightforward.
The repudiation-proof constraints in this extension are as follows:
Next step is to realize that we are in the conditions of the main model with 
ß = id  We construct a graphical interpretation of Algorithm 3.1 in this case.
From the equations 3.1, 3.3 and 3.15 it follows that
Graphically it means that It  is determined in such a way that the integral of s(x) 
from 0 to At - i = K  — It  is equal to K , see Figure 3.7.
Knowing the value of It , we find the value of It- i in the following way. This 
value has to be such that the integral of s(x) from A t - 2  •= K  — It  — It -  1 to 
Ar_i =  K  — IT is equal to It , see Figure 3.8. Moreover, it follows that A + B = K  
and A = At- i , which means that B = It - Thus, the procedure of finding It -  1 is 
the same as the procedure of finding It  with the the total amount of the physical 
capital investment being K  — It -
This algorithm can be continued. In the same way as we have constructed 
It - 2 , we can construct It - 3 , then It- a and so on. The criterion for finishing this
For example, it might be the case that every part by itself can be finished not quicker than in 2 
years, which means that the project can be finished not quicker than in 8 years.
Mhe only difference is that some projects that are financeable in the main model will not be 
financed here, because here there are the additional costs c(T).
1 < t  < T. (3.24)
(3.25)
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Lj 1
0 At-1 K x
Figure 3.7: Illustration to graphical interpretation: construction of I j
algorithm is as follows. Since the minimal feasible T  is optimal, for every T  we check 
whether S\(T)/2 > I\. Thus, before we construct It , we check whether the project 
is financed in one period. After we construct It , we check whether the project is 
financed in two periods, or A^-i is financed in one period, that is S\(2)/2 > I\ — Ai- 
After we construct Ir-i,  we check whether the project is financed in i -+- 2 periods, 
or in other words Kt - i- i K  — It — • • • — I r - i - 1  is financed in one period. That 
is 5i(T)/2 > Ar_i_i, where T = i +  2.
There are two possible outcomes of this algorithm:
1) At some stage we finish the procedure, which means that we have found a 
candidate for the optimal investment path. If this candidate gives a higher outcome 
than c[T) then the project can be financed.
2) We cannot finish the procedure, which means that this project cannot be 
financed.
This observation concludes the graphical interpretation.
One very strong conclusion follows form this graphical interpretation. The op­
timal investment path does not depend on the form of the cost function c(T). The 
higher cost function can only make projects non-financed. Such a strong result is 
due to the assumption that 1/T of the period is enough to implement one round of
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Figure 3.8: Illustration to graphical interpretation: construction of It - i
investment.
In this section we considered tan extension to the main model, where there are 
costs of staged financing due to the chopping of investment period. We found that 
this extension is equivalent to the main model when there is high enough outcome 
and no discounting. We used a graphical interpretation to illustrate the solution to 
this extension.
3.6 Conclusion
The main results of this chapter are as follows. First, we construct a solution to 
a generalized model of Neher (1999). Instead of a constant rate of return function 
we consider a variable one. Algorithm 3.1 describes the solution.
Second, we find that there exist repudiation-proof investment paths on which 
the outcome of repudiation in some periods is termination of the investment project. 
Such an outcome is not suitable for the entrepreneur and because of that he never 
repudiates in these periods. This can be considered as another source of collateral 
for the investor. This type of collateral has not been mentioned previously.
Third, we find the optimal investment path for a general problem with all types of
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collateral available and show that this path does not use termination as a collateral.
Fourth, we get the following results that are different from the results of Neher 
(1999). Neher (1999) found that all profitable projects become financed either 
without discounting or with positive wealth of the entrepreneur.* This is not the 
case in our model. We also do not obtain the result that the sequence of investments 
is always increasing.
Fifth, we construct two extensions to the main model. One is when both agents 
can repudiate the initial contract. We find that in this case there is some efficiency 
improvement in comparison with the main model. The other extension is when 
there are only costs of staged financing due to chopping of investment period. We 
discover that this extension is equivalent to the main model when there is a high 
enough outcome and no discounting. We use a graphical interpretation to illustrate 
the solution to this extension.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 3.1
Before we proceed let us bring to mind all the equations we are going to use. 
The problem of the entrepreneur is
subject to (3.1), (3.2) and (3.10), that is
T r K  t
It = K, R =  / s(x)dx and ßl~lh  < Ut, 1 < t < T .
+— i Jo  i
Tn Appendix we present a condition on the rate of return function that is sufficient to ensure 
that the first of the results is satisfied.
T
max
t , { i t } \ z T
(3.11)
£=1
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The conditions of Proposition 3.1 are
Ut = Lt, 2 < t < T, (3.12)
t
Y j ßi- lI, = Ul, 2 < t < T , (3.13)
i=l
> Ii(T)and U,(T- 1) < -  1), (3.14)
and
Minimal Cost Condition 2 If there is only one investment path that satisfies 
conditions (3.12), (3.13) and (3.I f) , this path satisfies Minimal Cost Condition. If 
more than one investment path satisfies conditions (3.12), (3.13) and (3.1 f), there 
is a unique path that satisfies Minimal Cost Condition with the following pecking 
order property:
• of all the possibilities select the path with the lowest value of I\;
•  of all the possibilities that satisfy the previous item select the path with the 
lowest value of I2;
• of all the possibilities that satisfy previous items select the path with the lowest 
value of 1^;
and so on up until period T .
To prove the proposition, we firstly assume that T  is as small as possible (condi­
tion (3.14) holds) and find which path is optimal in this case. We show that such a 
path has to satisfy conditions (3.12), (3.13) and the MCC. To prove that this path 
is optimal with respect to all feasible paths we show that it delivers higher utility 
than any path for V  > T.
64
(3.14) =► (3.12)
First, we prove that from condition (3.14), condition (3.12) follows. That is for 
the minimal feasible T
Lt > S t{T) / 2 V f =  2 ,3 , . . . , r .
This statement can be proved by contradiction. Assume that for optimal investment 
path 7 i,. . . ,  It for some t > 2 this property does not hold.* Let us construct some 
other shorter path with V  =  T  — t +  1, where I[ := A*, I2 := / t+ i,..., I^-t+i := It - 
This path satisfies all the feasibility constraints because the original path satisfies 
them. Examine this issue in more detail.
The feasibility constraint (3.1) is satisfied by construction. Let us prove that 
the feasibility constraint (3.10) with respect to I[ holds, that is I[ = I\ +  . . .  +  It < 
S[(T —1+ l)/2  =  U{, where S[(T —1+ 1) is a surplus to be bargained over in period 
one. On the one hand, it is straight forward to show that this surplus is the same 
as St{T) for the initial path, that is S[(T — t + 1) =  St(T). On the other hand, 
from the assumption that condition (3.12) does not hold in period t and from the 
feasibility constraint (3.10) for It it follows that St(T) / 2 =  Ut > It +  • • • +  A//?*-1, 
where the right-hand side is always not less than 7i +  . . .  +  Jt * The last two facts 
prove the first feasibility constraint for the new path. If t =  T, there is only one 
feasibility constraint, and as we have seen it holds. In this case we can go straight 
to the next step. If t < T, there are some other feasibility constraints. Our goal is 
to prove them as well.
Now we prove that the feasibility constraint with respect to I'2 holds. We modify 
inequality (3.10) for period t + 1 to gett
r2 =  i t+i < Lt+1 - h / ß * - . . . - i t/ ß <  Lt+i -  (a  + . . .  +  i t) /ß = l 2 - r j ß .
jIf there is a set of indexes where condition (3.12) does not hold then t is the largest index in 
this set.
^Note, that in period t + 1 condition (3.12) holds because by definition t is the largest among 
indexes for which that condition does not hold.
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The same way we prove the feasibility constraint for any where 2 <  <
T - t  + 1
/' =  = 1 ,+,.! -  / 1 //5i+ 1 _ 2  -  . . .  -  I i + t - i / ß  <
<  U + t - i  — {Ii  +  • • • +  I t ) I ß 1 1 —  I t + i / ß v 2 — • • • — h + t - 2 / ß  =
=  U m -  1 -  J J / / * - 1 -  -  • • • -  / ' - 1 / / 5 .
Thus, the constructed T  — t + 1 path is feasible. Let us show that it delivers 
higher utility than the original path. To do this we consider another T period 
path, that has zero investments during the first t — 1 periods, and then coincides 
with the T  — t + 1 path, that is I" =  0 V i = 1, . . . ,  t — 1, I" =  I\ +  . . .  +  It, 
I'l — li V t +1 < i < T. Now we show that the new T-period path delivers
higher utility than the original T -period path and lower utility than the T  — t + 1 
path, see Figure 3.9.
The first step is quite straightforward. Both paths generate the same return ß TR,  
while the original path has higher costs of delay because some of the investments 
were made earlier
ptr -  <ß
t=i t=l
The second step is also not difficult. The new T-period path is actually T — t + 1- 
period path that starts after waiting for t — 1 periods. Because of costs of delay the 
utility from the constructed T-period path will be l / ß l~l smaller than the utility 
from the T — t + 1-period path
T T - t + 1 T—t+l
ß TR  -  y^/3*-1/," = ß t- i {ßT~t+iR -  ß ^ 'K )  ßT~t+1R -  Y
t=i t=l f=i
Thus, we have showed that the constructed T — t +  1-period path is both feasible 
and delivers higher utility than the optimal T-period path. We get a contradiction.
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Figure 3.9: Investment paths { /i}W f, and t+1
(3.14) and (3.12) =► (3.13)
Second, we show that condition (3.13) also has to be satisfied when conditions
(3.14) and (3.12) hold. Here we use the same approach as Neher (1999): we prove 
the statement by contradiction. Assume that for optimal investment path I i , . . . ,  It 
for some t > 2, the following strict inequality holds Y?i=i < Ut. To produce a 
contradiction we construct another investment path by moving e investment from 
/ t_i to I t and show that all the feasibility constraints hold and the new path is 
preferred by the entrepreneur.t Let us examine this statement in more detail.
With respect to constraints for periods after t this change is feasible because 
it only diminishes the costs of the previous investments. From condition (3.12)
 ̂It~ i has to be strictly positive, otherwise the original investment path is not optimal as t — 1-th 
piece of investment can be removed.
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the right-hand side of (3.10) is Ui = Li V i = 2 , . . . ,  T. These liquidation values 
are the same after the change, while the left-hand sides of (3.10) diminish because 
e investment was moved to a later period. Thus after the change the feasibility 
constraints for periods after t are satisfied.
The constraint for t is satisfied because e is chosen to be small enough.
The constraints for periods before t are satisfied because they were satisfied 
before the change was made. Both the left-hand side and the right-hand side of 
(3.10) are exactly the same as before.
The change is beneficial for the entrepreneur, because it only diminishes the costs 
of the investment. Thus, we get a contradiction because the original investment path 
was optimal.
(3.12) , (3.13) and (3.14) = »  MCC
Consider investment path i i , . . . ,  i r  th a t satisfies conditions (3.12), (3.13), (3.14) 
and the MCC and some other investment path  / ( , . . . ,  I'T th a t satisfies only (3.12),
(3.13) and (3.14), bu t does not satisfy the MCC. Let us prove th a t At <  A't V 
t =  1, 2, . . .  , T  — 1.
The inequality for t = 1 follows straight away from condition MCC: Ai =  I\ and 
I\ is the minimum.
The inequality for t =  2 , . . . ,  T  — 1 can be proved by contradiction. Imagine 
At > A't for some t = 2 , . . . , T  — 1. Let us construct some other path  {I"Y t£  
tha t has A" =  min[At , AJ] V t =  2 , . . .  ,T . On the one hand, it is straight forward 
to show tha t this path  satisfies all the feasibility constraints because both original 
paths satisfy them.* On the other hand, this path  delivers higher utility than  any 
of {ItYtZi and {I'tYtZi investment paths because it has smaller costs.t Thus, we 
show th a t condition (3.13) is not necessary for an optimal investment path, which
Tt is always possible to move from the minimum for some period i to either the minimum or 
the maximum for the next period i 4-1, because one of the original paths can do it and the new 
path has smaller costs. It means that it is always possible to move to the minimum because the 
constraint for period i 4-1 allows the investor to invest less.
^The formal proof of this statement can be seen in the next paragraph.
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Figure 3.10: Investment paths {ItYtS and {ItYtS
contradicts to previous sections of the proof.*
Next step is to show that path {ItYtS  that has the property At < A[ V t = 
1,2, . . . , T  — 1 delivers higher utility than {I'tYt=\- Note, that both investment 
paths have the same return ßT R. Let us show that the costs for the investment 
path {ItYtS  are smaller.
Let us firstly compare costs of It investment for both paths. Note, that It > It 
because Y S S  h  =  Y ltS  = K  and At- i < A'r _1. It means that for {ItYtS  Path 
the whole It was invested in the last period, while for {I'tY tS  Pa*h only some part 
of It was invested in the last period and the rest was invested in period T  — 1. 
So, It has higher costs for path {I'tY tS• Next, we compare costs of 
investments for both paths and using the same approach get similar results. Thus, 
the costs of {ItYtS  investment path are smaller, which means that it delivers higher 
utility than the {I'tYtS investment path, and consequently we prove that condition 
MCC is necessary.
To summarize, we have proved that for the minimal feasible T  the optimal path
*If investment paths {ItYt=i and {I'tYtS are different then at least in some period t I" < 
It, which means that condition (3.13) is not satisfied on investment path {I'tYtS•> because by 
construction it is satisfied on {ItYtS•
satisfies conditions (3.12), (3.13) and the MCC. Now the last part of the proof, we 
show that this path, that is the path satisfying conditions (3.12)-(3.14) and the 
MCC, yields to the entrepreneur a higher utility than any feasible path for some 
larger T.
(3.12)-(3.14) and MCC gives higher utility than any T' > T path
Consider optimal investment path for T, namely and any path for
T +  i, namely I'T+i. Note that the path for T + i during the first i + t periods
invests not less than At. Let us consider this statement in more detail.
Firstly, we assume that A'+1 < I\. We construct another T-period path A'/ = 
min[Af, AJ+t], V t =  1, . . . ,  T. Let us prove that this path is feasible. The feasibility 
for t = 2, . . . ,  T can be proved using the same approach as in the previous subsection. 
The costs for the new path are smaller than in any of two original paths, and that 
allows us to move from the minimum to the minimum. The feasibility for t = 1 
is a bit more tricky. To prove it let us rewrite the first feasibility constraint for 
I i , . . . ,  It  path in the following way
h  < ßT(R - h i ß - . . . -  h i ß 1' 1 -  h / ß T).
From this inequality it follows that the first feasibility constraint for the new path 
is satisfied because I" < I\ and the costs for the new path are smaller. Thus, the 
new path is feasible and it delivers higher utility than the original T-period path, 
which is optimal among T-period paths. This is a contradiction.
Tp prove the original statement for any 2 < t < T  we again use the same 
T-period path A" = min[At,A '+t], V t = 1 , . . . , T .  We show that the new path 
is feasible and delivers higher utility than the original T-period path. We get a 
contradiction and conclude the proof of the original statement.
The property At < AJ+i ensures that the investment path delivers
higher utility than This observation concludes the last part of the
"Tor the prove of a very similar statement see the previous subsection.
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proof.
Note, that the investment path satisfying conditions (3.12)-(3.14) and the MCC 
is unique by construction.
Proofs of results
Result 3.2
To prove Result 3.2 we use Assumption (3.16) for period T, that is
ST > LT j (3.16)
where from equation (3.5)
SV = ßR,
and from equation (3.15)
t= T
LT = J 2 ß ‘~Th-
£= 1
We multiply inequality (3.16) by ßT~l and get
ß TR - J 2 ß t~l l t>0.
t= l
which means that the entrepreneur’s utility (3.7) is always non-negative on the 
optimal investment path once Assumption (3.16) is satisfied.
Result 3.3
Now we prove that Assumption (3.16) is always satisfied on the optimal invest­
ment path. Firstly, note that this assumption holds for t = 1. Si is positive because 
the project is profitable and L\ — 0 by construction, that is
S i  > 0  —  L\.
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Next, prove it for t = 2. This is easy to do with help of modified equations (3.5), 
(3.15) and (3.14), that is
S 2 = S i / ß 1 2 , L/2 = h / ß  +  I 2 and I\ < S i / 2 =>• S 2 > T2 .
Now, let us prove Assumption (3.16) V t = 3 , . . . ,  T. Because S 2 > L2 from modified 
equations (3.5) and (3.15)
St — St- 1/ ß + It, Lt — Lt~ 1/ ß +  It => St > Lt V t — 3 , . . . ,  T.
Result 3.4
Here we prove that the optimal investment path derived by the algorithm is 
better than any other repudiation-proof path for which Assumption (3.16) is not 
satisfied.
Let us consider an investment path that has
St < Lt
for some 2 < t < T, and let us prove that in that period condition (3.10) is satisfied. 
That is
t
^ < L t . (3.10)
i = l
To prove this inequality we use the fact that the project is profitable, that is
i = T
ßTR ~ Y ^ ß i- 1Ii> 0.
2=1
We divide it by ß l~l and using equation (3.5) derive
t
2=1
Combining this inequality with the assumption that Lt > St, we prove condi-
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tion (3.10) for period t. It means that in all periods where Lt > St condition (3.10) 
is satisfied. In other periods it is also satisfied because the investment path is 
repudiation-proof. This means that the investment path is feasible for optimization 
problem (3.11). Once it is feasible it is worse than the optimal investment path 
constructed by Algorithm 1.
Result 3.5
Here we prove that the optimal strategy for the entrepreneur is to invest all his 
wealth at the very beginning. The proof consists of two parts. In the first part we 
prove that it is optimal to invest all the wealth at the very beginning rather than in 
some later time. In the second part we show that it is optimal to invest the wealth 
rather than only use it as a collateral.
Let {It}tZo be optimal investment path with the entrepreneur’s wealth being 
invested at the beginning of the second period as a part of I2 (we call it an old 
path). There exist two cases: I\ > to and I\ < uj. For the first case let us show that 
{ItYtZ0 path is feasible when the entrepreneur’s wealth is invested at the beginning 
of the first period as a part of I\ (we call it a new path). Both paths produce the 
same return for the entrepreneur. Let us use feasibility of the old path to prove 
feasibility of the new path. Condition (3.15) for the old path for periods t > 2 
is exactly the same as for the new path. Changes appear in the first two periods 
only and do not affect the later periods. Thus, we only need to examine whether 
conditions for the first two periods are satisfied. First, consider condition (3.14) for 
the first period. The investor’s part in the first period for the new path is I\ — u, 
which is less than his part for the old path, Ii. It means that condition (3.14) for the 
new path holds once the similar condition for the old path holds. Now we prove that 
condition (3.15) for the second period holds. The analog of condition (3.15) for the 
old path for t = 2 is L2+lj = I2 + h /ß-  On the other hand, the feasibility constraint 
for the new path is L2 > I2 + ( I i~u) /ß  and it can be easily derived from the previous 
equality. Thus, the new path is feasible, but not optimal (condition (3.15) is not 
satisfied for the second period).
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As the next step consider the second case with I\ < u. Using the similar tech­
nique as in previous paragraphs one can prove that it is optimal for the entrepreneur 
to invest in the first period at least I\ by himself. Let us prove that it is optimal 
to invest the whole uj in the first period. Before we begin our proof let us find an 
answer to the following question. If the entrepreneur does invest only I\ in the first 
period what is his best strategy afterwards? From the previous paragraph we know 
that he would invest the rest in the second period, if the second-period investment 
is not large enough then what is left goes to the third period and so on. Now, we 
compare the case when the entrepreneur invests the whole wealth at the first period 
and the case when he invests it gradually. To realize that the first case is better 
note that the entrepreneur bears no costs on his investment in this set-up, while 
there are benefits from investing earlier (the project can be finished earlier). This 
observation concludes the second step of the proof.
If the entrepreneur’s wealth is invested in some period t > 2, then using the 
same technique one can prove that the corresponding optimal investment path is 
dominated by the optimal path with the entrepreneur’s wealth invested in the first 
period.
Now let us show that it is optimal to invest all the wealth rather than use it 
as a collateral. The case with collateral is even worse than investing the wealth in 
period T. If it is not invested in period T  then the costs of it are u/ß ,  while the 
benefits are u. This observation concludes the proof.
Result 3.7
In the time interval between this period’s ’Investment’ and the next period’s 
’Investment’, the investor has exactly the same outcomes of repudiation. As there 
is discounting he has an incentive to repudiate only at the beginning of this time 
interval, that is straight after he supplies the next piece of investment. He does not 
repudiate at any other moments in given period t.
With respect to the entrepreneur, everything is exactly the same as in the main 
model. It is optimal to repudiate straight after the investor gets another piece of
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investment sunk.
Proofs of other results
Proof of results in example 1
For a some large number T  let us find the optimal investment path using the 
following algorithm, which is a bit different from algorithm 1. Firstly, let us use 
condition (3.14)
t—T
U, = S J 2 =  (/? -  ]T  It) /2 = ( 2 (K — c) — (K — h ) ) / 2  > I u
t= 2
that means
h < K -  2c.
Now use condition (3.15) for t =  2 to get
I2 = L i - I  i = 2 (Ii -  c) -  h  =  h  -  2c < K  -  4c.
Next, let us prove that It = 2/t_x V t 6 [3, T]. Use condition (3.15) for periods t — 1 
and t V t € [3, T]
Lt —  Ii + . . .  + It+i and Lt~ i  — I\ +  . . .  +  It- 
From equation (3.3) that define Lt and Lt~\ it follows
Lt = Lt-i + 2 I t.
Combining these facts together we get It = 2/t_i V t € [3, T\. The proof is complete. 
Decreasing sequence of investments
Let us consider the following example. The first dollar of investment returns 2 
dollars, the second dollar of investment returns 0.6 dollars and the last 0.6 dollars
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return 1.2 dollars, see Figure 3.11.
2
0.6
0 1 2 2.6
Figure 3.11: Rate of return s(x)
Let us show that investment path Ii = $1, I2 =  $1 and / 3 = $0.6 is opti­
mal. Firstly, the project is not financed in one period because S\( l )/2 =  R/2 = 
f g 6 s(x)dx/2 =  $1.9 < K  = $2.6.
Secondly, the project is not financed in two periods. Investments I\ — $2 and 
I2 = $0.6 satisfy condition (3.15), L2 = f j 1 s(x)dx = $2.6 = I\ + I2 = $2.6. Let us 
examine condition (3.14): S\{2)/2 =  (R — h ) / ^  =  $1 < I\ = $2. Condition (3.14) 
is not satisfied, which means that the project is not financed in two periods.
Now we take three-period investment path Ii = $1, / 2 =  $1, / 3 = $0.6 and show 
that it is feasible. Condition (3.15) is satisfied, L2 =  fg1 s(x)dx = $2 =  I\ + I2 = $2 
and L3 =  fg1+l2 s(x)dx = $2.6 =  I\ + I2 +  I3 =  $2.6. Condition (3.14) is also 
satisfied, 5i(3)/2 = (R — I2 — / 3)/2 =  $1 =  ii  =  $1.
Thus, the three-period investment path is optimal. One can see that this path 
is decreasing.
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Conjectures to extensions of Neher (1999)
In this section we generalize comparative statics and extensions of Neher(1999). 
The following propositions (3.3), (3.4) and (3.5), are modified versions of proposi­
tions 4, 4A and 4B of Neher(1999), that hold for the case of a variable s.
Comparative statics with respect to ß and s(x)
Proposition 3.3 For any given project consider the optimal investment path con­
structed using the algorithm 1. As ß or s(x) increases, the path continues to satisfy 
all the feasibility constraints J
Proof. If ß increases then the left-hand sides of feasibility constraints (3.10) 
decrease and the right-hand sides of feasibility constraints (3.10) do not decrease 
(liquidation values stay the same, while the surpluses increase). It means that after 
the change in ß  the old optimal investment path is still feasible.
The increase in s(x) only affects the liquidation values and the surpluses. Both 
constitute the right-hand sides of constraints (3.10) and both increase. Again the 
old optimal investment path is still feasible.
In other words, an increase in ß decreases the costs associated with delay, while 
an increase in s(z) increases the profitability of the project. Both of the changes 
have only positive effects and can only make the entrepreneur better off. The same 
investment path has to be feasible. □
Let us define
L(s(x)) := f  s(x)dx. (3.26)
Jo
An interesting corollary to Proposition (3.3) is
Corollary 3.3 If  L(s(-)) is first order stochastically dominated by L(s'(-)) then the 
optimal investment path for s'(-) is feasible with s(-).
* By increase in s(x) we mean increase in s for some x, where s for all other x is not less than 
previously.
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Proof. Similar to the proof of the proposition. If the liquidation values for s 
are always higher than the liquidation values for s' on the same investment path 
then the path, that is feasible with a', will be feasible with s. □
Change in tangibility of the physical assets
To construct Proposition 3.4 let us consider the following extension to the model. 
Now, let the last piece invested It: not be completely sunk. It means that if It has 
not had the whole period with the entrepreneur, it is possible to trade It for a l t 
where 0 < a < 1. li It has had the whole period with the entrepreneur then it has 
the same value as in the main model. So the liquidation value of the project for 
period t is
This little change to the model does not change the algorithm of finding the solution. 
The result of the Proposition 3.1 is valid. The following comparative statics with 
respect to this extension holds.
using the algorithm 1 with Lt defined by equation (3.27). As a increases the path 
continues to satisfy all the feasibility constraints.
Proof. An increase in a only increases the liquidation values that stay in the 
right-hand side of feasibility constraints (3.10). After that change, the right-hand 
sides can only increase and the feasibility constraints will be satisfied. □
Growth of physical assets in outside value
Another possible change to the main model is to let the physical assets that have 
had at least one period with the entrepreneur grow in outside value at rate 7. It 
means that the liquidation value of the project for period t + 1 is
(3.27)
Proposition 3.4 For any given project consider the investment path constructed
(3.28)
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This change in liquidation value also does not alter the algorithm of finding the 
optimal investment path. The following comparative statics with respect to this 
extension holds.
Proposition 3.5 For any given project consider the investment path constructed 
using the algorithm 1 with Lt defined by equation (3.28). As 7 increases the path 
continues to satisfy all the feasibility constraints.
Proof. The proof of this proposition is very similar to the proof of the previous 
proposition. Increase in 7 only increases the liquidation values that stay in the 
right-hand side of feasibility constraints (3.10). After that change, the right-hand 
sides can only increase and the feasibility constraints will be satisfied. □
Sufficient condition for one of the Neher’s results
In this section we derive sufficient conditions for the following result of Neher to 
be satisfied: as ß — *  1 all profitable projects become financeable.
From Neher (1999) we know that once the rate of return function is constant the 
result mentioned above holds. Let us introduce such changes to the rate of return 
function that this property does not change. Really, let us assume that the rate 
of return function is monotonically decreasing and compare this situation with the 
situation when the rate of return function is constant and equal to the average rate 
of return for the variable cased It is clear that the optimal investment path for the 
constant rate of return case is feasible with the variable rate of return.t Once it 
is feasible the result of Neher, that is all the profitable projects are financed when 
ß  —► 1 , holds.
Result 3.8 As ß  1 all profitable projects with monotonically decreasing rates of 
returns become financeable.
Proof. The proof follows from the discussion above and is omitted. □
Tt means that the final returns are the same for both cases.
*The only change that arises with the shift from the constant rate of return case to the vari­
able rate of return case is that liquidation values increase (the right-hand sides of feasibility 
constraints (3.10) increase). This change does not break the feasibility of the investment path.
79
CHAPTER 4
Hold-up and sequential specific 
investments
4.1 Introduction
Many projects prior to their commencement are nebulous and difficult to describe. 
For example, research and development projects often have vague objectives and 
speculative or uncertain outcomes; start-up firms are often based around intangible 
ideas. With joint projects this makes it difficult to write a complete contract spec­
ifying the tasks of each party and the desired outcome (see for example Hart 1995, 
pp. 1-5). Grout (1984) and Hart (1995), amongst others, showed that parties may 
not make efficient specific investments when contracts are incomplete.*  These mod­
els typically have the following structure: trading parties make their investments 
that are sunk and, at least partially, specific; after these investments are made 
contracting on some relevant variable becomes possible; at this point the parties 
renegotiate and trade occurs according to the renegotiated contract. If, because of 
renegotiation, a party does not receive the full marginal return from their effort, 
investment will be inefficient.*
Other authors have examined how sequencing or staggering investment can help 
alleviate the hold-up problem. For example, Neher (1999) considered staged financ­
ing of a project when an entrepreneur is unable to commit not to renege on their
*Also see Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1988).
*It has also been noted that the level of general investments can be effected in the presence 
of incomplete contracts: Malcomson (1997) noted that hold-up of general investment can occur 
when there are turnover costs.
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contract with the financier. When the project is financed in stages, as the project 
matures, the alienable (contractible) element of the project, manifested in the accu­
mulated physical assets, provides a better bargaining position during renegotiation 
for the financier in the event of default. As a consequence, the entrepreneur has less 
incentive to renege. De Fraja (1999) considered the Stackelberg-type sequencing of 
investments in the presence of hold-up. De Fraja’s solution to the hold-up problem 
required the first party to make a general investment, then make a take-it-or-leave-it 
offer to the other player that included the first party paying for the specific invest­
ment. ̂  Given that this contract makes the first party the residual claimant she will 
invest efficiently. Admati and Perry (1991) showed two parties can overcome the 
free-rider problem by financing a public good in stages.
The model presented here develops a simple framework to contrast the simul­
taneous and staged (sequential) investment regimes. The essence of the model is 
that staging the project allows some investment to be made after the point in time 
when a contract can be written. Here, the resolution of the incompleteness is fa­
cilitated by the completion of some aspect of the project. Similarly, in Grossman 
and Hart (1986) contracting became possible after the two parties made their initial 
investment. Further, Neher (1999) made the point that contracting becomes pro­
gressively more feasible as human capital invested in the project is converted into 
physical assets.
The basic structure of the model is as follows. Two parties are required to invest 
in order to complete a project. Two distinct alternatives are available to the parties. 
First, they can invest simultaneously at the start of the game. If they do so, both 
invest prior to when complete contracting is possible. After both investments are 
sunk the parties renegotiate and the payoffs are realized.t Alternatively, one party 
can invest first while the other party waits. This first investment allows the project 
to take shape: as a result, contracting on the second investment becomes possible.
t Although the investment may be industry-specific, it is not relationship-specific in the tradi­
tional sense. See Malcomson (1997).
Whis regime is equivalent to the incomplete contract models of Grossman and Hart (1986) and 
Hart (1995).
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At this stage, the parties will renegotiate and write a contract specifying the second 
party’s investment. The final stage of investment will then occur, completing the 
project and allowing the parties to receive their payoffs.
As an example to motivate the model, a popular music recording can either be 
completed simultaneously or sequentially.*  An artist can write the songs, record 
them and go to the record company who then makes their investment in promo­
tion, printing and distribution. Alternatively, both parties can make investments 
simultaneously in choosing the songs, recording, promotion and the like. These in­
vestments by the artist and the record company can be specific if both parties have 
an overarching contract to deal with one another. Further, this contract is likely 
to be incomplete in that only after the recorded product is finished can the parties 
decide on important issues, such as which songs should be released as a single, etcd
Several important results arise from this simultaneous versus sequential invest­
ment model. First, the sequential regime can create trading possibilities that may 
not be feasible if the parties have to invest simultaneously. For example, the second 
player will not be willing to invest simultaneously if it leaves them with a negative 
net return. On the other hand, the sequential investment regime gives this player 
the opportunity to delay their investment until when contracts are complete. This 
may be sufficient incentive to encourage the seller to invest. This result is similar 
to the results of other authors, for example Neher (1999) and Admati and Perry 
(1991), albeit in a different context.
Second, we show that the possibility of investing sequentially does not always 
improve welfare. As it turns out, flexibility in the timing of investment can act as 
an additional form of hold-up. For want of a better expression we call this kind of 
hold-up, ‘follow-up’. This occurs when both parties should invest simultaneously 
at the start of the project in order to maximize surplus, but there is an incentive 
for one party to wait until after the other player has sunk their effort before they
^Also see Hart (1995) for an example of sequential investment with incomplete contracts by a 
building contractor and a purchasing party, (pp. 1-5)
*For a detailed description of the music industry see Fink (1996).
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follow-up with their own investment.* Consider the case when technology requires 
that one particular party must invest at the commencement of a project but that 
the other party can invest either at the same time or wait. The first party will 
anticipate that the second party will delay their investment - opt for the sequential 
regime - if it suits them.
Third, as discussed above, the second player acting in self-interest may have 
the incentive to opt for the regime that does not maximize total welfare. The 
burden of this opportunism is typically borne by the other player. However, if such 
opportunism drives the first player’s return below his no-trade payoff, this additional 
form of hold-up will prevent a potential surplus-enhancing project from proceeding. 
In this case, the second player also bears some of the cost from the reduction in 
total surplus - the second player is disadvantaged by her inability to commit to a 
particular timing schedule of investment.
Fourth, the decision over the timing of investment can be seen as a choice over 
the completeness of contracts: if parties opt for simultaneous investment they are 
opting for a more incomplete contract than possible (with the sequential regime). 
As a result, the choice concerning the completeness of contract is endogenous. The 
advantage of a (more) complete contract with sequential investment is that hold-up 
of the follower is avoided. The cost of a complete contract is that it diminishes 
the first party’s incentive to invest and increase the costs of delay. The second 
party will opt for simultaneous investment - that is, they will opt for an incomplete 
contract - when their gain from the increase in total surplus outweighs the additional 
bargaining power they receive from avoiding hold-up.*
Finally, interesting dynamics can arise out of this investment game when both 
parties want to be a follower rather than the leader. If there are just two potential 
investment periods (and the opportunity to invest disappears after the second pe­
riod) the parties find themselves in a prisoners’ dilemma. If the potential investment 
horizon is continually extended to three periods, four periods and so on, eventu-
t ‘Follow-up’ can occur in addition to the regular hold-up of investment.
Tn their study of the Coase theorem, Pitchford and Snyder (1999) also developed a model that 
generates endogenous incomplete contracts.
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ally the benefit from not investing (waiting) will diminish sufficiently so that the 
players will find themselves in a coordination game. (The players will mix between 
investing immediately and waiting.) If the horizon is extended further from this 
point, with certain parameter values it is possible that the players will again return 
to a prisoners’ dilemma game. This arises because the payoff in the coordination 
game (say in period K) alters the expected return from waiting in the game with 
the longer horizon (say a game of K  + 1 periods). It is possible that the optimal 
strategies switch between a prisoners’ dilemma game and a coordination game as 
the potential horizon is extended. The equilibria in the potential infinite horizon 
game are also examined.
4.2 The model
There is a potentially profitable relationship between two parties that, for conve­
nience, w*e label as a buyer and a seller. Specifically, if the buyer and seller invest I\ 
and I2 respectively the two parties share surplus R. The exact relationship between 
the investments and surplus is discussed below.
The timing of investment is the focus of this chapter. Two alternatives are 
considered. First, both players invest simultaneously at time t = 1, as shown in 
Figure 4.1. At this stage, contracting on either investment is not possible; conse­
quently renegotiation (or contracting) will occur after both investments are sunk.1" 
Definition 4.1 reiterates this discussion.
Definition 4.1 Simultaneous investment occurs when both parties invest at the 
same time, prior to renegotiation.
Figure 4.2 outlines the timing of the alternative investment regime. In this 
regime the buyer invests I\ at time t = 1 prior to when contracting is possible. 
How'ever, this investment makes contracting possible, so having observed I\ the two 
parties renegotiate and contract on / 2. It is only at this stage that the seller makes
^The renegotiation process is discussed below.
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t = 1 t = 2
t
Ji, I2 invested
t
Renegotiation
t
R  realized and 
payoffs made
Figure 4.1: Simultaneous investment
her investment / 2. This occurs at time t = 2. After both investments have been 
made, surplus is realized and the payoffs to each party are made. Definition 4.2 
defines sequential investment.
Definition 4.2 Sequential investment occurs when one party (the buyer) invests at 
time t = l, while the other party (the seller) waits and invests at time t = 2.
t = 1 t = 2 * =  3
I------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1------------------------------------------------------- 1
t t t t
11 invested Renegotiation / 2 invested R  realized and
payoffs made
Figure 4.2: Sequential investment
As noted above, the investments of the buyer and seller (Ji and / 2) combine 
together to generate surplus R. The investments of both parties are sunk and 
completely specific to the relationship, in that they are worth zero outside the
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relationship. R  is only available at the completion of the project. For simplicity 
we assume the buyer and the seller can make discrete investments of I\ =  {0,/i} 
and I 2 = {0, ^2 } respectively.^ The surplus generated will be equal to R  if both / 1  
and / 2  are invested, and zero otherwise. The outside options of both players are 
normalized to zero. Further, trade between the buyer and seller is efficient; that is, 
52R — 6 f 2 — f i  > 0, where the discount factor 5 is discussed belowd Assumption 4.1 
summarizes this discussion.
Assumption 4.1 The buyer can make investment I\ = {0,/i} and the seller can 
make investment I2  = {0, / 2 } - I f  h  — f i  and I 2 = / 2  surplus R is available to 
the two parties. The outside options of both players are normalized to zero and
S2R  -  Sf2 -  h  > 0 .
Although there is complete and symmetric information between the trading 
parties, the investments are unverifiable ex ante. However, as discussed above, 
once the buyer’s investment has been sunk the project becomes tangible allowing 
subsequent investment to be verifiable. This can arise when the required tasks of the 
second party become evident after the project is underway. The buyer’s investment, 
A, could also be thought of as an investment in writing a contract, or blueprint, for 
the desired trade. In this context the parties can opt to invest without a complete 
contract (simultaneous investment) or to opt for a (more) complete contract (the 
sequential regime) f
Unlike investment, the surplus generated by the project is always unverifiable. 
This prevents the parties writing surplus sharing agreements. Further to this, prior 
to the commencement of the project the parties are unable to write a fixed price
Tn the discussion here, it is assumed that the level of investment by each player is discrete 
and, hence, fixed if they decide to invest. In the next chapter we explore the timing of investment 
and the potential for follow-up when investments are continuous.
^This assumption means that trade is efficient with both simultaneous and sequential invest­
ment as it follows from 52R — df2 — f i  > 0 (the relevant condition for when investment is sequential) 
that 5R — A — /1 > 0  (the relevant condition for simultaneous investment).
^Note, the idea that the buyer invests effort into writing a contract does not rule out the 
possibility that this blueprint is specific to the parties.
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contract, as suggested by MacLeod and Malcomson (1993). These points are sum­
marized in Assumption 4.2 and 4.3 and Remark 4.1.
Assumption 4.2 Prior to the investment of both I\ and I2 are unverifiable, and 
hence non-contractible.
Assumption 4.3 Surplus /?(/!,/ 2) is unverifiable.
Remark 4.1 Surplus sharing agreements are not feasible.
As in Hart and Moore (1988) and MacLeod and Malcomson (1993), the two 
parties cannot vertically integrate to overcome their hold-up problem. This could 
be due to specialization, for example. If the parties could vertically integrate, as 
noted by Williamson (1983), they could overcome hold-up and investment would be 
efficient. Assumption 4.4 outlines this point.
Assumption 4.4 The two parties cannot vertically integrate.
Further, both the parties discount future returns and costs with a constant 
discount factor 5 E (0,1] per period, as stated in Assumption 4.5.
Assumption 4.5 Both parties discount future costs and returns with the discount 
factor 6 per period, where 6 6 (0,1].
With the simultaneous regime, the returns accrue at t = 2, and are thus are 
discounted by S. The sequential regime lengthens the entire investment process: 
an investment made after renegotiation at time t = 2 is discounted by 6 while the 
returns are discounted by 52 as they accrue at time t =  3. The discount factor is 
included in the model on that basis that investment can take real time to complete. 
Moreover, for simplicity, each investment is assumed to take the same amount of 
time. Note, however, that the results presented in this chapter do not rely on the 
inclusion of an additional period with the sequential regime. The situation when 
there is no additional discounting with the sequential regime is equivalent to when 
<5 =  1.
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When the parties renegotiate they must decide how to split the available surplus. 
For simplicity it is assumed that both parties have equal bargaining power. With 
zero outside options it means that each party receives one-half of the available 
surplus.*
Assum ption 4.6 Both parties have equal bargaining power and receive one-half of 
the available surplus.
4.3 Follow-up and the timing of investment
First consider the outcome when the parties invest simultaneously. After invest­
ing f i  and /2, the parties will renegotiate over surplus R. As noted above, the parties 
will distribute surplus equally. The returns to the buyer and seller respectively are:
and
\&R-f1 ; (4.1)
\S R  -  h -  (4-2)
When only the simultaneous investment regime is available the buyer will antic­
ipate a return of \8R  — f \  from within the relationship. Consequently, the buyer 
will opt into the investment relationship provided
(4.3)
The buyer will opt not to enter the relationship if
R -  < 0 . (4.4)
^The relative bargaining strengths of the parties are encapsulated in Chiu (1998) by a and 
(1 — a), so that the first party receives a of the surplus. Here a = | .  These bargaining strengths 
depend on exogenous characteristics of the negotiating parties, for example their rate of time 
preference or their expectation of a breakdown in bargaining. As usual, sunk costs do not affect 
the distribution of surplus at renegotiation.
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This is an example of the standard hold-up problem that arises with incomplete 
contracts. If contracting were complete, given overall surplus is increased within 
the specific relationship, the parties could contract on / i  and ensure that the buyer 
receive surplus at least as great as 0. The same reasoning applies to the seller. If 
^ 5 R  — J 2 > 0 the seller will opt into the relationship. Conversely, if ^ 5 R  — f 2 < 0 
the seller will anticipate the hold-up problem and opt not to invest, reducing total 
surplus.1-
Now consider when the parties can only invest sequentially. In this case the two 
parties will renegotiate after the buyer has sunk his investment, but prior to the 
seller investing f 2. If both parties invest in the relationship, the return of the buyer 
and seller, valued at t  =  1, will be:
i(<52i? -  S f 2) -  A; (4.5)
± ( 8 2R - 8 h ) . (4.6)
The important element here is the treatment of the buyer and the seller in 
the renegotiation process. As the buyer has sunk their investment, f \  does not 
affect the distribution of surplus. The seller, on the other hand, has not made 
her investment. Her investment / 2 , as a consequence, is considered as part of net 
surplus the parties bargain over. In this sense, the seller avoids being held-up with 
sequential investment.
At this point we turn our attention to the situation when both regimes are 
possible. As noted in the literature, having the option of sequential investment can 
improve welfare. To see this consider the case when the buyer’s outside option is 
never binding ( |( 52R  — S f 2) — / 1  >0):  this ensures that the buyer will opt into the 
relationship regardless as to whether investments are simultaneous or sequential. 
Further, assume \ { ö 2R  — S f 2) >  0 > ^ÖR — f 2. As the seller’s no trade option
1 Up-front compensation will have limited success overcoming the hold-up problem, as fixed 
payments do not affect marginal incentives.
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exceeds her return if investments are simultaneous {^6R — f 2 < 0) she would not 
enter the relationship if investments could only be made simultaneously. However 
the sequential regime may create an environment that helps facilitate trade between 
the parties. The seller will receive a payoff of \{ö2R — Sf2), valued at time t =  1, as 
the parties renegotiate after the buyer has invested but before the seller has done 
so. As noted above, this allows the seller to avoid being held-up: the extra surplus 
afforded the seller with sequential investment encourages her to invest where she 
would not otherwise done so. The allows trade to occur that would not be feasible 
with only simultaneous system available. Proposition 4.1 summarizes the discussion 
above.
Proposition 4.1 When \{82R — Sf2) — f \  > 0 and \{S2R — 6f2) > 0 > \5R  — 
f 2, the seller will not invest with the simultaneous investment regime as part of a 
subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) strategy. The seller will, however, invest in the 
relationship as part of a SPE strategy with the sequential investment regime.
This proposition mirrors much of the existing literature on the staging of invest­
ments with incomplete contracts. For example, Neher (1999) examined financing 
an entrepreneur overtime in stages rather than funding the entire project up-front. 
In his model the bargaining power of the financier (vis-a-vis the entrepreneur) is 
enhanced by the quantity of accumulated physical assets^ Consequently, as the 
project matures the financier has additional protection from hold-up. The possi­
bility of funding in stages allows projects to proceed that would otherwise not be 
feasible. In the model presented here, on the other hand, it is assumed that as the 
project matures contracting becomes possible. If a party can delay their investment 
until this point in time they can avoid being held up. If the costs of hold-up are 
sufficiently great as compared with a party’s outside opportunities, the sequential 
regime provides scope for trade that may not have otherwise existed.
Now we consider the case when \dR  — fi  > 0 and \SR  — f 2 >  0. Given this, both 
parties would enter into the investment relationship if the simultaneous investment
t Physical assets increase the liquidation value of the firm. This enhances the financier’s outside 
option and, as a result, her claim on surplus.
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regime were the only option available. It is evident that simultaneous investment 
always produces greater surplus than sequential investment.*  Nevertheless, the seller 
will act to maximize her own surplus and not to maximize total surplus. As a result, 
the seller will opt for the sequential regime if:
i(<52fl-<5/ 2) > i« ? - / 2 (4.7)
despite the fact that total surplus is reduced. Herein lies a potential hold-up problem 
- the seller will opportunistically opt for sequential investments even though surplus 
is maximized with simultaneous investment. To distinguish the inefficient timing 
of investment from the standard hold-up problem we call this practice ‘follow-up’. 
This discussion is summarized in Proposition 4.2.
Proposition 4.2 Assume that I(62R — Sf2) — f \  > 0, |i?  — fo >  0 and f R — f 2 > 0. 
I f the seller has the choice of whether to invest simultaneously or sequentially and 
\{62R — 5f2) > \R  — f 2 , her SPE strategy will be to invest sequentially, reducing 
total surplus.
This analysis brings to light another important implication not previously noted 
in the literature. Although investing over many periods can allow parties to over­
come the hold-up problem, it is shown here that the option of staggering investments 
can be detrimental to overall welfare.*
Now consider the effect of the sequential regime on the buyer’s incentive to 
invest. Sequential investment puts the buyer at a disadvantage as his sequential 
payoff is necessarily less than his simultaneous payoff. From equations 4.1 and 4.5, 
\{52R — 5f2) — fi < \ 8R — f\.  The buyer will be willing to enter into the specific
t\Vith discrete investments f \  and f 2 are unchanged between both regimes. The only effect 
of a sequential regime is that it further delays the receipt of surplus one additional period from 
the start of the project. Consequently, if 5 < 1 the sequential regime produces a smaller ex ante 
return.
*In the bargaining literature it has been known for some time that the addition of extra potential 
bargaining periods can reduce welfare. For example, Fudenberg and Tirole (1983) showed that the 
addition of extra period in a bargaining game with asymmetric information did not necessarily 
increase welfare for a bargaining game with only one potential bargaining period.
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relationship, despite the inevitable follow-up, if
t ( 52R - 5 / 2) - A > 0 . (4.8)
On the other hand, if
|(<52/? -  <5/2) -  A < 0 (4.9)
the buyer will not be willing to enter. In this case, the follow-up problem is suffi­
ciently great that the buyer’s outside option is more attractive than entering into 
the relationship.
If the buyer’s return from simultaneous investments exceeds his outside option, 
but the sequential payoff did not, the seller would be better off if they could commit 
to invest simultaneously. If the seller could guarantee she would invest simultane­
ously the buyer would opt into the relationship, and both parties would be better 
off. When the seller cannot commit, the buyer will opt out of the relationship and 
the seller will suffer as trade between the parties will not occur. Proposition 4.3 
summarizes this discussion.
Proposition 4.3 I f \ 5 R —fi  > 0 > \{52R —6f2)—fi  and ^(62R —6f2) > \ 6 R —f 2 >
0, the buyer will only be willing to invest with the simultaneous regime. The seller 
will invest sequentially in any SPE in which investment occurs. Anticipating this, 
the SPE strategy of the buyer will be to not invest. As a result, the surplus of the 
seller is reduced by having the option of a sequential regime of investment.
This is a similar result to Grout (1984) who argued that a union would be better 
off if it could commit not to opportunistically renegotiate after the firm has sunk 
its investment.
The model presented here also provides a context in which parties can endoge­
nously opt for an incomplete contract. The parties will opt for a (more) incomplete 
contract here where the loss of total surplus, or the cost of writing a contract, ex­
ceeds the benefits from the avoiding hold-up. To see this, again assume that the 
buyer must invest at the start of the project, but that the seller can opt to invest at
92
the same time as the buyer or sequentially. Further, assume that the buyer will al­
ways enter the relationship as ^(62R — 0 f2 ) — / 1  > 0. The seller will choose to invest 
simultaneously when \SR  — > I(62R — 5f2). Despite the option of more complete
contracting, the seller chooses to invest with an incomplete contract. These findings 
are summarized in the following proposition.
P roposition  4.4 If ^(62R — 6/ 2) — fi  > 0, I(62R — 6f 2) > 0 and ^öR — f 2 > 07 the 
seller’s SPE strategy is to opt for an incomplete contract by investing simultaneously, 
provided \5R  — f 2 > ~ S f2 ).
The comparative statics can be examined when the seller is just indifferent be­
tween investing simultaneously or sequentially.t These comparative static results 
show that the seller is more likely to opt for the incomplete contract when: f 2 is 
low; and the surplus is high. The seller’s incentive to adopt the (more) incomplete 
regime is decreasing as she becomes more patient, provided the discount factor is 
sufficiently high.*  These results are intuitive. The benefit of the sequential regime 
to the seller is declining as she becomes more impatient, provided 5 is sufficiently 
large. Further, the net surplus of the seller is the difference between her share of 
the surplus and the investment costs she has to pay: when / 2  is small there is less 
benefit sharing this cost with the buyer.
This section examined how the timing of investments can act as a potential 
source of hold-up. It was shown that if a party can choose to invest prior to or 
after renegotiation the other party can be held-up by the timing of investment. 
This reduces the incentive for that party to invest and, in the extreme, prevents 
surplus enhancing transactions from taking place. The model is sufficiently flexible, 
however, to also be able to show the potential benefits of sequencing investment.
T et W =  -  / 2] — \(62R — Ö/2 ). Comparative statics can be calculated for changes in
parameter values when W  «  0. Thus, ^  =  <5/2 — 1 < 0 and = <̂5(1 — <5) > 0. With respect
to IPT ~ h )  ~ If <5 < |(1  4- ^  > 0 . If 6 > |(1  -f ^ ) , ^  < 0.
*There is an additional effect of 5 due to the discounting structure in the staged investment 
regime. That is, 5 < | ( 1  + -̂) the incentive to opt for the simultaneous regime is increasing as 
<5 increases, whereas if £ > |(1  + ^|), the incentive to opt for an incomplete contract - with the 
simultaneous regime - is decreasing in <5.
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Sequencing allows contracts to become complete: this protects the party investing 
second from being held-up, and consequently encourages investment by that party.
4.4 Leading or following investment game
Up until this point it has been assumed that the seller has the option to adopt 
the sequential regime. What happens if either of the individuals can be the party 
that invests first? If either party can invest first, it follows that either agent could 
wait until the other player has invested so that they can invest when contracts are 
complete. When there is an advantage of investing after the other party has sunk 
their investment (a follower advantage), the two players may vie to invest second.
To investigate this, assume the parties are identical, so that / i  =  f i  =  /• 
Further, assume that an investment by either individual would allow contracting 
to be feasible. If \[b2R  — 5f) > \ R  — / ,  both individuals would prefer to invest 
second. * Let us consider this case in more detail.
First, consider when there are just two potential investment periods in which 
the project can be completed and that [^(52R  — 6f)  — /] < 0. In this case neither 
party will be willing to invest first. Moreover, a contract on the timing of invest­
ments coupled with some up-front compensation is unlikely to resolve the hold-up 
problem. Given the non-verifiability of investment, a contract written on the timing 
of investment is unenforceable. For example, after the compensation payment has 
been made the recipient can simply trigger renegotiation without fear of sanction. 
As a result, trade is unlikely to proceed in this case. Adding additional periods will 
not change this outcome.
Second, consider when the payoff with sequential investment for the lead investor 
- who invests at t = 1 - is positive: that is, — Sf)  — /] > 0. To explore the
strategies the players will adopt initially, consider when there are exactly two periods 
remaining in which the project can be completed. The choice for each player is then
^When | ( 62R  -  Sf )  <  ^ R  — f  the return from simultaneous investment exceeds the maximum 
possible sequential payoff and both parties will invest at t  =  1.
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to invest immediately at t = 1 or to wait and invest in the final period at time t =  2. 
As surplus from simultaneous investments is greater than the no-trade option, if the 
game reaches t =  2 both agents would invest if they had not previously done so. 
The normal form of this game is illustrated in Figure 4.3. In the figure, /  represents 
investing at t = 1 and W  waiting and investing at t = 2. The payoff for the buyer 
is written in the left of each box in the matrix and the seller’s on the right.
Seller
I IV
Figure 4.3: Normal form for two period game
As
\ ( 62R - 6 f ) > S- R - f  (4.10)
and
S ( ^ R - f ) > \ ( 6 2R - S f ) - f  (4.11)
both players have a dominant strategy of delaying and investing at time t = 2. 
This is a version of prisoners’ dilemma: surplus is maximized if both players invest
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simultaneously at t = 1, so as to avoid the additional costs of delay, but the only 
Nash equilibrium in this game is that each player will delay investing.
This artifact of the equilibrium arises as a result of the short time horizon. Now 
consider the case when there are three potential investment periods d The choice 
of each player initially is to invest immediately at t = 1 or to wait. If both players 
opt to invest at t =  1 the project is completed in the first period and the payoffs 
are unchanged from the two-period horizon game when the project is completed 
immediately. Similarly, if at t =  1 the buyer invests but the seller does not, she 
will invest at t =  2d In this case the payoffs are unchanged from the two-period 
example above. Similarly, if the seller invests at t = 1 and the buyer invests at time 
t =  2, the payoffs are also unchanged from two-period game. The only payoff that 
is altered is when both players opt to not invest at t =  1. In this case, the parties 
again face a two period potential investment horizon (at times t = 2 and t =  3). 
From above, the equilibrium in this two-period horizon game is that both players 
wait until the last period to invest. Consequently, the payoff in the three-period 
horizon game when both parties do not invest at t = 1, is the two-period payoff 
discounted for the extra period - that is, 62(^R  — /) . Provided
(4.i2)
the dominant strategy remains to not invest at t — 1 for both players.
As more potential trading periods are added a similar adjustment of the payoffs 
continues. Figure 4.4 shows the normal form of the game with n potential bargaining 
periods.
At some point, say when the potential horizon has n periods, the payoff from not 
investing when the other player also does not invest becomes less than the payoff 
from choosing to invest immediately. This occurs when
*Note, as above a maximum of two periods is needed to complete the project.
^As contracting is possible at time t = 2, there is no advantage to the seller to wait until time 
t = 3 as this will merely delay her receiving her payoff an extra period, without increasing her 
claim on surplus.
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Seller
I  W
(<S2R - 6 f ) - f
Figure 4.4: Normal form for n period game
-  / )  < \(62R - S f ) - f <  6 -  /) . (4.13)
When the potential bargaining horizon is n periods there is no longer a dominant 
strategy for each player: each player will play a mixed strategy between investing 
immediately and waiting. The intuition is that, when there is a long potential time 
horizon, the players know that stalling until the end of the potential horizon is 
of little benefit, as there is a sufficiently large number of periods that the payoff 
from waiting that long is relatively small. This provides an incentive to invest 
immediately. However, there is also a potential dividend from waiting on the chance 
that the other party invests immediately. The players are in a coordination game 
in that period: each party wants the project to go ahead immediately but both
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investors would prefer to follow rather than lead.1” Also note that the game with 
n + 1 potential investing periods may return to a prisoners’ dilemma game. This 
arises because the coordination game with n periods is the outcome of waiting in 
the first of the n +  1 periods. The payoff of this coordination game might be higher 
than \{S2R — Sf) — / ,  which again creates a dominant strategy to wait. The game 
could switch between a prisoners’ dilemma and a coordination game as potential 
investment periods are added. As an illustration of this, consider the following 
example.
Example 4.1 The following example shows the possibility of switching between a 
prisoners ’ dilemma and a coordination game when there are many potential invest­
ment periods.
Let 5 = 0.9, /  = 10 and R = 100. Figure 4.5 illustrates the normal form game 
of the investment decision for both parties when there are n =  2,3, . . .  potential 
investment periods.
From Figures 4.3 and 4.4 the payoffs are A = 35, B = 26, C = 36 and D = 
<5n-135. If n = 2 and 3, the SPE strategy of both players is to wait - this is a 
prisoners’ dilemma. When n = 4, in the first potential investment period both 
players adopt a mixed strategy. This is a coordination game.
Now we show that for n =  5 the game reverts to a prisoners’ dilemma. If the 
buyer chooses actions /  and W  with probabilities a and l —a respectively, while the 
seller mixes between I  and W  with probabilities ß and 1 — /3, the expected return 
of the buyer is
Aaß  + Ba{ 1 -  ß) +  <7/3(1 -  a) +  27(1 -  a)( l  -  ß). (4.14)
To get a Nash Equilibrium in mixed strategies we find ß  such that the payoff to the
*Note, this is not a typical coordination game. Instead, it is similar to what Binmore (1992) 
described as an Australian Battle of the Sexes; the two parties want to coordinate to be where the 
other player is not. Further, this game is not Matching Pennies as it is not a zero sum game.
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Seller
Figure 4.5: Normal form for n period game
buyer does not depend on a, in other words
ß
B - D
B + C -  A - D '
(4.15)
Similarly, for the payoff of the seller not to depend on ß  it must be the case that
B - D
B + C - A - D '
(4.16)
The payoff to the buyer from playing this mixed strategy is
D + ( C - D )
B - D
B + C - A - D
B C - A D  
B + C - A - D
(A — b ){b  -
B + C - A - D '
(4.17)
Because C > A > B > D this payoff is always greater than B  and, provided the 
discount factor is sufficiently high, the game returns to a prisoners’ dilemma in
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period n = 5. As 5 = 0.9 in this specific example, the relevant payoff for period 
n = 5 - - is greater than B. On the other hand, if 5 were small enough
we could end up in the coordination game V n > 4 . Thus, it is not possible to 
discern the exact structure of the game when n —> oo without knowledge of the 
precise parameter values. □
Two points are important here. First, if both parties have the opportunity to 
wait until after the other has invested, strategic behavior can reduce total surplus. 
Second, if for technical reasons, as assumed above, one player (the buyer) must invest 
at the start of the project, the potentially damaging coordination game regarding 
which party is to invest first is avoided. This suggests technical differences in the 
individuals, that determine which of the parties must invest at the beginning of 
the project, may help overcome some of the problems generated by the timing of 
investments and follow-up.
The issue of which party must invest first could be resolved naturally when the 
parties have differing investment costs.* Again assume that the investment costs and 
outside options are fi for i = 1,2, as in section 4.3. However, now assume that there 
is no specified order of investments (that is, either party can invest first to start the 
project). If [^(62R — 6f 2) — fi] > 0, the buyer will be willing to enter the relationship 
regardless of which regime eventuates. Further, assume that if the seller’s cost of 
investment ( /2) is sufficiently high as to ensure that | (SR — f 2) > 0 > \5R  — / 2. 
In this case the seller would never invest first. She would be willing, however, to 
contract with the buyer after he has made his investment. Once again the option 
of sequential investments improves welfare - it allows for a trade opportunity that 
would not otherwise occur. The differing opportunity costs of the parties make it 
clear which party is to invest at t = 1: the party with the smallest investment 
cost should invest first. This prediction accords with what is observed with venture 
capital projects.* It is often the case that the financier waits until the entrepreneur, 
the party with the smaller opportunity cost, has already made their investment and
i’Of course, investment costs could include opportunity costs.
^See Gompers and Lerner (1999) for a discussion of venture capital.
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the project is underway before committing to the project. Sequencing of investment 
in this case affords the financier the protection from hold-up needed to encourage 
participation.* 
G:  1
Figure 4.6: Extensive form for infinite horizon game
Finally, consider when the parties face a potentially infinite-horizond The ex­
tensive form game is illustrated in Figure 4.6. Here, player 1 (for example the 
buyer) can choose to invest immediately (I) or can choose to wait (W). At the same 
time player 2 (the seller) has the strategic options of investing (I) and not investing 
and waiting (W). There are three stationary SPE in this game. The first involves 
player 1 playing the following strategy: do not invest in the first period; do not 
invest in the second period unless player 2 invested in period t = 1; do not invest 
in the third period unless player 2 invested in period t — 2; and so on. Player 2 
plays the following strategy: invest in the first period; if not in the first, invest in 
the second; if not in the second, invest in the third; and so on. In this equilibrium 
player 2 invests immediately and player 1 follows up with their investment in the
 ̂Differing discount factors between the two parties may also help to resolve which party should 
invest first. In this case the more patient player may be willing to invest first. The second player 
with the lower discount factor, is consequently afforded the benefits of investing a period closer to 
the receipt of surplus.
* Again assume the parties are identical.
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next period. Neither player has an incentive to deviate in any subgame. Player 1 
receives the highest payoff possible in this game - C - while player 2 receives a payoff 
of B. If player 2 deviates to invest in the second period, she will receive a payoff of 
SB, ruling out any possibility of a profitable deviation. A symmetrically equivalent 
equilibrium exists in which player 1 invests immediately and player 2 invests in the 
second period.
A stationary mixed strategy equilibrium also exists. In this equilibrium both 
parties invest with some positive probability. For example, player 1 invests imme­
diately with probability a and player 2 invests immediately with probability ß. If 
at least one player invests the entire investment process will last no longer than 
two periods and the game will end. The payoffs to each player are outlined in Fig­
ure 4.6. However, if both parties do not invest in the first period, which occurs 
with probability (1 — a)(l — ß), the players return to an identical situation, only 
one period in the future. In this continuation game the players will again adopt 
the same strategies. As a result the expected payoff of each player are exactly the 
same as at t = 1, however, they are discounted from the delay of one period. This 
symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium is always feasible, for any parameters where 
C > A > B, as summarized in Proposition 4.5.
Proposition 4.5 A stationary mixed strategy SPE always exists in the infinite hori­
zon investment game, provided C > A > B .
Proof. Example 4.1 calculated the payoff of an agent from playing a mixed 
strategy: this payoff is given by equation 4.17. Given the stationarity of strategies, 
any SPE requires this payoff multiplied by 5 to equal D , yielding the following 
equation:
D2 +  D{A(X -  6) -  B -  C)) + 5BC =  0. (4.18)
This quadratic equation has two solutions: the first is less than B , the second is 
greater than B. The first is feasible as a solution to this problem, while the second 
is not, as either player will only adopt a mixed strategy when D < B. (If D > B,
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both parties have dominating strategy to wait.) As one solution is always less than 
B , a mixed strategy always exits. □
Note that all the equilibria produce lower ex ante welfare than the first-best 
outcome.
4.5 Concluding comments
This chapter develops a model in which two parties can invest in a mutually 
beneficial project together at the same time (simultaneous investment) or they can 
choose to have the investments made one after the other (sequential investment). It 
is assumed that contracting on any future investment becomes possible after some 
investment has been made, as it allows the project to become more clearly defined. 
Consequently, the advantage of the sequencing of investments is it allows the party 
that has delayed making their investment to avoid being held-up. The disadvantage 
of staging is that it reduces the payoff of the first-mover. Sequencing of investment 
also lengthens the time from the start of the project until the returns are realized, 
reducing the ex ante value of total surplus when parties discount future returns.
Much of the emphasis in the existing literature has focused on how staging in­
vestments can improve welfare when there are incomplete contracts or when parties 
are unable to commit. In the model presented in this paper it is demonstrated 
that, in some cases, the option of sequencing investments can reduce welfare. It is 
shown that under certain conditions a party will opportunistically opt for the se­
quential regime, reducing total surplus. We interpret this possibility as a new form 
of hold-up and term it ‘follow-up’. Moreover, in some cases the mere possibility 
that investment can be made sequentially may discourage investment by one party, 
preventing trade from occurring and reducing welfare of both players.
Interesting dynamics can arise if both players prefer to follow rather than make 
their investment before (or concurrently with) the other party. With just two po­
tential investment periods, both players have a dominant strategy to not invest in 
the first period and wait to invest in the second period. This is a version of the
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prisoners’ dilemma. As the potential investment horizon is extended, the payoff 
from waiting is discounted so that, with an investment horizon of a certain length, 
the players adopt a mixed strategy of investing immediately or waiting. This is a 
coordination game. As the investment horizon is extended even further from this 
point, the players may again return to a prisoners’ dilemma, in which they have 
a dominant strategy to not invest until they reach the investment period in which 
they are in the coordination game.
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CHAPTER 5
Timing of investments, hold-up and total 
welfare
5.1 Introduction
Recently several papers have shown how sequencing investment can help alleviate 
the hold-up problem. For example, Neher (1999) demonstrated that staged financing 
could improve the bargaining position of a financier in the event of default, allowing 
a project to proceed when an entrepreneur was unable to commit not to renegotiate. 
De Fraja (1999) considered how the Stackelberg-type sequencing of investment could 
overcome hold-up when the first party makes a general investment, then proposes a 
contract that makes him the residual claimant of surplus d In addition, Admati and 
Perry (1991) showed tw'o parties can overcome the free-rider problem by financing 
a public good in stages.
There are costs involved with sequencing investments, however. For example, 
sequencing a project lengthens the time required for it to be completed, increasing 
the costs of delay if parties discount the future. In addition, sequencing may improve 
the relative bargaining position of one party relative to the other: while this may 
increase the stronger agent’s incentive to invest, it can decrease the investment of 
the weaker agent. This may occur, for example, if the second investor’s bargaining 
power is improved after the first player has sunk their investment.
To explore these issues this chapter develops a theoretical model that compares
*The first investment is general because, although it can be industry-specific, it is not relation­
ship specific in the traditional sense (see Malcomson 1997).
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the relative efficiency of simultaneous and sequential investment under the presence 
of hold-up. In the model two parties are both required to make a specific invest­
ment to complete a project. Two alternative timing regimes are possible. First, 
both parties can invest simultaneously. In the usual manner, as contracts are ini­
tially incomplete renegotiation occurs after both parties have sunk their investments. 
Following renegotiation, the project is completed and the payoffs are realized. Al­
ternatively, following De Fraja (1999), the parties can invest one after the other in 
a Stackelberg-type arrangement. In this chapter it is assumed that the resolution 
of incompleteness is facilitated by completion of some aspect of the project. More 
specifically, after the first investment is sunk contracting on the second investment 
becomes possible. This set-up is similar to Grossman and Hart (1986) who assumed 
that contracting became possible after the two parties made their initial investment. 
Similarly, in Neher (1999) investment facilitated more complete contracting by con­
verting intangible human capital into physical assets. As a consequence, with the 
sequential regime, after the first player has invested, the parties will renegotiate 
and the second party will invest according to the agreed contract, completing the 
project.
Several important results arise from this simultaneous versus sequential invest­
ment model. First, the chapter investigates the relative efficiency of the two al­
ternative investment regimes. When the investments are independent the model 
identifies three basic trade-offs between the regimes:
• The sequential system enlarges (relative to simultaneous investments) delay 
costs by increasing the length of time before the project matures.
• The sequential system reduces the first player’s incentive to invest, vis-a-vis 
the simultaneous system, because of the longer time between when his invest­
ment is made and when the returns are realized.
• The sequential system enhances the incentive for the second player to invest 
efficiently as they do not suffer hold-up, which is not the case with simultane­
ous investments.
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The ultimate impact on total surplus is a combination of these trade-offs. We 
show that under different circumstances either regime of investment maximizes wel­
fare. Moreover, despite the simplicity of the model, no simple relationship between 
the welfare effects of the two regimes exists, as there is no restriction on how these 
three trade-offs interact. However, given that the simultaneous regime encourages 
the first player to invest, if this player’s contribution is relatively more important 
than the other player’s contribution the simultaneous regime is preferred. In the 
same way, the sequential regime is preferred when the second investor’s contribution 
is relatively more important, provided both players are sufficiently patient. Simi­
larly, if a party is not responsive to the incentives provided by one timing regime, 
the regime that maximizes the other party’s incentive to invest is preferred. For 
example, when the first investor is not responsive to the additional incentive pro­
vided by the simultaneous regime, the sequential regime generates a higher level of 
surplus.t On the other hand, if the second player is not responsive to the additional 
incentives to invest provided by the sequential regime, the simultaneous regime is 
preferred. These predictions are similar in nature to the property-rights predictions 
of Hart (1995), although the model is somewhat more general in that a player may 
voluntarily forgo the advantages of sequencing of investment (their property right) 
in order to encourage the other party to invest more. In this way the parties can opt 
for a (more) incomplete contract by choosing to invest simultaneously. The model 
is also extended in several other ways, for example by considering these trade-offs 
when the two investments are strategic complements and substitutes.
Second, we show that the possibility of investing sequentially does not always 
improve welfare. As it turns out, flexibility in the timing of investment can act 
as an additional form of hold-up. We call this kind of hold-up ‘follow-up’. This 
occurs when both parties should invest simultaneously at the start of the project 
in order to maximize surplus, but there is an incentive for the second party to wait 
until after the first player has sunk their effort before they follow-up with their
t Again this assumes both parties are sufficiently patient.
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own invest ment. * In this case, the first party will anticipate that the second party 
will opt for the sequential regime. The first party will then reduce their investment 
accordingly, decreasing total surplus. In the extreme this additional form of hold-up 
will prevent a potential surplus-enhancing project from proceeding. A similar result 
arises in the model presented in the previous chapter.
5.2 The model
There is a potentially profitable relationship between two parties that, for con­
venience, we label as a buyer and a seller. Specifically, if the buyer and seller invest 
Ii and / 2 respectively the two parties share surplus R. We assume that total sur­
plus is a function of both investments where i? ( / i , /2) is two times differentiable, 
non-decreasing in both variables and concave; that is R[ — d R ( I i , l 2 )/dIi > 0, 
R'ü = d2R(I\, l 2 ) /d l f  < 0 for i =  1,2 and R^uR'22 ~  (-R12)2 > 0, as summarized by 
Assumption 5.1.
A ssum ption 5.1 R[ = d R ( I i , l 2 )/dIi > 0, J R =  d2R(Ii, I2)/c)I? < 0 for i = 1,2 
and R'u R''2 -  {Rl2)2 > 0 where R 12 = d2R(IU I2)/ d h d l 2.
Two alternative timing arrangements are considered. First, both players invest 
simultaneously at time t = 1, as shown in Figure 5.1. Initially, contracting on 
either investment is not possible; consequently renegotiation will occur after both 
investments are sunkA
Figure 5.2 outlines the timing of the alternative investment regime. In this 
regime the buyer invests I\ at time t = 1 prior to when contracting is possible. 
However, this investment makes the contracting process possible, so having observed 
I\ the two parties renegotiate and contract on / 2. It is only after this that the seller 
makes her investment / 2. This occurs at time t =  2. After both investments have 
been made, surplus is realized and the payoffs to each party are made. Both parties
^Follow-up’ can occur in addition to the regular hold-up of investment.
^The renegotiation process is discussed below.
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t =  1 t = 2
t
Ji, I2 invested
t
Renegotiation
t
R realized and
payoffs made
Figure 5.1: Simultaneous investment
discount future payoffs and costs with a constant discount factor per period of 5 E 
(0,1]. As a result, at the beginning of the project the returns from the simultaneous 
regime are valued at 6R, while the returns with the sequential investment are worth 
62R.
t = 1 t = 2 t = 3
t t t t
Ii invested Renegotiation / 2 invested R realized and
payoffs made
Figure 5.2: Sequential investment
The investments of both parties are sunk and completely specific to the rela­
tionship, in that they are worth zero outside the relationship. R is only available at 
the completion of the project and investment in the relationship is always efficient. 
Further, it is assumed that each party’s outside option is normalized to zero.
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Although investments are unverifiable ex ante, once the buyer’s investment has 
been sunk the project becomes tangible, allowing subsequent investment to be veri­
fiable. On the contrary, the surplus generated by the project is always unverifiable. 
This prevents the parties writing surplus sharing agreements. Further, as in Hart 
and Moore (1988) and MacLeod and Malcomson (1993), the two parties cannot 
vertically integrate to overcome their hold-up problem.
When the parties renegotiate they must decide how to split the available surplus. 
We adopt a reduced-form bargaining solution in which each party receives one-half 
of the available surplus.1" Unlike many incomplete-contracts models, the results in 
this chapter are not sensitive to the bargaining solution used.
5.3 Simultaneous and sequential investments
As contracts are incomplete when investments are made simultaneously both 
parties know that renegotiation will occur. Consequently, they adjust their in­
vestments from the first-best level accordingly. The buyer chooses I\ in order to 
maximize
Here, the returns are discounted by 6, because they are only available after one pe­
riod. Renegotiation occurs after both investments have been sunk; as a consequence 
each party anticipates receiving one half of the available surplus. The first-order 
condition for the buyer is
The seller faces a similar decision choosing her level of / 2. She will set / 2 to 
maximize
max -R(I i ,  / 2) -  IY. 
h Z
(5.1)
2
S '
(5.2)
(5.3)
^This reduced form bargaining solution can be thought of as relating to an extensive form 
bargaining game.
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which yields the first-order condition of
R'2 =  | .  (5.4)
Let the buyer’s and seller’s investment choices with the simultaneous regime be 
denoted by I\ and / 2 respectively. These values solve system of equations 5.2 and 
5.4. The solutions are unique because of Assumption 5.1.
Now consider when the investments are made sequentially. With the sequential 
regime the buyer invests Ii at time t — 1. Following renegotiation, at time t = 2 
the seller chooses I2 • Consequently, the buyer sets I\ to maximize
maJ - \ 5 R ( I u I2) - I 2} - h .  (5.5)
h Z
The first-order condition for this problem is
K  = j r  (5-6)
The seller, who sets her investment level after observing Ii and renegotiating
with the buyer will maximize
max ^[6R(Ii, I2) ~  h]- (5.7)
h Z
The first-order condition for this maximization problem is
#2 =  (5-8)
Let the buyer’s and the seller’s levels of investment be Ii and I 2 when contracts are
made sequentially. These values are the solution to the system of equations 5.6 and 
5.8. Again, the solutions are unique because of Assumption 5.1.
Finally, define I{ and as the first-best level of investment with the simulta­
neous regime. Similarly, let I{* and /£* be the first-best investment levels with the
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sequential regime.* 
5.4 Timing of investment and total welfare
As it turns out, very little can be said about the trade-off between simultaneous 
and sequential investments when functions are general. Following Hart and Moore 
(1988), to explore this issue further assume that each investment has no influence on 
the marginal productivity of other player’s investment; that is, R 12 = 0, as stated 
in the following assumption.*
A ssum ption 5.2 R'[2 = 0.
R em ark  5.1 I f  R'i2 = 0, it follows that R = f i(I i)  + where f[ > 0 and
fi < 0 for i = 1,2.
In this framework three separate effects can be isolated that, when combined, 
give the relative advantage of either timing regime. First, consider the costs of 
delay. Let the total surplus ex ante with simultaneous investment be Ss-im and the 
total surplus ex ante when investment is sequential be 5seq- For two fixed levels of 
/ 1  and I  o
Ssim = S R (h , h )  - h - h >  S2R(1 1 , h )  - h -  SI2 = Sseq. (5-9)
As sequential investment delays the payoff an extra period, the surplus from simul­
taneous investment is greater than with sequential investments when I\ and I2 are 
fixed: the costs of delay always favor simultaneous investment. Further, the rel­
ative payoff of simultaneous investments is increasing as the players become more 
impatient. This effect is summarized below.
^The first-best level of investments solve the following system of equations: R\ = R2 =  |  for 
the simultaneous regime; and R\* = ^  and R2* = |  for the sequential one.
* R l2 = 0 could arise when an investment by the buyer increases his benefit from trade whereas 
investment by the seller reduces her costs. Although they do not affect one another, each invest­
ment increases the potential surplus available to be split upon renegotiation. A similar assumption 
is made by Hart and Moore (1988).
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Effect 5.1 The costs of delay reduce the surplus generated by sequential investment 
relative to the surplus with simultaneous investments.
Second, consider the buyer’s investment decisions under both regimes. Examin­
ing the first-order conditions in equations 5.2 and 5.6, R[ =  J < R[ = p . Given 
the assumption of concavity and monotonicity of R:
h  > h- (5.10)
The sequential investment regime delays the collection of returns to the buyer: this 
reduces the incentive for the buyer to invest.1”
Effect 5.2 Relative to sequential investment, the simultaneous regime increases the 
incentive for the buyer to invest in I\.
For the seller the relative incentives to invest with simultaneous and sequential 
investments are given by equations 5.4 and 5.8. Again, because of Assumption 5.1,
I2 < I 2 - (5-11)
With simultaneous investment the seller is held-up. With sequential investment, 
however, the seller invests after renegotiation, thus avoiding any hold-up problems. 
In fact, the sequential investment level chosen by the seller equals the first-best level; 
so that I 2 = Tp. This is the advantage of the sequential regime over simultaneous 
investment. Effect 5.3 summarizes this discussion.
Effect 5.3 The sequential investment regime increases I2 to its first-best level.
Effect 5.2 states that the simultaneous regime increases I\. Effect 5.3 suggests 
that the sequential regime increases I2 . To assess the impact of an increase in either 
investment on total welfare, isolated from the costs of delay, consider Ss m̂ relative
^Note that both I\ and I\ are below the first-best level. With simultaneous investments R[ = 
2/6 > R 1 = 1/6, meaning that I\ < IJ. Similarly, with sequential investment, R[ = 2/52 > R/ = 
1/62, meaning that < /{*.
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to an augmented Sseq, termed f/seq> that has the same discount structure as the 
simultaneous system. Useq ignores the additional discounting of R  and of / 2 that 
occurs because of the additional period. In this case:
•Ssim =  * /i(£ ) -  h  + S M t ,) -  7* (5.12)
where the level of investments are determined by equations 5.2 and 5.4. Similarly, 
using equations 5.6 and 5.8
Useq =  SMh)-  h  +5/2(72) -  72. (5.13)
The relative incentives to invest for the seller and buyer are summarized in the 
following lemma.
L em m a 5.1 5fi(h) -  h  < <5/i(?i) -  h,  and <5/2(72) ~ h >  Sf2(T2) -  72.
Proof. The first-best investment level of / i ,  derived from Sfi(li) — Ji, occurs 
when f l = This level of investment is termed J*. For I\ < JJ,  ̂because
f i (Ii )  <  0. For Ii < I{, [öfi(Ii) — Ii}' >  0, hence Sfi(Ii) — I\ is a non-decreasing 
function V /j € [0, ), which means <$/i(/i) — h  < 5 /i(/i) — h-  A similar argument
applies to / 2. □
Lemma 5.1 indicates that increasing ii  towards its first-best level always in­
creases the surplus it generates. The same argument applies to / 2. From Lemma 5.1 
we can say that the surplus generated by I\ is greater with the simultaneous regime. 
Similarly, the surplus generated by /2 is greater with the sequential regime.
In terms of total surplus, the ultimate trade off between simultaneous and se­
quential systems depends on these three effect: costs of delay incurred with the 
sequential regime favor simultaneous investments; given the additional hold-up, the 
sequential system reduces the buyer’s contribution to total surplus as compared 
with the simultaneous system; and, finally, the sequential system increases the in­
centive for the seller to invest, increasing her contribution to total surplus. Two of
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these effects work in favor of the simultaneous system and one works in favor of the 
sequential system. Proposition 5.1 summarizes this discussion.
Proposition 5.1 There are three factors that affect the total surplus generated by 
the simultaneous system relative to the total surplus that will be generated by the 
sequential system: (Effect 5.1) costs of delay favor the simultaneous system; (Effect 
5.2) the simultaneous regime increases the buyer’s incentive to invest, increasing 
his contribution to total surplus; and (Effect 5.3) the sequential regime increases the 
seller’s incentive to invest, relative to the simultaneous regime.
The combined effect of these three effects can be complicated. Note, however, 
that the three effects each depend on 5: the costs of delaying the return of surplus 
another period directly relate to (5; the level of I\ depends on 6 as the two relevant 
first-order conditions are R[ = 2/62 and R[ =  2/(5; and the two first-order condition 
for the choice of I2 are R^ = 1/5 and R'2 = 2/(5. However, if 5 =  1 the first two 
of these effects disappear. The only remaining effect is that sequential investment 
allows the seller to avoid being held-up, increasing her incentive to invest. Thus, 
if (5 =  1, < Sseq- As R  is a continuous function it follows that there is a
neighborhood for 5 close to 1 where the surplus from sequential investment exceeds 
the surplus generated with simultaneous investments. This is summarized in the 
following remark and an example is provided in the Appendix.
Remark 5.2 There is a small enough e such that for any 5 G (1 — e, 1], Sstm < 
Sseqi that is, the surplus from sequential investments exceeds that produced with 
simultaneous investments.
It is not possible, however, to establish that the relative difference between the 
surplus from sequential and simultaneous investments is monotonically increasing in 
(5. With general functions, the relationship between 6, I\ and I2 and total surplus, 
R  can be complicated. See the Appendix for a particular example.
Remark 5.3 No monotonic relationship between the surplus from the simultaneous 
and sequential systems as 5 changes.
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5.5 Hold-up and the choice of investment regime
Thus far we have considered the relative merits of the various timing arrange­
ments in terms of total welfare. The focus shifts here to explore the incentive for 
the seller, acting in self-interest, to choose the investment regime that does not 
maximize total surplus. Implicit in this discussion is the assumption that the buyer 
must invest at the beginning of the project. As a result, only the seller has the 
opportunity to delay her investment and follow-up the buyerd
There is a trade-off for the seller when she chooses between the two regimes. As 
simultaneous system encourages the buyer to invest, this may allow the seller to 
capture more surplus during renegotiation. However, sequential investment allows 
the seller to invest without the fear of hold-up. The seller will choose the regime 
that maximizes her welfare. Where her interests differ sufficiently from the first-best 
incentives the seller will adopt the ‘wrong’ system, reducing total welfare.
The seller may find it in her interests to adopt the sequential system when simul­
taneous investment maximizes welfare. She will not, however, adopt a simultaneous 
system when the sequential regime maximizes welfare. With inefficient simultane­
ous investment the seller will lose out on two fronts: first, she will incur hold-up 
with simultaneous investments; and second, she will be sharing a lower total sur­
plus. Consequently, she will never have any incentive to opt for the simultaneous 
regime inefficiently.
To further investigate the incentives of the seller assume that R 12 = 0, as in 
Assumption 5.2, and that the buyer’s level investment is invariant to the seller’s 
choice of regime.t Consequently, I\ can be suppressed, allowing all attention to 
revolve around the choice about the timing of I 2 . The seller will then choose the 
system (and the level of investment) that maximizes her surplus, regardless of the 
effect on total welfare.
*See the previous section for a discussion relating to the case when each party can invest either 
first or last.
^The buyer’s investment may be invariant, for example, because he has extreme beliefs about 
the seller’s investment strategy: the buyer could be either naive or pessimistic as to whether the 
seller will opt for the simultaneous or sequential regime.
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With simultaneous investments, total welfare can be written as
6 R - I 2 (5.14)
for the seller’s choice of investment / 2 =  / 2, suppressing I\. The seller will set J2 to 
maximize
\ r ~ 1 2- (5.15)
Denote the seller’s objective function under the simultaneous regime as that is,
Vi =  I R — I2 . This allows the total welfare generated with simultaneous investments
to be written as 2v\ + / 2.
With sequential investments total welfare is
62R ~ 0 I 2, (5.16)
while the seller’s objective function is
(5.17)
Denote the seller’s objective functions under sequential investment as u2: that is, 
v2 =  y-R—1/2. This means that total surplus generated with sequential investments 
is 2u2.
Now assume these potential payoffs for the seller are also equal so that V\ = u2. 
Given / 2 > 0, simultaneous surplus will be greater than the surplus from sequential 
investments. It is possible, however, to perturb f 2 such that u2 > V\ while it remains 
true that simultaneous surplus exceeds the surplus with sequential investments, as 
2v\ +  / 2 > 2v2 ■ In this case the seller will opt for the sequential regime even though 
total surplus is maximized with the simultaneous regime. The above discussion is 
summarized in the proposition below. An example is given in the Appendix.
Proposition 5.2 There exists a range of parameters for which the seller chooses 
sequential investments when the simultaneous regime maximizes total surplus.
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If the seller opts for the inefficient investment regime the buyer’s share of surplus 
is necessarily reduced. Herein lies how the choice of timing of investment can act 
as an additional form of hold-up; we term this new form of hold-up ‘follow-up’. 
In the extreme the reduction in surplus may lower the buyer’s utility inside the 
relationship below his outside option: that is |[£R (ii, I2) —12] — h  < 0 . In this case 
the option of the sequential regime prevents trade from occurring;* the inability to 
commit to a particular timing regime (the simultaneous regime) hurts the seller as 
well as the buyer.*
5.6 Predictions of the model
This section analyzes the optimal timing of investment. First, the section ex­
plores the relative efficiency of each regime when one investment is very important 
in terms of its contribution to overall surplus. Second, we examine the situation 
when one party’s investment is invariant to the regime adopted.
5.6.1 Important investments and timing
From effects 5.2 and 5.3 above, sequential investments favor I2 while simulta­
neous investments favor I\. As a consequence, when A is very important relative 
to I2, the simultaneous investment system is preferred over sequential investments. 
Using similar reasoning, when I2 is very important relative to / 1 , the sequential 
system is favored over the simultaneous investment system, provided both parties 
are sufficiently patient.
*Note that provided — I \  > 0 , the buyer would have opted into the relationship if
only the simultaneous regime were available.
^Of course, the sequential regime can also create trading possibilities not available with only the 
simultaneous regime. For example, the seller may not be willing to invest simultaneously because 
the hold-up that occurs during the subsequent renegotiation may leave them with negative utility. 
On the other hand, sequential investment gives her the opportunity to delay their investment until 
when contracts are complete. This encourages the seller to invest and allows trade to proceed. 
This result is similar to the results of other authors, for example Neher (1999) and Admati and 
Perry (1991).
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To see this, we adopt a variant of Hart’s (1995) definition of an unimportant 
investment.*  For simplicity we assume /i(0) =  / 2 (C)) =  0.
Definition 5.1 h  is unimportant if R (h , h )  = 6f i ( h )  +  0/ 2(12) — h  — h  is close 
to R(0 ,J2) = 0/ 2(12) - / 2 V / 1 . Similarly, h  is unimportant if R(h ,  I2) = ^fi(Ii)  + 
6/ 2(12) -  h -  12 is close to R (IU 0) =  6f i ( h )  -  h  V h-
The key element here is that when a particular investment is unimportant it 
contributes relatively little to total surplus, although the marginal incentive to invest 
for the relevant player is unchanged.* The term ‘close to’ in Definition 5.1 can be 
considered as equivalent to the statement that A  is close to B  iff A A — B.
First consider when / 2 is unimportant. Using the definition above, if / 2 is unim­
portant total surplus with simultaneous investment, 6f i ( h )  + 6/ 2(12) — h  — hi  can 
be replaced by
6f i ( h ) - h .  (5.18)
As a result all that matters to overall welfare is I\. Surplus is then maximized by 
the system that promotes the highest level of I\. As noted above, the level of h  
with simultaneous investments, I\, is closer to the first-best level than I\. Following 
from Definition 5.1:
R ( h X )  ~  <5/(/i) -  h  > R(h ,  h )  ~  <52/(7 i ) -  Tv (5.19)
A similar argument can be made when I\ is unimportant. In this case the sequential 
regime provides the seller with greater incentive to invest efficiently. There is, 
however, additional costs of delay with the sequential regime as compared with the 
simultaneous regime. The sequential regime will only be preferred if the benefits 
from the seller’s additional investment outweigh these delay costs. From Definition 
5.1 the total surplus with simultaneous investments is 6/ ( 12) — hi  whereas the
*See Hart (1995, p. 44).
*The first-order conditions for both players are unchanged from the initial problem. With 
simultaneous investments f i (It) =  |  for i =  1,2. With sequential investments the first-order 
condition for the buyer is /i ( /i)  = fi and the seller’s first-order condition is / 2{h)  =  |-
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total surplus with sequential investments is given by 62f ( I2) — 6I2. The following 
proposition summarizes this discussion.
Proposition 5.3 When I2 is unimportant the simultaneous investment system max­
imizes total welfare. When I\ is unimportant either regime may maximize total 
welfare.
This result parallels Proposition 2(B) in Hart (1995). Hart argued that when 
one investment was unproductive, asset ownership would be organized as to give 
the other party as much incentive to invest as possible. The model presented here 
suggests that when one investment is relatively unimportant, the timing of invest­
ment should provide as much incentive as possible to the other party (ignoring the 
costs of delay). As in Hart (1995) there is no need to worry about the loss of surplus 
from reducing the other player’s investment, because it contributes relatively little 
to surplus.
5.6.2 Inelastic investments
A party’s level of investment may be invariant to the timing regime adopted. 
This may result, for example, because of a binding wealth constraint. This inelas­
ticity can be utilized by maximizing the incentive for the other party to invest.
To facilitate the discussion consider the following analogue of Definition 1 in 
Hart (1995, p. 44).
Definition 5.2 The buyer’s (seller’s) investment decision is inelastic when his- 
(her) level of investment I\ (I2) is the same for both the simultaneous and the 
sequential regimes.
If the buyer will invest 11 with either regimes, the sequential regime enhances 
the seller’s incentive to invest. There is, however, an additional cost of delay. In 
terms of maximizing welfare, these two factors work against each other. As a result, 
either regime could maximize welfare when the buyer’s investment is inelastic. Al­
ternatively, when the seller’s investment is inelastic - that is, she always invests 12
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regardless of the regime adopted - the simultaneous regime both encourages greater 
investment by the buyer and reduces the cost of delay. In this case the simultaneous 
regime is unambiguously superior. This discussion is summarized in the following 
proposition.
Proposition 5.4 When the buyer’s investment is inelastic there is an ambiguous 
relationship between the type of regime and total welfare. I f the seller’s investment 
is inelastic, the simultaneous regime unambiguously maximizes total surplus.
This result is similar to Proposition 2(A) in Hart (1995, p. 45). There, if one 
party’s incentive to invest is invariant to asset ownership the other party should own 
the assets in order to encourage more efficient investment. Similarly here, when one 
party’s incentive to invest is inelastic to the regime adopted, the regime chosen 
should maximize the incentive for the other party to invest. The only complication 
here is that the cost of delay also needs to be taken into account. For example, 
if the generation of additional surplus from more efficient investment by the seller 
with the sequential regime does not outweigh the costs of delay, the simultaneous 
system should still be adopted.
5.7 Extensions
This section makes several extensions to the model presented above. First, 
we explore the relationship between the two systems when I\ and 12 are strategic 
complement or substitute investments. This allows the relative efficiency of each 
system to be examined when one player’s investment decision is highly sensitive 
with respect to the regime that is adopted. Second, we investigate the implications 
for total welfare when there is a lack of commitment so that either party can trigger 
renegotiation at any point in time.
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5.7.1 Strategie substitute and complementary investments
When investment are strategic complements or substitutes R\2 7̂  0. As this can 
significantly complicate matters, assume that 8 =  1, as summarized in Assump­
tion 5.3.
A ssu m p tion  5.3 5 =  1
When Assumption 5.3 holds the total surplus is
S = R( IUI2) -  h ~  h  (5.20)
with both regimes. For the two regimes each player will choose their level of in­
vestment given their respective first-order conditions, showm in the Appendix. As 
R \2  7̂  0, an adjustment in one investment will alter the marginal productivity of 
the other player’s investment; this will affect each player’s incentive to invest.
If the cross derivative of the investments is positive (R i2 > 0) the investments 
are strategic complements as an increase in I\ enhances the marginal productivity 
of I2- This is summarized in Definition 5.3.
D efin ition  5.3 If  R \2 > 0, I\ and / 2 are strategic complements.
Complementary investments may arise between trading parties, for example, 
when investment in a particular location enhances the value of the other party’s 
investment. Effort in learning about the specific requirements of the trading part­
ner can also enhance the productivity of the other player’s investment. Similarly, 
investing in machinery or retooling in such a way to fit the requirements of the 
trading partner can help increase the marginal product of the other investment.
First, consider the case when investments are simultaneous. As one of the parties 
shades their investment, this encourages the other party to also shade their invest­
ment. The overall effect is that both parties reduce their investments even further 
below their levels when R\2 =  0. This is the familiar underinvestment of the hold-up
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literature when there are externalities.'*  As a consequence, when investments are 
simultaneous and the investments are complementary there is underinvestment in 
both 11 and I2. This is summarized in Result 5.1.
Result 5.1 When the investments are strategic complements and made simultane­
ously, there is underinvestment in both I\ and I2 .
Now consider when R12 < 0.
Definition 5.4 I f R n  < 0, I\ and I2 are strategic substitutes.
An example of strategic substitute investments is when the two parties both 
require the use of a third asset, such as a particular location or venue, the supply 
of which is fixed or severely limited.1" In this case, the buyer using the asset reduces 
the seller’s return on any investment because their use of the asset is subsequently 
limited.
It is shown in the Appendix that the overall impact on I\ and I2 is ambiguous 
when investments are made simultaneously. For example, if the seller shades her 
investment the buyer has an incentive to increase I\. Provided that the substi­
tutability of the investments - as measured by the absolute size of R'[2 - exceeds the 
effect of diminishing returns to investment - as measured by the absolute value of 
R 2 2  - the buyer will have an incentive to increase his investment above the first-best 
level. Similarly, there can be over-investment in / 2 provided the substitutability of 
the investments outweighs the negative effect of the diminishing returns of invest­
ment (I R'[2  |>| R'n I)- It follows from the assumption of concavity, however, that 
there will be underinvestment in at least one of the investments, even if there is 
over-investment in one of the investments."1 The above discussion is summarized in 
the following result.
^For example, see De Fraja (1999).
t Another example could be a negative externality between the parties. See, for example, Pitch- 
ford and Snyder (1999). Alternatively, if the two parties both produce a byproduct or pollutant, 
the output of w’hich is limited by government regulation, an increase in output by one party limits 
the permissible output by the other.
*For details see the Appendix.
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R esult 5.2 When the investments are substitutes and made simultaneously there 
can be under or over-investment in I\ and I2, however, there will be underinvestment 
in at least one of the investments.
Now consider when investments are made sequentially. The buyer will underin­
vest regardless as to whether the investments are strategic complements or substi­
tutes, as was the case when R \2 — 0. In regards to I2, when the investments are 
strategic complements the seller also underinvests.t This is because, unlike when 
R \2 = 0, the underinvestment in Ii reduces the incentive for the seller to invest in
h -
In contrast, when the investments are substitutes, the underinvestment in I\ by 
the buyer provides an incentive to the seller to overinvest in I2 . The following 
result summarizes the above discussion.
R esult 5.3 When investment is sequential, there is underinvestment in I\. When 
investments are strategic complements there is also underinvestment in I2, while if 
investments are strategic substitutes there is overinvestment in I2.
This subsection has explored the situation when investment by one party affects 
the marginal productivity of the other’s investment, either in a negative or positive 
manner. It was shown previously that when R \2 = 0 the relative welfare of the two 
systems depended on the interaction of three effects. When the investments are 
either complements or substitutes these three effects are complicated somewhat by 
the impact each investment can have on the other investor’s incentives. The next 
subsection extends this analysis further, notably by relaxing the assumption that 
5 = 1.
+Note that when R \2 = 0 the sequential regime encouraged the seller to set I2 at the first-best 
level.
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5.7.2 Substitutes and complements with hyper-incentives
To further explore this issue consider the following specific functional form:
Ä = / i ( / i )  +  /2 (/2)+ e / i /2  (5.21)
such that total surplus with simultaneous investment is
Ö R - I 2 -  h  (5-22)
and total surplus with sequential investment is
52R - h -  SI2. (5.23)
With this function, when e < 0 the investments are strategic substitutes and when 
£ > 0 they are strategic complements.
With the simultaneous regime, the first-order conditions for each party are:
?i =  § -  e h  (5.24)
and
7 2 7h  =  -5 ~ e h -
When investment is sequential the relevant first-order conditions are:
7-1 7 .
f 1 £2 £^2 ’
and
!■> = ] - eh-(5-27)
If \e\ is small the complementarity or substitutability between I\ and I2 will 
be outweighed by effects 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3, outlined when the investments are inde­
pendent (e = 0). As the impact of e is relatively small it remains the case that 
11 > 11 and I 2 < I2 , in a similar manner as to when R \2 = 0. Further, there are the
(5.25)
(5.26)
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same welfare trade-offs between the regimes, namely that simultaneous investment 
increases the contribution to total welfare from I \  while the surplus generated by I2 
is enhanced with sequential investment. Note that, however, when R u  ^  0 the se­
quential regime will merely encourage the seller to invest at the surplus maximizing 
level given the buyer’s investment; this will not necessarily be the first-best level. 
This discussion is summarized in the following remark.
Remark 5.4 When R = f f f l f )  + /2U2) + s h h ,  provided the investments are not 
strong strategic complements or substitutes, the same three effects outlined in Result 
5.1 determine the relative welfare of the simultaneous and sequential regimes. Note, 
the directions of these three effects remain unchanged, although the values may be 
different.
Proof. See the Appendix. □
When |e| is large, the effects arising from the interaction between investments 
can lead to other possibilities. For example, if e  > 0, it is possible for the any one 
of the relevant first-order conditions to be less than zero. This provides that party 
with the incentive to invest 00; given the complementarity between investments, 
the other party will also invest 00, and the first-best will be achieved (ignoring the 
costs of delay). Another interpretation is that the first party will invest as much as 
they can, given their budget constraint. Again, this will encourage the other party 
to increase their investment. When a party’s derivative is negative, this produces a 
‘hyper-incentive’ for that party to invest. This term is defined below.
Definition 5.5 A hyper-incentive is created when the first-order condition for a 
party is negative.
Interestingly, one regime may produce a negative first-order condition while the 
other may not. For example, the simultaneous regime may produce a negative first- 
order condition for the buyer, while the sequential system remains positive. In this 
case, the simultaneous regime produces a hyp er-incentive for the buyer to invest - 
this means that this regime is favored over the alternative. On the other hand, the
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sequential regime may produce a hyper-incentive for the seller, while her first-order 
condition with the simultaneous regime may still be positive. It is not the case that 
the sequential regime is always preferred, however, as the sequential regime involves 
additional costs of delay. For sequential investment to be favored these costs of 
delay must be outweighed by the extra surplus generated from the hyper-incentive. 
The above discussion is summarized in the following result.
Result 5.4 When the simultaneous regime creates a hyper-incentive for the buyer 
it is favored over the sequential regime. When sequential investments generate a 
hyper-incentive for the seller it is favored over the simultaneous investment regime, 
provided the players are sufficiently patient.
Of course, w’hen both systems generate hyper-incentives for a particular party, 
simultaneous investment is preferred as it avoids some costs of delay.
In this subsection we have relaxed the assumption that 5 =  1 when the in­
vestments are either complements or substitutes. When the complementarity or 
substitutability between I\ and I2 is sufficiently small the same welfare trade-offs 
apply as when R 12 = 0: the simultaneous regime encourages investment in I\ and 
lowers costs of delay, while the sequential regime encourages investment in I2. With 
significant interaction between the investments the matter is further complicated so 
that other outcomes are possible.
5.7.3 Renegotiation
Hart and Moore (1999) assumed it wTas not possible for trading parties to make 
a credible commitment not to renegotiate. Grout (1984) also noted that industrial 
relations contracts are often not binding. Similarly, in an ‘at-will’ contracting envi­
ronment either party can unilaterally trigger renegotiation or terminate the contract 
if they wish.1" In this section we assume that either party can trigger renegotiation 
at any point in time.
^See the discussion of ‘at-will’ contracts in Malcomson (1997). The contracts in this subsection 
are slightly different from a typical ‘at-will’ contract environment. Usually in an ‘at-will’ envi­
ronment there is an asymmetry in the bargaining power between the buyer and the seller. For
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When this is the case, only the final renegotiation affects the distribution of 
surplus (and hence the incentive to invest). The last opportunity to renegotiate 
occurs after the last investment has been made, that is, once I 2 has been completed. 
Renegotiation will always occur at this stage because the buyer is better off with a 
new distribution of surplus after I2 is sunk.
First, consider when investment is simultaneous. As before, renegotiation will 
occur after both investments have been made. Consequently, the first-order condi­
tions for both players are the same as described above. With sequential investment 
renegotiation will always occur after the seller has invested. As both investments 
are sunk, the parties will split the surplus 50-50. The buyer will set his investment 
to maximize:
51 [ R ( I u I2) ] - I v (5.28)
His first-order condition under these circumstances will be
Ä'i =  I  (5-29)
which is unchanged from when there is no subsequent renegotiation. Label the 
level of the buyer’s investment when commitment is not possible with sequential 
investment as ifi. From this it can be seen that
7i =  7i</i. (5.30)
On the other hand, the seller will maximize:
j [ R ( h J 2)\ -  5I2 (5.31)
example, if the buyer (firm) starts negotiations and proposes a new lower price, the seller (worker) 
is taken to have accepted this new proposed contract if she continues to supply her services (labor). 
On the other hand, if the seller attempts to raise price, the default price takes precedence, unless 
the buyer explicitly accepts the new contract.
128
which yields the first-order condition
R'2 =  | .  (5.32)
Label the seller’s choice of her investment when commitment is not possible at any 
stage and investment is sequential as 12. Comparing the first-order condition for 
the seller when there is simultaneous investment (R2 = §), and when investment is 
sequential but there is no aft er-investment renegotiation (R2 = |) ,  it can be seen 
that
I 2 = h <  h- (5.33)
If there is ex post renegotiation it does not matter that the investments were initially 
made sequentially as both parties suffer from hold-up. As the buyer is always held- 
up, assuming R^2 = 0, his incentive to invest is unchanged from the usual sequential 
regime discussed above. Now, however, any potential advantage of the sequential 
regime is eliminated: the seller also suffers from hold-up with the sequential regime 
reducing her incentive to invest. As the sequential system involves more costs of 
delay, the simultaneous system produces higher total surplus than the sequential 
regime. Consequently, if commitment is not possible, simultaneous investment is 
strictly preferred to sequential investment. Moreover the ability of either party 
to trigger renegotiation at any time effectively renders the possibility of sequential 
investment (or its attractiveness) redundant. This is summarized in the following 
result.
Result 5.5 I f the parties cannot commit not to renegotiate after both investments 
have been made, the simultaneous system strictly dominates sequential investment 
for 6 < 1 in terms of total welfare as well as welfare of the seller. Consequently, if 
the parties are unable to commit not to renegotiate, the sequential regime is never 
adopted.
This lack of commitment may be advantageous, however, if the seller would like 
to commit not to adopt the sequential regime, as it provides the buyer with a lower
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level of surplus than his outside option (as discussed in section 5.5). The knowledge 
that the buyer will trigger renegotiation acts as a credible commitment by the seller 
to invest simultaneously. This may in turn encourage the buyer to invest.
5.8 Conclusion
This chapter develops a model in which two parties can invest in a mutually 
beneficial project at the same time (simultaneous investment) or they can choose 
to invest one after the other (sequential investment). It is assumed that contracting 
on any future investment becomes possible after some investment has been made as 
it allows the project to become more clearly defined. Consequently, the advantage 
of the sequencing of investments is it allows the party that has delayed making 
their investment to avoid being held-up. The disadvantage of staging is that it 
reduces the incentive to invest of the first-mover. This can also have feed-back 
effects on the second party’s investment depending on the relationship between the 
two investments. In addition, sequencing of investment lengthens the time from 
the start of the project until the returns are realized, reducing the ex ante value 
of total surplus when parties discount future returns. The relative advantage of 
the sequential versus the simultaneous investment regime depends on the precise 
nature of these trade-offs. Two principles apply, however, provided the parties are 
sufficiently patient: first, the regime that favors the most important investment in 
terms of its contribution to total surplus is preferred; and, second, if one investment 
is invariant to the regime adopted, the optimal timing of investment will be the 
regime that maximizes the incentive for the other party to invest.
Much of the emphasis in the existing literature has focused on how staging in­
vestments can improve welfare when there are incomplete contracts or when parties 
are unable to commit. In the model presented in this chapter it is demonstrated 
that, in some cases, the option of sequencing investments can reduce welfare. It 
is shown that under certain conditions a party will opportunistically opt for the 
sequential regime, reducing total surplus. We interpret this possibility as a new
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form of hold-up and term  it ‘follow-up’.
Appendix
Example 5.1 Consider the case when R(I\, I2) — odnli + fillip . Figure 5.3 shows 
the four different surpluses for both simultaneous and sequential investments when 
contracts are both complete and incompletef First note that S*, the total surplus 
when investment is contractible and simultaneous, and S**, the total surplus when 
both investments are contractible but made sequentially, are equal when 6 = 1 as 
there are no costs of delay. Second, consider the surplus generated when contracts 
are incomplete. S sim represents the total surplus with simultaneous investment, 
while Sseq represents the total surplus with the sequential regime. With low values of 
6, Ssim exceeds Sseq• However, for values of 5 greater than about 0.9; Sseq > Ssim> 
that is, the total surplus from sequential investments exceeds the total surplus with 
the simultaneous regime.
Example 5.2 As an example consider the following explicit function where: f  1 =  
alf and f i  = bl\. Here, consider the case when a =  11, b = 10, c = 0.3 and 
e = 0.7. Using the explicit solutions to each party’s first-order condition, the total 
utility generated with simultaneous investment can be written as a function of 6: 
Ssim(ö) = 0.6 1_e — ( ^ ) 1-6 +bö ( y -)1-c — ( ^ ) 1-c . Similarly, the total surplus
e 1
with sequential investment is: Sseq{ö) — a&2 1 6 — 1 6 +  bö2(cbö)~-̂  —
6 ( ^ 6 ) ^ .  Figure 5.4 compares these two surpluses. First, there is clearly a non­
monotonic relationship between S and the difference between Ssim (5) and Sseq{ö)- 
Second, the two functions cross twice, once when 6 is close to 0 and another time 
when 6 is close to 1.
t With simultaneous investment and complete contracts the first-order conditions are ^  ^  =
1/5. When contracts are incomplete and investments are simultaneous the first-order conditions are
=  Ijf =2/5 .  When investments are sequential and contracts complete: R = \ / 52 and ^  = \/5.  
Finally, when investments are sequential and contracts incomplete the first-order conditions are: 
F- =  2/52 and ^  =  1/5. The specific functions used assume a  =  ß  =  5: that is S*(5) =  
105(ln55 -  1), S „ m(5) =  KM(ln56 -  0.5 -  ln2), S**(6) = 5<52(ln5<52 -  1) +  5<52(ln5<5 -  1) and 
Sseq{5) = 5<52(ln5<)2 -  0.5 -  In2) 4- 5<52(ln5S -  1).
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Example 5.3 Consider the case when R = lOlnli +  8 /71/ 2 - Figure 5.5 plots the 
surplus of the seller with different investment regimes (on the Y-axis) against 5 
(on the X-axis). Ss -m shows two times the seller’s surplus when investments are 
made simultaneously. Sseq shows two times the surplus of the seller - this equals 
the total surplus - when investments are made sequentially. S s m̂ shows the total 
surplus of both parties with simultaneous investments. It can be seen that for 5 > 0.8 
(approximately) the seller will opt for the sequential system over the simultaneous 
option. However, from Ss m̂ and Sseq It is only when 6 > 0.95 (approximately) that 
the sequential system produces more surplus than simultaneous regime. Thus, for 
5 G (0.8, 0.95) the seller opts for the regime that does not maximize total welfare. 
Also note, in this example the buyer’s investment is assumed fixed at I\ for all of 
the functions. The specific functions used are S s m̂ (6) =  £(10 In 5(5 + 81n4£) — 45, 
Ssim{6) = £(10 In 5£ + 8 In 4£) -  8£ and Sseq{S) = £2(10 In 5£ + 8 In 8£) -  8£.
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Figure 5.3: Illustration to example 5.1
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Figure 5.4: Illustration to example 5.2
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Figure 5.5: Illustration to example 5.3
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Result 5.1 When the investments are complements and made simultaneously, there 
is underinvestment in both I\ and 12.
Proof. When Assumption 5.3 holds the total surplus is
S  =  R (h ,  h )  — h  — h  (5.34)
for the levels of investment chosen in the different systems. The first-order conditions 
are
# i = 2 (5.35)
%  = 2 (5.36)
for the simultaneous investment system, and
Ä! =  2 (5.37)
R x =  1 (5.38)
with sequential investments.
To investigate this further, replace substitute a G [1,2] for 2 in each of the 
equations, so that
# i  =  a (5.39)
%  = a (5.40)
for the simultaneous investment equations, and
R  i =  a (5.41)
S 1 = 1 (5.42)
for the sequential system. This allows the buyer and seller’s investment levels to be 
represented as functions of a: from equations 5.39 and 5.40 the relevant investment 
levels become h{a) and I2(a); and from equations 5.41 and 5.42 I\(a) and I2{a) are
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the relevant investment levels. Totally differentiating equations 5.39 and 5.40 with 
respect to a yields
A(a) 4“ — 4 (5.43)
Ä » 4 ( « )  + 4 > 4 ( « )  = 1- (5.44)
Solving this system of equations using Cramer's rule yields solutions
# 2 2  -  #
/ /
12
« 2  -
(5.45)
4>(a) n n  ■fli2 (5.46)
# 1 1  # 2 2  -  W
Note that given the assumption of concavity the denominator is always negative. 
When R u  > 0,
?,(a) < 0 (5.47)
12 (̂ 0 ^  0. (5.48)
The overall effect of moving from the first-best level of investment (when R- =  1) 
to the second best solutions given by equations 5.35 and 5.36, must consider the 
integral of the marginal changes over the entire range of a £ [1, 2]. However, as the 
marginal change is always of the same sign we can discern that when the investments 
are complements there is underinvestment of both investments. □
R esult 5.2 When the investments are substitutes and made simultaneously there 
can be under or overinvestment in I\ and I2 , however, there will be underin­
vestment in at least one of the investments.
Proof. From equations 5.45 and 5.46, when R 1 2  < 0,
For / 1 , the derivative is positive
? i(« )* 0 (5.49)
?2(a) % 0. (5.50)
1 #12 l>l #22 1. Likewise, the derivative for
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R  is positive if | R'[2 |>| R'n I* In addition, it follows from the assumption of 
concavity that l[{a) + l'2(a) = < 0. This suggests that there will be
^ 11*^22  V̂ 12 /
underinvestment in at least one of the investments, even if there is over-investment 
in one of the investments. □
Result 5.3 When investment is sequential, there is underinvestment in R . When 
investments are complements there is also underinvestment in l2 while if in­
vestments are substitutes there is overinvestment in I2.
Proof. As above, totally differentiating the equations 5.41 and 5.42 yields
« « )  +  f l iA W  = i (5.51)
Ä 2 i/i(a )  T  R22I2(a) =  0. (5.52)
Solving using Cramer’s rule shows that
T(n\  R<221l\a) — p" p" (  p" 2̂ (5.53)
f  ( \ _ ~Rl2
12\a) p" p" ( p" \2'
-^11-^22 {^12)
(5.54)
Regardless of the sign of R\2,
— 7
R < 0. (5.55)
This indicates that there will be underinvestment in R.
For I2i when the investments are complements - that is when R'[2 > 0 - there is 
underinvestment in I2 as
T2 < 0. (5.56)
When R'i2 < 0,
?2 > 0
indicating that there will be over-investment in I2. □
(5.57)
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Remark 5.4 When R = +  h { h )  +  e h h ,  provided the investments are not
strong complements or substitutes the same three effects outlined in section 5.3 
determine the relative welfare of the simultaneous and sequential regimes. 
Note, the directions of these three effects remain unchanged, although the val­
ues may be different.
Proof. Let us consider the following parameterized first-order conditions
f [ (h)  = a - s l 2and / ' ( / 2) =  b -  (5.58)
The following equation on the optimal level of I\ can be derived from the above 
system:
S n - f K T . W
(5.59)
Differentiating this equation with respect to I\ when b = constant and a = a(/i) 
gives
m
a' -  /;'(•) -e,
which means
dh /£(■) <  o.
(5.60)
(5.61)
da a' /£(■)/('(■) -  £2
Similarly when a = constant and b = b(Ii) differentiating equation 5.59 with 
respect to I\ gives
(5.62)f„n-/('(•) f,h v ) -------= b -  e,
from which it follows
d li  _  1 e
~db= b' = ¥ ^  m W 7)
When \e\ is small the effect outlined in equation 5.63 can be ignored. Con­
sequently, equation 5.61 has the dominant effect. From this we know that I\ is 
higher with simultaneous investment than with the sequential regime, and that I\ 
is greater still with complete contracts (first-best I\). Further, in a similar manner 
as outlined in Lemma 5.1, higher levels of I\ translate to a greater contribution to
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total surplus. We can rank the regimes in terms of the contribution I\ makes to 
welfare: the simultaneous regime dominates the sequential regime.
We now derive the equation on the optimal level of I 2 from the parameterized 
system
Differentiating this equation with respect to I\ when: b =  constant and a 
and when a =  constant and b = b(Ii) gives
(5.64)
a ( h ) \
d h
da
1
a' e 2 -  #(•)/"(•)
> 0 (5.65)
and
dh  1 /;'(•)
db V ~ e2
respectively.
In a similar manner as described with Ii above, when |e| is small the effect 
outlined in equation 5.66 has the dominant influence on I 2 . This suggests I2 is 
greater with the sequential regime than with simultaneous investments, although it 
is still lower than its first-best level. The levels of I2 also directly translate into its 
contribution to total welfare: / 2 contributes more to total welfare with sequential 
investment than with the simultaneous regime. □
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CHAPTER 6
Industry sunk costs and entry dynamics
6.1 Introduction
The development of a new market often involves sunk costs. For example, a firm 
may need to invest heavily in advertising in order to generate knowledge and stim­
ulate interest in a new product. Importantly, it can be the case that a significant 
component of these costs are industry sunk costs, as opposed to firm-specific sunk 
costs. Similarly, investment in research and development can aid potential competi­
tors when intellectual property rights are poorly protected possibly internationally.t 
This paper incorporates industry sunk costs into a strategic model of investing as 
a leader or as a follower.
The basics of the model are as follows. Before any firm can exploit a new prof­
itable market opportunity, a certain amount of resources need to be expended on 
either advertising, to inform the public of the new product, or on non-patented 
research. This cost is borne by firms that initially enter the market, but this ex­
penditure is a public good for all potential entrants in that, once the investment 
has been sunk, all firms can benefit from this investment if they choose to enter the 
market. The question then arises for each firm as to when they should enter the 
market: early entry allows them to benefit with fewer competitors but may mean 
they incur some of the industry set-up costs; delayed entry may allow a firm to 
avoid the set-up costs, but they also forgo some benefits by not participating in the
^For example, see Stegemann (2000), Ostergard (2000) and Levy (2000) for a discussion of 
international protection of intellectual property and copyright. In another context, Roberts (2000) 
argued that patents provided limited protection to internet companies and their technologies.
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market.
Several interesting results arise out of the model. First, consider the case when 
there are two potential entry periods. This means a firm can enter immediately or 
it can sit out of the market for one period and enter in the next period. A firm 
cannot enter the market if it decided not to enter in either of the first two periods. 
If sunk costs are sufficiently high, each firm has a dominant strategy to wait and 
not enter the market until the second potential investment period. This result is a 
type of prisoners’ dilemma: welfare is reduced by the delay in entry but no firm has 
an incentive to deviate.
Second, as the number of potential investment periods are increased (from two 
periods), the benefit of waiting at the start of the game is reduced as future returns 
are discounted. With a potential horizon that is sufficiently long, the firms will 
adopt a mixed strategy between investing and not investing in this period: this is 
a coordination gamed
Third, interesting dynamics can arise as the potential investment horizon is 
further extended, in which it is possible for the outcome of the game to switch 
between a prisoners’ dilemma and a coordination game. For example, consider the 
case when the firms play a mixed strategy when there are k periods. With an 
additional potential investment period, in the first of the k + 1 periods each firm 
will consider the benefit of not investing immediately: this is the outcome of the 
/c-period coordination game. This outcome may be sufficiently large to provide an 
incentive for the firms to wait; the game has reverted to a prisoners’ dilemma. This 
generalizes the result of Chapter 4 to n players.
Fourth, in the infinite-horizon game firms play a mixed strategy in the unique 
symmetric equilibrium. Of course, other non-symmetric equilibria also exist.
Last, once one player has entered the market, all other potential suppliers enter 
as soon as possible. This creates an entry cascade. A similar result was generated by 
Zhang (1997) when firms have differing private information regarding an investment
*Note, this game differs from the usual coordination game somewhat: it is, instead, similar to 
what Binmore (1992) described as an Australian Battle of the Sexes.
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opportunity. In Zhang’s model after a strategic delay, the best informed firm enters 
the market, and following this all other firms enter immediately in an investment 
cascade. The result in the model presented here is significant as it generates an 
investment cascade without private information.
6.2 n-player investment game
Consider the following set-up. There are n >  2 firms that are potential entrants 
to a some new market. The net benefit from entering is B  per period, to be shared 
amongst all firms that have entered.t All parties discount future returns by 6 per 
period. There are some costs C that are incurred in the first period in which entry 
occurs, where C is shared among all the firms that enter in that initial period. Entry 
(by at least one firm) is efficient in that yr^ > CC
First, consider the situation when there are only two potential entry periods, so 
that a firm can enter in the first period, enter in the second period, or decide to 
not enter the market at alld Let us show that it is always profitable for a firm to 
enter the market in the second period, if it has not already done so. Consider the 
situation when no firm entered the market in the first period. If m firms enter in 
the second period, the payoff to any individual firm from entering, evaluated at the 
time, is ~  As (I?I) > C ent rY * s profitable for every firm. If at least
one firm entered in the first period the payoff to a firm from entering in the second 
period, again evaluated at the time, is if a total of m  firms entered over both
periods. Clearly entry is profitable in this case. As a consequence, if a firm has not 
already done so, it will enter the market in the final potential investment period.
Second, using the result above, now consider a firm’s decision as to whether or 
not to enter the market in the first period. To examine this issue we consider: (a)
i B could represent profits in the industry that the firms share with perfect collusion, as assumed 
by Mankiw and Whinston (1986).
*Note that, given there are no firm specific sunk costs, the welfare outcome in this model is the 
same regardless of the number of firms producing, provided at least one firm is in the market.
^This two-period investment game has a similar structure to the bank run game analyzed by 
Gibbons (1992, pp. 73-75) and Diamond and Dybvig (1983) and Chamley’s (2001) model of 
exchange rate speculation.
143
the payoffs from entry when the firm is the only entrant; and (b) when they share 
entry in the first period.
If n — 1 firms decide to wait, the benefit to the other firm from entering in the 
first period is
sirhj+ _ B  - (61)
If the firm does not enter in the first period, all of the other firms will enter in 
the second period, so the payoff to this firm is just discounted by one period payoff 
of all firms entering
SU sr,
(6.2)
n (1 — d) n
Payoff of waiting (not investing in the first period) is bigger if and only if
(1 ---- )C > B.n (6.3)
Conversely, the firm will enter in the first period, given all the other firms do 
not enter, if B > (1 — |)C .
Now consider the entry decision of one firm when k > 0 of the other firms decide 
to enter and n — k — 1 decide to wait. If the firm enters it will get the following 
benefit
(  1B (   j \ B  C 
n (l — 6) \/c + l n j  k + l
(6.4)
On the other hand, if it does not enter it will get
6B
n( 1 — 5)' (6.5)
Comparing these two equations one can infer that the benefit of waiting is bigger 
iff
C >  B. (6.6)
From both these cases, the firm has a dominant strategy to invest immediately if 
B > C. When C > B > C( 1 — f ), the firm prefers to wait if k other firms enter but 
invest if no other firms invest. Consequently, the firm will adopt a mixed strategy.
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Finally, if B < C{ 1 -  | ) ,  the firm has a dominant strategy to wait and not invest 
in the first period.
This discussion is summarized in Proposition 6.1.
Proposition 6.1 If B > C all firms invest immediately in the first period in any 
subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE). I f C > B > C( 1 — £) each firm will mix between 
entering immediately and waiting to enter in the second period in the SPE. Finally, 
if B  < 0(1 — in the SPE all firms will wait and only enter the market in the 
second period.
If B < C(1 — £) the firms are in a prisoners’ dilemma: the welfare of every firm 
would be improved if they all could commit to invest immediately, but here each 
firm has a dominant strategy to wait, reducing total surplus.
Assume that B  < C(1 — £), so that the players are in a prisoners’ dilemma in the 
two-period investment game. Now consider the optimal strategies of the firms when 
there are three potential investment periods. In this case, the payoff from waiting 
for a firm if no one invests in the first period is the two-period payoff discounted by 
an additional (5 - the extra period of delay reduces the benefit of waiting. Reducing 
the benefit from waiting makes immediate entry more attractive. If this reduction in 
the benefit from waiting is sufficient, a firm will no longer have a dominant strategy 
to wait. Instead they will adopt a mixed strategy between investing and waiting. 
Note, the mixed strategy equilibrium is a coordination game similar in structure 
to what Binmore (1992) described as the Australian Battle of the Sexes. In this 
coordination game, players wish to coordinate to undertake the activity that the 
other players do not do. Alternatively, of course, the reduction in the benefit from 
waiting will not be sufficient, and the players will remain in a prisoners’ dilemma 
entry game.
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6.3 Switching between prisoners’ dilemma and the coordina­
tion game
In the previous section we implicitly assumed that the welfare outcome in the 
model is the same regardless of the number of firms producing, provided at least 
one firm is in the market.t If this is the case once the game switches from a pris­
oners’ dilemma to a coordination game, the players optimal strategies will remain 
a coordination game in every subsequent period as the number of periods is in­
creased.1' However, if we generalize this model to allow firm specific sunk costs then 
the equilibrium strategies of the players can switch between prisoners’ dilemma and 
a coordination game as the number of potential investment periods is increased.
Now consider the following generalization of the basic model. Let R* is the 
payoff of a player if he invests and Qk is the payoff if he does not invest; k indicates 
number of players investing. We assume that
Q n - l  ^  • • • Q i  ^  R n  >  • • • >  R l -  ( 6 - 7 )
This assumption states that benefits from investing second are higher when more 
players invest first. As being a follower rather than a leader is associated with 
sharing some additional positive surplus, the less players that invest second, the 
larger is the share of surplus received by every second period investor. Using a 
similar logic, one can infer that costs from investing first are higher when less players 
invest first, because less players share the entrance costs.
As we mentioned above, in this generalized set-up the equilibrium strategies of 
the players can switch between prisoners’ dilemma and a coordination game, as 
the number of potential investment periods is increased. As an illustration of this 
consider the following example for the three player game.
Tf 0 < k < n players invest in the first period and the rest n — k players invest in the second 
period, the welfare outcome is equal to the joint benefits minus the joint costs, namely B / ( l —S)—C. 
This outcome does not depend on k, while its distribution among players alters wfith k.
^The proof for this result is contained in the Appendix.
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Exam ple 6.1 This example shows the possibility of switching between a prisoners' 
dilemma and a coordination game when there are many potential investment periods.
Let 6 = 0.9, Q2 = Q\ = 8.5, R$ = 25/3, R2 = 8 and Ri = 6.5. Figure 6.1 
illustrates the normal form game of the investment decision for three parties when 
there are k = 2 potential investment periods. Note, that the payoff of players when 
they invest in the second period is discounted payoff of investing in the first period, 
namely Qo = Rs*
Plaver 1 ^
W
Player 2 
I W
25 25  25  
. S ’ S ’ S 8,8.5,8
8.5, 8, 8 8.5,8.5,6.5
player 1 f
Player 2 
I  VF
8,8,8.5 6.5,8.5,8.5
8.5,6.5,8.5 7.5,7.5,7.5
Player 3 - I  Player 3 - W
Figure 6.1: A three player strategic game, in which player 3 chooses I  or W.
If k = 2 and 3, the SPE strategy of both players is to wait - this is a prisoners’ 
dilemma. When k — 4, the payoffs for (VF, VF, VF) change from 7.5 to 6.075. This 
payoff is now less than the payoff of the player if he invests and others do not, namely
6.5. Consequently, there is no dominant strategy available in the first potential 
investment period when k = 4. This is a coordination game. The discounted mixed 
payoff from the above-mentioned coordination game is 6.534, which is higher than
6.5. For k = 5 the game reverts to a prisoners’ dilemma. □
6.4 ' Infinite horizon game
Consider when n firms face a potentially infinite-horizon. Here, every firm can 
choose to invest immediately (I) or can choose to wait (W). There are n+l stationary 
SPE in this game. The first involves players 2 , 3 . . . n  — 1 playing the following 
strategy: do not invest in the first period; do not invest in the second period unless
*For more detail see the investment game in Chapter 4.
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player 1 invested in period t = 1; do not invest in the third period unless player 1 
invested in period t = 2; and so on. Player 1 plays the following strategy: invest 
in the first period; if not in the first, invest in the second; if not in the second, 
invest in the third; and so on. In this equilibrium player 1 invests immediately and 
players 2 ,3 .. .n  — 1 follow up with their investment in the next period. Neither 
player has an incentive to deviate in any subgame. Players 2,3 . . .  n — 1 receive the 
highest payoff possible in this game - Qn- i  - while player 1 receives a payoff of Ri. If 
player 1 deviates to invest in the second period, she will receive a payoff of ruling 
out any possibility of a profitable deviation. Symmetrically equivalent equilibria 
exist in which some other player invests immediately and remaining players invest 
in the second period.
A stationary mixed strategy equilibrium also exists. In this equilibrium all par­
ties invest with some positive probability. For example, player 1 invests immediately 
with probability on, player 2 invests immediately with probability <2 2 , and so on. 
If at least one player invests, the entire investment process will last no longer than 
two periods and the game will end. However, if all parties do not invest in the first 
period, which occurs with probability (1 —an) ( 1  — 0 :2) • • • (1 — a n), the players return 
to an identical situation only one period in the future. In this continuation game 
the players will again adopt the same strategies. As a result the expected payoff 
of each player are exactly the same as at t = 1, however, they are discounted from 
the delay of one period. The following proposition states that in the infinite-period 
case symmetric stationary SPE always exists and is unique.
Proposition 6.2 In the infinite horizon investment game always exists a unique 
symmetric mixed strategy SPE.
Proof. See the Appendix. □
6.5 Cascading investment
Finally, consider the observable entry behavior of firms in either the finite or 
infinite-horizon game when firms are either mixing between immediate entry and
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waiting. In this case there is a positive probability that no entry occurs for one or 
more periods. However, once at least one firm has entered, all firms enter at the 
next possible opportunity, as in an investment cascade. A similar dynamic could 
exist in the finite-horizon model where the optimal strategies of the firms switch 
between having a dominant strategy to wait (prisoners’ dilemma) and mixing (the 
coordination game). Again, the industry may display no entry for several periods, 
but once entry has occurred all firms immediately enter. This is summarized in 
Proposition 6.3.
Proposition 6.3 An investment cascade can result in an investment game when 
there are industry sunk costs.
Also note, if the firms have a finite number of potential investment periods and 
they have a dominant strategy to wait until the last period to enter, the entry 
behavior of the firms looks similar to the investment cascade: there is no entry for 
n — 1 periods after which time all firms entry in the rc-th period.
6.6 Conclusion
This chapter considers the choice between being a leader or a follower in an 
investment game, where there is a number of potential investors in a new profitable 
market opportunity. They could either invest in the first period and incur some 
entrance costs or they could wait and invest in the second period. The following 
interesting results arise out of the model. First, the switching result of Chapter 4 is 
generalized to n players. Namely, it is possible that with two potential investment 
periods the parties find themselves in a prisoners’ dilemma; with three potential 
investment periods they mix between investing immediately and waiting: and with 
four potential investment periods the players again return to a prisoners’ dilemma. 
Second, the model can display an entry cascade, quite often observed in empirical 
studies of technology diffusion. Once one player has entered the market, all other 
potential suppliers enter as soon as possible.
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Appendix
Proposition 6.2 In the infinite horizon investment game always exists a unique 
symmetric mixed strategy SPE.
Proof. First, let us prove that there is at least one symmetric mixed strategy 
SPE. The following condition is assumed.
Qn-1 > • • • Ql ^  Rn ^  • • • > Rl > Qo- (6.8)
Let us find the mixed strategy equilibrium. The probability of investing p solves 
the following equation
(i -  v Y ~ xRi +  -  p)"~2R2 + ■■■ + pn~x Rn =
(6.9)
(1 -  p)n~lQo +  Q i_lP(l -  p)n~2Q\ + . . .  +  Pn~lQn-i.
The mixed strategy payoff is either the left hand side or right hand side of this 
equation, and this payoff satisfies the following condition
d * payof f  = Qo. (6.10)
Thus, our goal is to find such Q0 that equations 6.9 and 6.10 are satisfied. Note, that 
if we assume Qo =  Ri,  then from equation 6.9 it follows p = 0 and payof f  = i?i, 
which means d * payof f  < Q0. On the other hand, when Q0 = 0, it follows that 
d*payo f f  > Qo (the payoff is strictly positive by definition). Thus, there is always 
at least one value of Qo that satisfies both equations.
Now, let us prove that this value is always unique. First, let us show that 
there is always only one p that solves equation 6.9 for any given parameter values 
Qo, Q i . . .  Qn—l , R i :  R — 2. . .  Rn- Specifically, if we divide this equation by (1—p)n_1 
and denote q : = p / l  — p, we get
Qh-iiQ  — i — R2)q +  • • • +  (Qn-i — Rn)qn 1 = Qo — Ri- (6.11)
150
The value in the right hand side of this equation, and all the coefficients in the left 
hand side, are positive constants. It means that the left hand side is increasing in 
q, while the right hand side is constant in q. It is obvious that a strictly increasing 
function intersects with a constant function only once, which means that there is 
a unique q that satisfies equation 6.11. That unique value of q corresponds to a 
unique value of p.
Second, we show that value of Qo that solves equations 6.9 and 6.10 is unique. 
First, prove that the payoff in equation 6.9 is decreasing in Qo-* Namely, from 
Figure 6.2 one can see that when we increase Qo we move curve QoQn-i higher, 
and this change can only decrease the payoff given both curves are increasing. * 
Second, in equation 6.10 the left hand side is decreasing in Qo, while the right hand 
side is increasing in Qo- There is a unique value of Qo that satisfies this equation. 
Finally, let us prove that both curves in Figure 6.2 are increasing. Coefficients for 
the left and right hand sides of equation 6.9 are positive and increasing. It is a 
simple exercise to take derivatives from these functions with respect to p and show 
that the derivatives are always positive. This fact concludes the proof. □
Result 1 In the original set-up once the game switches from a prisoners' dilemma 
to a coordination game, the players optimal strategies will remain a coordina­
tion game in every subsequent period as the number of periods is increased.
Proof. Let us firstly prove the proposition when there are only two players. 
If players face a prisoners’ dilemma in period n — 1, while in period n they face a 
coordination game then
Ä! =  Q0 * d~a = R 2 * dn~a, a € (0,1). (6.12)
where Ri is the payoff of a player if he invests in the first period and the other 
player does not invest; R 2 is the payoff of a player when both players invest; Qo is
*Note, that from the previous paragraph it follows that the payoff is determined uniquely for 
any given value of Qo.
Tn Figure 6.2 we depict the left and right hand sides of equation 6.9 as functions of p. The 
values of these functions at the point where they intersect are equal to the payoff.
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payoff
Figure 6.2: Graphical interpretation why the payoff is decreasing in Qo
the payoff of a player if both do not invest; and finally Qi is the payoff of a player 
if he does not invest while the other player invests.
If in period n + 1 the game will again be a prisoners’ dilemma, then the mixed 
strategy return is greater than R\. This requires that
Using the fact that
RiQi — R2Qq 
R i + Qi ~~ R 2 ~ Qo
d > R \ . (6.13)
Qo =  cTR 2 , (6-14)
inequality 6.13 can be written as
{Qi -  R 2 * da)d > Q l - R 2 + (d~a -  l)dnR2. (6.15)
Now, let us assume that
R 1 + Q1 = 2 R 2. (6.16)
This allows inequality 6.15 to be written as
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( 2 - d a) d -  1 > <f*(d1-°  -  1). (6.17)
When n =  0, inequality 6.17 transforms to
2d > d1+a +  d}~a (6.18)
which contradicts the fact that the geometrical average is always less than arith­
metical one. To get a similar contradiction for n > 0, notice that the right hand 
side in equation 6.17 is negative and increasing with n.
Thus, when R\-\-Q\ =  2 R 2 there is no immediate jump to the prisoners’ dilemma 
when there are only two players and the following inequality is satisfied
(Qi -  R2 * da)d < Q 1 - R 2 + (d~a -  l)dnR2. (6.19)
This inequality is opposite to inequality 6.15 and follows from the above contra­
diction. When Ri + Qi > 2R2 the same inequality holds because the derivative of 
inequality 6.19 with respect to Q1 is negative.
Now the question is whether we can jump in later periods. The answer will 
be £no’ if the mixed return is greater than R\d, which follows straight away from 
inequality 6.13. Namely, we showed that
R\ > R1Q1 — R2Q0 
R\ + Qi — R2 — Qo
d > R id , ( 6 .20)
which means that the mixed return can be written as Rid~a2. This mixed return is 
actually Q0 for the next period. Thus, the same logic works for the non-immediate 
jump as well.
Next we prove that the same result holds with more than 2 players.
Let Rk denote the payoff of a player if he invests and Qk denote the payoff if he 
does not invest; k indicates the number of players investing. We assume that
Qn—l > . - . Q l > R n > - - - > R l > Q o -  (6.21)
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Let us find the mixed strategy equilibrium. The probability of investing solves 
the following equation
(1 -  p)n-1Ri + QLlP( 1 -  p2 + • • • +  P"_1Än = 22^
(1 - p ) n_1Qo +  < 3 i_ iP (i-p )n' 2Qi + . . .  + p n_1<2„-i.
The payoff is either the left hand side or right hand side of this equation. To 
show when d * payof f  < R i , let us show when this payoff is less than the payoff 
from two player game with Qn-i, Qo, Rn and R\. For the moment assume that
R2 Q\ ~  R% Q2 = ■ . . — Rn ~ Qn—1- (6.23)
In this case it is easy to see that the payoff has a maximum when Qi = Q2 = • • • = 
Qn-i  and R 2 = R3 = . . .  = Rn, and this maximum is equal to the payoff from the 
two player game. Now equation 6.22 can be written as
-  p)"-1 _  -
l - ( l - p ) " - 1 R l - Q o  '
Using equation 6.22 one can calculate the payoff, and it will be exactly the 
same as the payoff from two player game with Qn-i>Qo>-ßn and Ri. Thus, when 
condition 6.23 holds, there is no return to the prisoner’s dilemma.
Now let consider a general case when condition 6.23 does not hold. Here we use 
a similar technique that we used when we proved Proposition 6.2. The left hand 
side and the right hand side of equation 6.22 are increasing functions with respect 
to p. From Figure 6.2 one can see that when we decrease Ri i = 2 . . .  n — 1 we move 
curve R\Rn lower and this change decreases the payoff. It means that for values
R 2 — Ql ^  Rn — Qn-1) R 3 — Q2 5: Rn ~ Qn-l • • • (6.25)
there is no return to the prisoner’s dilemma. This observation concludes the proof.
□
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